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INTRODUCTION
On January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the installation and use of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend1
ment. What might appear to be a victory for privacy advocates,
however, was rooted in a concept of law that is obsolete in the
face of new and emerging tracking technologies.
In United States v. Jones, the government obtained a warrant granting law enforcement officers ten days to install a
GPS tracking device in a car owned by the wife of a suspected
1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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drug dealer. On the eleventh day, agents actually installed the
device—not in Washington, D.C., as required by the warrant,
3
but in Maryland. For the next twenty-eight days, the Government tracked the vehicle, later using the information to indict
the car owner’s husband, Antoine Jones, on drug trafficking
4
conspiracy charges. Four members of the Court joined Justice
Antonin Scalia in relying not on whether agents had violated
Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy—the test commonly
applied to the use of electronic surveillance—but on the ancient
5
common law of trespass.
Justice Scalia explained, “It is important to be clear about
what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining infor6
mation.” Such an intrusion “would have been considered a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it
7
was adopted.”
True. But the Bill of Rights came into effect on December
15, 1791. Two hundred and twenty years later, focusing on the
physical placement of the GPS device ignores the growing body
of tracking technologies that make no contact with the individual. Remote identification is the law enforcement tool of the future. GPS is only an interim step.
Consider facial recognition technology (FRT). Complex algorithms measure the size, angle, and distance between fea8
tures, enabling identification based on facial characteristics.
Paired with video, this technology allows governments to observe and record actions in public space and to recall this information for any number of reasons. Such remote tracking is
not the equivalent of placing a tail on a suspect. It requires no
suspicion of any individual; it functions as warrantless mass
surveillance. It is inexpensive. It has perfect recall. And it generates terabytes of new knowledge. As the court below noted in
United States v. Maynard,
2. Id. at 948–49.
3. Id. at 948.
4. Id.
5. See id. The five justices did not address whether the search was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Sotomayor
filed a concurring opinion, as did Justice Alito, who was joined by Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan.
6. Id. at 946 (2012).
7. Id.
8. See Face Recognition—Technology Overview, EX-SIGHT.COM, http://
www.ex-sight.com/technology.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
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A person who knows all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is
a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one
9
such fact about a person, but all such facts.

This level of intrusiveness suggests something different in
kind, not degree, from what has come before. It is quickly becoming more common.
Patents alone demonstrate that the technology has come of
10
age. Between 1970 and 1995, the U.S. Patent Office granted
11
fewer than 10 patents involving facial recognition. From 1995
12
to 2000, it issued 20 such patents. Between 2001 and 2011,
13
the number leapt to 633.
These patents are increasingly focused on, and applicable
to, law enforcement and national security, where applications
range from confirming targets for elimination and pairing photographs and data from different databases, to monitoring individuals as they move through public space. Between 1970 and
1995, none of the patents specifically focused on law enforcement or national security. Of the patents issued between 1995
and 2000, less than half were directed at such uses. But following 9/11, three major facial recognition patent clusters with direct law enforcement and national security applications
emerged: digital video (80 patents), image surveillance (35) and
14
biometric identification data (136). (See Figure 1).

9. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
10. But note the myriad problems that persist with FRT. See, e.g., E-mail
from C. L. Wilson, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., to Travis L. Farris, Janet
M. Boodro, Roy Weise, Tom Hopper & John Atkins (Dec. 2, 2003, 08:29 EST),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/US_VISIT_NIST-DHS_
Coordinated_Doc.pdf (noting low probability of verification in outdoor illumination).
11. The timing and frequency of patents was ascertained by the author by
conducting structured searches of restricted time intervals in a patent search
engine. See PRIORIP, http://www.prior-ip.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2012)
(website no longer available).
12. See supra note 11.
13. The number of FRT patents issued per year is as follows: 1995 (2);
1996 (2); 1997 (0); 1998 (7); 1999 (3); 2000 (6); 2001 (4); 2002 (12); 2003 (30);
2004 (17); 2005 (10); 2006 (57); 2007 (57); 2008 (90); 2009 (100); 2010 (167);
2011 (89). See supra note 11.
14. See supra note 11.
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Figure 1
Facial Recognition Patents 1995–2011

Figure 1: Total and in three key clusters: digital video, image surveillance, and biometric data.

Further examination demonstrates a growing government
15
market in this area. Major defense contractors such as Lock15. See, e.g., Distributed Stand-off ID Verification Compatible with Multiple Face Recognition Systems, U.S. Patent No. 7,817,013 (filed Dec. 1, 2005)
(issued Oct. 19, 2010) (describing the technology as “providing stand-off biometric verification of a driver of a vehicle while the vehicle is moving and/or a
person on foot at a control gate” and assigned to Honeywell International Inc.);
Distributed Stand-off Verification and Face Recognition Systems, U.S. Patent
No. 7,843,313 (filed Dec. 1, 2005) (issued Nov. 30, 2010) (providing same capability as U.S. Patent 7,817,013, filed on same day, and also assigned to Honeywell International Inc.); Identification of an Object in Media and of Related
Media Objects, U.S. Patent No. 7,787,697 (filed June 9, 2006) (issued Aug. 31,
2010) (pairing of audio and visual biometric identification in a mobile device;
and assigned to Sony Ericsson Mobile Commission AB); Mobile Self-Contained
Networked Checkpoint, U.S. Patent No. 7,789,258 (filed May 7, 2007) (issued
Sept. 7, 2010) (providing a portable checkpoint system that allows for facial
recognition and assigned to the U.S. as represented by the Secretary of the
Navy); Real-Time Facial Recognition and Verification Systems, U.S. Patent
No. 7,130,454 (filed Mar. 15, 2002) (issued Oct. 31, 2006) (providing a “system
and method for acquiring, processing, and comparing an image with a stored
image to determine if a match exists,” using pre-stored color values, such as
flesh tone; assigned to Viisage Technology, Inc.); Security System Control for
Monitoring Vehicular Compartments, U.S. Patent No. 7,768,380 (filed Oct. 29,
2007) (issued Aug. 3, 2010) (providing a security system for monitoring vehicular compartments by scanning and using facial recognition to identify the
driver and passengers; assigned to Automotive Technologies International,
Inc). A similar picture emerges when looking at the specific companies involved. VideoIQ, Inc., for example, obtained a patent for local verification systems and security monitoring technologies. U.S. Patent No. 7,504,942 (filed
Feb. 6, 2006) (issued Mar. 17, 2009). The company’s customers range from
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heed Martin and Honeywell International, together with myriad startups dedicated to FRT and video technologies, have
swiftly moved into related technologies. Simultaneously, government agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Air
Force Research Laboratory (DARPA), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, have invested in advanced technologies that range from behavior recognition, motion pattern
learning, and anomaly detection, to object recognition and
16
tracking.
Government forays into biometric identification abound.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, is currently developing what it calls Next Generation Identification
17
(NGI). One of its components, the Interstate Photo System,
commercial and educational interests to municipalities, transportation and
government, including the Department of Homeland Security. Customers,
VIDEOIQ, http://www.videoiq.com/customers.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
16. See, e.g., Biography of Anthony Hoogs: Senior Director of Computer
Vision, KITWARE, http://www.kitware.com/company/team/hoogs.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (listing Dr. Hoogs as the principal investigator in various
DARPA projects). Dr. Hoogs has researched extensively in the field of biometric identification. See, e.g., Kobus Barnard et al., Evaluation of Localized
Semantics: Data, Methodology, and Experiments, 77 INT’L J. COMPUTER VISION 199, 216 (2008) (acknowledging financial support from Lockheed Martin);
Zhaohui Sun & Anthony Hoogs, Image Comparison by Compound Disjoint Information with Applications to Perceptual Visual Quality Assessment, Image
Registration and Tracking, 88 INT’L J. COMPUTER VISION 461, 461 (2010) (listing GE Global research as Dr. Hoogs’s institutional affiliation); Michael T.
Chan et al., Event Recognition with Fragmented Object Tracks, 18 INT’L CONF.
PATTERN RECOGNITION (2006) (noting support from Lockheed Martin); Michael T. Chan et al., Joint Recognition of Complex Events and Track Matching
2006 IEEE COMPUTER SOC. CONF. COMPUTER VISION PATTERN RECOGNITION
PROC. 1615, 1615–22 (2006) (same); Naresh P. Cuntoor et al., Track Initialization in Low Frame Rate and Low Resolution Videos, 20 INT’L CONF. PATTERN
RECOGNITION PROC. 3640, 3640–44 (2010); Anthony Hoogs et al., Detecting
Semantic Group Activities Using Relational Clustering, 2008 IEEE WORKSHOP
MOTION VIDEO COMPUTING PROC. 1, 1–8 (sponsored by Lockheed Martin),
available
at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=
4544062; Anthony Hoogs & Roderic Collins, Object Boundary Detection in Images Using a Semantic Ontology, 2006 CONF. COMPUTER VISION PATTERN
RECOGNITION WORKSHOP PROC., available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=arnumber=164054; Anthony Hoogs & A.G. Amitha
Perera, Video Activity Recognition in the Real World (National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence) 23 AAAI CONF. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PROC. 1551,
1551 (2008) (noting applications for technology in observing “stealing, fighting,
exchanging, packages, and covert surveillance”), available at http://www
.aaaipress.org/Papers/AAAI/2008/AAAI08-260.pdf.
17. See Fingerprints & Other Biometrics: Next Generation Identification,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_
biometrics/ngi (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
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allows law enforcement to submit still images or video surveil18
lance feeds obtained from any public or private source. The
system is designed to store this data and, using FRT, to identi19
fy individuals, pairing images with biographic information.
NGI also uses biographic information to search its Repository
20
for Individuals of Special Concern (RISC). This database consists of records of “known or appropriately suspected terrorists,” as well as “other persons of special interest” (a category
21
that remains undefined). NGI further includes a Rap Back
Service, where employers can collect employees’ biometric data
and give it to the FBI, which will then notify them of any crim22
inal, and, in some cases, civil activities. This means that everything from criminal convictions to parking tickets to attendance at political rallies, captured on film, could be reported.
The FBI is not alone. In 2004, the Department of Defense’s
(DoD) Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS), designed to work with the FBI’s biometric database, became op-

18. See Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(2008),
http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/interstate-photo
-system [hereinafter Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation
Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS)], (stating that photos may
be obtained from security cameras, friends, and family). But see What Facial
Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before
the Sub comm. on Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 105th
Cong. 3 (2012) (statement of Jerome M. Pender, Deputy Dir. Crim. Just. Info.
Servs. Div., FBI), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-718PenderTestimony.pdf (“Only criminal mug shots are used to populate the
national repository.”).
19. See Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18.
20. What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties, supra note 18, at 2.
21. Fingerprints & Other Biometrics: Repository for Individuals of Special
Concern (RISC), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi/repository-for-individuals-of-special-concern
-risc (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
22. See 5 Things You Should Know About the FBIs Massive New Biometric Database (Alternet), UNCOVER THE TRUTH (Jan. 10, 2012), http://
uncoverthetruth.org/press/5-things-you-should-know-about-the-fbis-massive
-new-biometric-database-alternet; see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
ELECTRONIC BIOMETRIC TRANSMISSION SPECIFICATION (EBTS) 60 (2007),
available at https://www.fbibiospecs.org/docs/EBTSv8.0_20070924.pdf (noting
that the service will allow authorized agencies to enroll and receive notifications about individual criminal activity and possibly civil activity if not legally
prohibited).
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23

erational. By 2009, DoD’s database had evolved into the Next
Generation ABIS, a system that combines fingerprint, palm
print, facial recognition, and iris analysis with biographic and
24
encounter transactions. It stores, retrieves, and searches data
25
collected from “persons of national security interest.” DoD has
complemented this initiative with a Biometrically-Enabled
26
Watchlist. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
the State Department also maintain biometric databases and
27
watchlists. Memoranda of understanding between the agen28
cies focus on how to make these systems interoperable.
Despite the explosion of federal initiatives in this area,
Congress has been virtually silent on the many current and po29
tential uses of FRT and related technologies. No laws directly
address facial recognition—much less the pairing of facial
23. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL BIOMETRICS CHALLENGE
6 (2011), available at http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/Biometrics
Challenge2011_protected.pdf.
24. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/biometric09.pdf.
25. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, DEP’T OF DEF., ELECTRONIC BIOMETRIC
TRANSMISSION SPECIFICATION 1 (2009) [hereinafter BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE],
available at http://www.biometrics.gov/standards/DoD_ABIS_EBTS_v2.0.pdf.
26. See BIOMETRICS IDENTITY MGMT. AGENCY, DOD BIOMETRICS COLLABORATION FORUM 14 (2011) [hereinafter DOD BIOMETRICS COLLABORATION FORUM], available
at http://www.biometrics.dod.mil/Files/Documents/2011_
Collaborations/ForumReport.pdf.
27. See Government Agencies Using US-VISIT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/government-agencies-using-US-visit (last visited
Nov. 2, 2012).
28. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 8.
29. See, e.g., DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, §§ 1001–
1005, 119 Stat. 2960, 3084–86 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (creating opt-out system for expunging DNA profiles
from the national index and authorizing collection of DNA samples from persons arrested or detained under federal law); Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-405, §§ 202–203 118 Stat. 2260, 2266–71 (codified as enacted in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., codified as amended in scattered sections of 10
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C., and codified as repealed in 42 U.S.C. § 10606) (enhancing provisions for DNA collection and analysis, and providing for postconviction DNA testing). But note that in October 2011, Senator John D.
Rockefeller IV (D-W. Va.), requested that the Federal Trade Commission consider the privacy impact of FRT with a report due February 9, 2012. Brian
Heaton, Facial Recognition Technology Spurs Privacy Concerns for Feds,
GOV’T TECH. (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Facial
-Recognition-Privacy-Concerns-Feds.html. The report largely recommends industry self-regulation as opposed to legislative action. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS i (2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf.
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recognition with video surveillance—in either the criminal law
or foreign intelligence realm. Many of the existing limits placed
on the collection of personally identifiable information do not
apply. Only a handful of hearings has even questioned the use
of biometrics in the national security or law enforcement con30
text.
The absence of a statutory framework is a cause for significant concern. Facial recognition represents the first of a series
of next generation biometrics, such as hand geometry, iris, vascular patterns, hormones, and gait, which, when paired with
surveillance of public space, give rise to unique and novel ques31
tions of law and policy. These constitute what can be considered Remote Biometric Identification (RBI). That is, they give
the government the ability to ascertain the identity (1) of multiple people; (2) at a distance; (3) in public space; (4) absent notice and consent; and (5) in a continuous and on-going manner.
As such, RBI technologies present capabilities significantly different from that which the government has held at any point in
U.S. history.
Hitherto, identification techniques centered on what might
be called Immediate Biometric Identification (IBI)—or the use
of biometrics to determine identity at the point of arrest, following conviction, or in conjunction with access to secure facilities.
Fingerprint is the most obvious example of IBI, although more
recent forays into palm prints fall within this class. DNA technologies that require individuals to provide saliva, skin, or other samples for analysis also can be considered as part of IBI.
Use of technology for IBI, in contrast to RBI, tends to be focused (1) on a single individual; (2) close-up; (3) in relation either to custodial detention or in the context of a specific physical area related to government activity; (4) in a manner often
30. For a notable exception, see Hearing on Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 92 (2008)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Recent reports suggest that the FBI is engaged in a $1 billion program to create
a massive biometric database, compiling not just fingerprints, but eye scans,
palm prints, facial features, and other identifying features of millions of people. It is vitally important for the FBI to master emerging and enhanced technologies in the fight against crime and terrorism. But we must also be cognizant of the impact that such a database can have on the privacy rights and
civil liberties of Americans.”).
31. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS “FOUNDATION DOCUMENTS,” 4–6, http://www.biometrics.gov/documents/biofoundationdocs.pdf (last
visited Nov. 2, 2012) (providing an overview of current and emerging biometric
technology).

416

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:407

32

involving notice and often consent; and (5) is a one-time or
limited occurrence. The types of legal and policy questions
raised by RBI differ from those accompanying IBI.
What we are witnessing, as a result of the expansion from
IBI to RBI, is a sea change in how we think about individuals
in public space. Congress has yet to grapple with the consequences.
This Article seeks to drive the discussion forward by detailing the recent explosion of federal initiatives in biometric identification, highlighting gaps in the current statutory framework
governing RBI, and considering the Court’s jurisprudence in relation to the constitutional questions that arise. Arguing that
the current statutory and constitutional framing is inadequate
to address the new conditions that accompany these emerging
technologies, it calls for immediate and careful congressional
consideration of RBI.
Part I begins with a discussion of the evolution of biometric
technologies and federal programs. Prior to September 11,
2001, there were relatively few initiatives focused on the collection and use of biometrics. Immediately following the attacks,
resources flowed to this area. Initially, most of the attention
centered on U.S. borders. Over the next decade, the patterns
shifted. Paralleling the evolution of applications related to
homeland security came efforts to expand biometrics to government employees. Traditional law enforcement collection of
fingerprints expanded to include other forms of biometric data.
Similar systems worked their way into the military infrastructure, with soldiers using new tools for targeting, identification,
and surveillance purposes. New technologies began to extend
horizontally, across federal agencies, as well as vertically, to
state and local governments. Emphasis is now moving beyond
merely establishing biometric systems to facilitating information sharing between these databases, blurring the line between investigations and intelligence gathering.
Part II considers the statutory frameworks that potentially
apply to the current systems: government acquisition of individually identifiable data, criminal warrant requirements, and
foreign intelligence surveillance. In relation to the first, federal
32. An important exception here would be the lifting of prints or collection
of DNA from a crime scene, where neither consent nor notice would be present; such a scenario, however, is contemplated in the context of (2)—i.e., a
limited geographic area related to government activity, in this case the investigation of a crime.
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agencies have considerable, largely unchallenged authority to
collect and analyze personally identifiable information. Congressional restrictions on the exercise of such authorities generally do not apply to biometric systems. Gaps in the 1974 Privacy Act and its amendments and the 1990 Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Amendments, in conjunction with Privacy Act exemptions and the 2002 E-Government Act, minimize the extent to which such instruments can be brought to
bear. The second area turns on Title III of the 1968 Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and Title I of the 1986
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Neither statute, however, directly addresses RBI. The third area, controlled by the
1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and its
amendments, similarly falls short. It is unclear whether biometric surveillance is considered as within the Foreign Intelligence Court’s remit. Even if it is, significant questions exist as
to whether FISA’s provisions can be met by RBI. In the absence
of a statutory framework with which to evaluate the current
federal initiatives and their potential inclusion of facial recognition and video technologies, we are driven back upon constitutional considerations.
Part III recognizes that RBI sits uneasily in the Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which has yet to squarely
address the implications of these new technologies. Potentially
applicable lines of cases depend upon conditions that fail to
provide meaningful distinctions within RBI.
Part IV notes that little relief may be found in associated
constitutional doctrines. The Fifth Amendment’s right against
self-incrimination, understood as protecting individuals from
being forced to take action, fails to reach the passive nature of
ubiquitous surveillance. The First Amendment’s protection of
speech and assembly present a low bar, even where RBI may be
directly targeting political rallies. The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ due process protections key in on the accuracy of
the technology—something that may become less of an issue as
research advances.
Part V concludes with the recognition that the types of
questions posed by this technology may require a new approach
to the place of privacy in society. Instead of focusing on the
rights discourse as a framing for personally identifiable information, it may be more important to think about privacy in a
constitutive sense—i.e., as playing a role in social cohesion and
personal and social development. Simultaneously, ways of iden-
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tifying the technologies thus implicated, and of understanding
their impact, need to be developed—this, in juxtaposition to the
unmitigated embrace of new and emerging technologies and the
assumption that such advances represent something merely
different in degree, not kind, from what has come before.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL LEAP
For more than a century, U.S. law enforcement agencies
33
have employed biometric identification. Such technologies initially took the form of fingerprinting. In the early twentieth
century, the New York Police Department, the New York State
Prison System, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons became the
34
first to adopt this technique. Soon thereafter, the U.S. Army
35
found a parallel use in the national security realm. In 1907,
fingerprinting spread to the U.S. Navy and the following year
36
to the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). The use of fingerprints
proved labor intensive, requiring numerous people and hours to
33. In 1892, Sir Francis Galton published his famous treatise, Finger
Prints, establishing their individuality and permanence and offering the first
classification system to distinguish between persons. Laura A. Hutchins, Systems of Friction Ridge Classification, in THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 5-1, 56 (Alan McRoberts ed., 2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/225325.pdf. Edward Richard Henry followed Galton’s work with his Classification and Uses of Finger Prints, providing a more easily searchable system
with straightforward methods of classification and comparison. EDWARD
RICHARD HENRY, CLASSIFICATION AND USES OF FINGER PRINTS 3–14 (1905)
(discussing Galton’s work and noting the degree to which fingerprinting had
become integrated into military and civil functions in India). These studies,
together with growing interest in the topic, prompted the British Home Office
to conduct an inquiry into the identification of criminals by measurement and
fingerprints. History of the Metropolitan Police, METROPOLITAN POLICE,
http://www.met.police.uk/history/fingerprints.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
By 1901 New Scotland Yard had launched its first Fingerprint Branch, adopting Henry’s system of classification. Id.
34. Fingerprints: The First ID, FINDLAW, http://criminal.findlaw.com/
crimes/more-criminal-topics/evidence-witnesses/fingerprints-the-first-id.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (noting that Scotland Yard used fingerprinting in
1901 before American agencies began using it in 1903).
35. See id.
36. Jeffery G. Barnes, History, in THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 1-1, 119 (Alan McRoberts ed., 2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/225320.pdf; see The History of Fingerprints, ONIN.COM, http://onin.com/
fp/fphistory.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). By 1928 the FBI had similarly begun using fingerprint identification. Aviation Security: Challenges in Using
Biometric Technologies: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H.
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 108th Cong. 17 (2004) (statement of Keith
A. Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Applied Research & Methods), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04785t.pdf.

2012]

419

REMOTE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION
37

identify, catalogue, and compare prints stored on paper. Starting in the 1960s, the introduction of automated technology for
comparison and storage altered the landscape—complex anal38
yses could be completed within seconds. Digitization further
sped the number of records that could be stored and analyzed.
By the end of the twentieth century, automated fingerprint
matching had become the norm and new forms of biometric
39
identification had begun to emerge. The government launched
a number of initiatives aimed at taking advantage of the new
technologies. The National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Biometric Consortium (established in 1992) created
an interagency body to consider and coordinate biometric activ40
ities at the federal level. Most of the programs underway emphasized fingerprint and DNA as methods of identification,
41
with further interest in facial recognition and iris analysis.
Accordingly, the FBI established its Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), while the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated an automated
42
biometric identification system called IDENT. The FBI also
created the Combined DNA Index System, known as CODIS, a
computer database that integrates local, state, and federal
DNA records of convicted offenders, evidence collected from
43
crime scenes, and missing persons.
37. PETER KOMARINSKI, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYS8–10 (2005).
38. Id. at 10–11; NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11: ADVANCING SCIENCE, ENHANCING OPERATIONS 8 (2008)
[hereinafter BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11], available at http://www
.biometrics.gov/Documents/Biometrics%20in%20Government%20Post%209-11
.pdf (dating research conducted by the FBI and NIST on the automated matching of fingerprints to 1967).
39. The first patent granted for automated iris recognition, for instance,
was issued in 1994. Introduction to Iris Recognition, UNIV. CAMBRIDGE, http://
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/jgd1000/iris_recognition.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2012).
40. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 6.
41. See id. at 8. In 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
launched INSPASS, a system based on hand geometry, used to facilitate swifter processing of business travelers registered for the program. Id. In 1995,
there was a commercial release of iris prototypes. Id. In 1996, INS launched a
fully automated Port of Entry at Scobey, Montana, relying upon voice verification technology. Id.
42. See id.
43. See Laboratory Services: Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis (last visited
Nov. 2, 2012).
TEMS
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Following the attacks of 9/11, renewed interest in biometrics led to an expansion of the existing databases, the institution of new programs, and the creation of new inter-agency
44
agreements to allow for the sharing of biometric data. Like
the civilian institutions, the military vigorously pursued new
uses of biometric technologies, creating in the process its own
database known as the Automated Biometric Identification
System, with further expansion resulting in the creation of
45
Next Generation ABIS. Federal initiatives reached beyond
horizontal coordination, to include vertical integration with
46
state and local government.
A. PRE-9/11 FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT OF BIOMETRIC
TECHNOLOGY AND COLLECTION SYSTEMS
Two federal fingerprint repositories and one DNA database
predated the September 11, 2001 attacks. A brief discussion of
each helps to illustrate the changed circumstances that followed.
The first initiative stemmed from research jointly sponsored in 1967 by the FBI and the National Institute of Stand47
ards and Technology. More than a quarter of a century later,
the FBI began planning development of IAFIS, which became
48
operational in 1999. IAFIS collected ten-print images, entered
49
by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. It quickly came to serve as a national repository, allowing officials to
check new prints against the database, and to correlate the
50
prints to individual identity.
Throughout the 1990s, talks between the FBI and INS as
to whether the latter could use IAFIS for border security ex44. See BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 20, 26.
45. See id. at 25.
46. See id. at 29 (describing coordination of US-VISIT service amongst
federal, state, and local agencies).
47. See BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 8–9. It
took more than twenty years for the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) to release a national standard. AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., AM. NAT’L
STANDARD FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS—FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION—DATA
FORMAT FOR INFORMATION INTERCHANGE (1986), available at http://
biometrics.nist.gov/cs_links/standard/archived/ANSI-NIST-ICST_1-1986.pdf.
48. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 8–9.
49. See Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_
biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
50. See id.
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51

posed schisms in the agencies’ needs. INS, which was developing its own automated biometric system, emphasized the importance of being able to process a high volume of inquiries
52
swiftly. The movement of large numbers of people and limited
facilities for holding individuals at points of entry made it diffi53
cult to accommodate delays. With its operational mission in
mind, INS considered two fingerprints sufficient for screening
54
those entering and leaving the country. The FBI, in contrast,
with an eye towards criminal prosecution, emphasized the im55
portance of obtaining ten prints. The inclusion of such information, however, made searches more complex which, corre56
spondingly, took longer.
To accommodate the special needs presented by the border,
in 1994, Congress approved INS’s own repository, known as
57
IDENT. Two years later, Congress authorized further devel58
opment of the integrated entry and exit data system. This database included photographs and two index finger fingerprints,
with additional information related to the individual’s criminal
59
history.
Efforts to integrate IAFIS and IDENT’s parallel fingerprint systems repeatedly stalled on the shoals of institutional
needs and bureaucratic politics. In 1998, for instance, Congressman Alan Mollohan, the ranking member of the House
Appropriations Subcommittee for Commerce, Justice, State,
and the Judiciary, wrote to Attorney General Janet Reno, ask-

51. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration: Integration of the Fingerprint System (Dec. 7, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/
oig/reports/plus/e0203/finger.htm [hereinafter Status of IDENT/IAFIS].
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Id. Barriers to integration at the time included different operational
requirements, insufficient funds for the development of IAFIS projects, and a
certain stasis that accompanied the independent development of the two repositories of data. See generally The Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case: A Review
of the INS’s Actions and the Operation of Its IDENT Automated Fingerprint
Identification System, U.S. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. (Mar. 20, 2000),
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0003/index.htm (noting the failure of IDENT
to identify Resendez as an individual wanted by the FBI).
58. See Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-215, § 2, 114 Stat. 337, 337–39.
59. See Status of IDENT/IAFIS, supra note 51; see also BIOMETRICS IN
GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 8.
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ing straight out whether the two systems were redundant.
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Justice Management Division insisted that they were not, in the process issuing a report
considering three options: (1) to retain IDENT in its current
form, while adapting it to ensure greater integration of criminal data in the two-print mode; (2) to move IDENT to a tenprint system and to retain both in parallel; or (3) to scrap
61
IDENT and force INS to use IAFIS’s ten-print system. (DOJ
did not consider dismantling its own database, IAFIS, in favor
of INS’s IDENT.) DOJ’s Justice Management Division, the FBI,
Border Patrol, and INS agreed that the second option would be
the best one, which would have required Congress to increase
62
63
funding across the board. Congress refused. A high profile
case in 1999 again forced the question of integrating the two
systems. At issue was the capture of Rafael Resendez-Ramirez,
a Mexican citizen with an extensive criminal record, wanted in
64
connection with several railway murders. In June of that
year, two Border Patrol agents detained him but subsequently
released him when IDENT failed to include the information
65
that he was wanted by the FBI. Resendez-Ramirez committed
four more murders before he surrendered to U.S. authorities
66
the following month. Congress excoriated the Executive
67
Branch for failing to integrate IAFIS and IDENT.
Even as it developed an extensive fingerprinting system,
the FBI explored ways to use DNA analysis for criminal investigations. In the late 1980s the Bureau formed a Technical
Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods to look more closely
68
at this question. Sponsored by the FBI Laboratory, the working group held a series of meetings to address the scientific
69
challenges involved in deploying DNA technologies. As the research progressed, in 1994, Congress modified the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by adding provi60. Status of IDENT/IAFIS, supra note 51.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FBI
DNA LABORATORY: A REVIEW OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE 15 (2004), available
at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0405/final.pdf.
69. See id.
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sions regulating DNA laboratories and governing the accumu70
lation of DNA records and samples. This legislation created
CODIS, a database run by the FBI to store local, state, and fed71
eral DNA profiles in searchable form. Four years later, the
Crime Identification Technology Act provided for more effective
interstate criminal justice identification, information, commu72
nications, and forensics. The legislation established grants to
73
encourage the identification and analysis of DNA. By 2000,
the demand for DNA analysis had outpaced the federal government’s ability to process samples, leading to the passage of
74
the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act.
Outside of fingerprinting and DNA, there were some forays
into facial recognition. In 1993, for example, the DoD initiated
75
the Face Recognition Technology (FERET) program. The goal
was to develop automatic facial recognition systems for securi76
ty, intelligence, and law enforcement purposes. By 1996, the
Army Research Laboratory had moved to real-time video face
77
identification within an access control context. Four years later, DoD established its first Biometrics Management Office and
78
Biometrics Fusion Center. That same year DARPA initiated
70. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210301, 108
Stat. 2065, 2065–66.
71. Id.; see also Laboratory Services: Combined DNA Index Systems
(CODIS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/
codis (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (providing a description of the mission and
work of the CODIS Unit).
72. Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-251,
§ 102, 112 Stat. 1870, 1870–71.
73. Id.
74. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546,
114 Stat. 2726. Note that these initiatives continued post-9/11. See, e.g., Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, §§ 203, 411, 118 Stat. 2260, 2269–
71, 2278–84 (enhancing DNA collection and analysis and providing for postconviction DNA testing); DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162,
§ 1002, 119 Stat. 3084, 3084–85 (creating an opt-out system for expunging
DNA profiles from the national index and authorizing collection of DNA samples from persons arrested or detained under federal law).
75. Patrick J. Rauss et al., FERET (Face Recognition Technology) Program, 2962 PROC. SPIE 253, 253 (1997), available at http://adsabs.harvard
.edu/abs/1997SPIE.2962..253R.
76. Face Recognition Vendor Test, NIST INFO. TECH. LABORATORY, http://
www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/frvt-home.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
77. See P. JONATHON PHILLIPS ET AL., FERET (FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY) RECOGNITION ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT AND TEST RESULTS 9, 33
(1996), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1
.19.3924.
78. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 9, 24.
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the Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID) Program.
DARPA reported that the purpose of the program was to provide early warning support for force protection and homeland
80
security against terrorism and crime. The goal was to develop
algorithms for locating and acquiring subjects up to 150 meters
(500 feet) away, fusing face and gait recognition into a 24/7
81
human identification system. (This program transferred to the
Information Awareness Office post-9/11 and formed one component of John Poindexter’s Total Information Awareness pro82
gram.) At the conclusion of FERET, DoD’s Counterdrug Technology Development Program Office, DARPA, and the National
Institute of Justice created a facial recognition vendor test to
83
keep abreast of commercial developments in the field.
In 1995, the INS similarly launched a facial (and voice)
recognition program, narrowly focused on individuals crossing
84
the Mexico-U.S. border at Otay Mesa, California. The following year Congress extended the so-called SENTRI program (Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection), to Laredo, Hidalgo, and El Paso, Texas, as well as Nogales and San
85
Louis, Arizona. SENTRI rapidly expanded to the northern

79. Id. at 9, 18.
80. Human ID at a Distance (HumanID), INFO. AWARENESS OFFICE,
http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/HID.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
81. Id.
82. See GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31730, PRIVACY: TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAMS AND RELATED INFORMATION
ACCESS, COLLECTION, AND PROTECTION LAWS (2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31730.pdf.
83. FACIAL RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST 2000, EVALUATION REPORT 12
(2001), available at http://www.face-rec.org/vendors/FRVT_2000.pdf. There
have since been four occasions on which similar tests were conducted to evaluate publicly-available products. See Face Recognition Vendor Test, NIST INFO.
TECH. LABORATORY (JULY 31, 2012), http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/frvt-home
.cfm.
84. See BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 8, 23
(noting use of facial and voice recognition at Otay Mesa, California border
crossing); see also SENTRI Program Description, CPB.GOV, http://www.cbp
.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted_traveler/sentri/sentri.xml (last visited Nov. 2, 2012)
[hereinafter SENTRI] (providing a description of the SENTRI program, including eligibility criteria).
85. Inspection of the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection: Appendix II, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 2000), http://www
.justice.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0019/app2.htm (providing a timeline of major project milestones, including the October 1996 federal regulations allowing collection of user fees for pilot program). For the current SENTRI enrollment centers see SENTRI, supra note 84.

2012]

REMOTE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION

425

86

border. The highly visible initiative generated a number of
awards for the use of innovation and technology in govern87
ment.
What these and other programs suggest is that, prior to
9/11, movement within specific biometric areas, such as fingerprint, DNA, and facial recognition, paralleled growing interest
in biometrics generally. It took the attacks, however, to catapult these programs to special status. Myriad federal, state,
and local programs followed, in the process significantly blurring the lines between investigations and intelligence gathering
and giving rise to concern about the use of remote biometric
identification.
B. POST-9/11 FEDERAL BIOMETRIC AND FACIAL IDENTIFICATION
PROGRAMS
Almost immediately following the attacks, Congress made
it clear that it expected movement in the biometric realm and
88
made substantial resources available for the purpose. The Executive mirrored the legislature: the White House issued directives targeting the development of biometric technologies. Almost every major department tasked with national security
and law enforcement initiated some sort of biometric activity.
The Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice,
Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department
of Health and Human Services each created new biometric programs.
86. See, e.g., Inspection of the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’
Rapid Inspection: Memorandum from Robert L. Ashbaugh, Acting Inspector
Gen., to Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 20, 2000), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/INS/
e0019/exec.htm (listing the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, New York and Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, Michigan as SENTRI sites).
87. See Inspection of the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid
Inspection: Appendix II, supra note 85 (noting SENTRI was the Vice President’s National Performance Review Hammer Award winner—granted to
teams of federal employees making significant contributions towards reinventing government principles—in October 1996, selected for inclusion in the
Smithsonian Institute’s Permanent Research Collection as part of the Computerworld Smithsonian Awards Program in June 1997, and a semifinalist in
the Innovations in American Government award program, jointly sponsored
by the Ford Foundation and Harvard University in October 1998).
88. In addition to the statutory initiatives, discussed infra, see Biometric
Identifiers and the Modern Face of Terror: New Technologies in the Global War
on Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t
Info. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 24 (2001) (touting the benefits of facial recognition and downplaying concerns about accuracy).
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Initially, focus centered on individuals entering and leaving the United States, as well as on those working in secure
89
transportation areas. Emphasis quickly expanded to other areas, such as government employee identification, domestic law
enforcement, intelligence gathering, surveillance, military targeting, and confirmation of the identity of individuals killed as
90
part of war. The nature of the technologies sought expanded
from IBI to RBI, in the process raising a new set of legal and
constitutional questions. Figure 2 provides some examples of
the current systems, programs, and initiatives, discussed in the
ensuing text.
Figure 2

1. Border Security
Prior to 9/11, Congress enacted several statutory provisions requiring the Executive Branch to create a more robust
89. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-785T, AVIATION
SECURITY: CHALLENGES IN USING BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 12–17 (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04785t.pdf.
90. Because many of the programs involved more than one identification
technology in their design and implementation, I adopt an approach in the following section based on the purpose of the programs. At least some of the
technologies incorporated represent IBI, not RBI; however, the inclusion of
RBI-type technologies moves the categorization of the programs to the RBI
realm.
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entry and exit program for foreign visitors to the United
91
States. Following the attacks, the matter became more urgent, with increasing focus on the potential role of technology
in creating a more accurate and efficient system. The immediate emphasis stemmed from concern that the nineteen hijackers passed directly through airport security on the day of the
attacks, as well as through immigration screening during their
92
previous entry to the United States. Eighteen of the nineteen,
93
moreover, had been issued U.S. identification documents.
Recognizing potential terrorists, though, was like finding a
needle in a haystack: with more than 300 formal ports of entry,
94
some half a billion annual crossings were taking place. As for
documentation, the Department of State processed more than 9
million visa applications annually, with the DHS considering
another 50,000 requests for asylum per year, and 30,000 appli95
cations for immigration benefits per day. The question of how
to address security concerns was complicated by the country’s
economic and commercial interests. The economy depended upon the quick and efficient movement of people and goods across
the borders. New technologies offered a solution and multiple
initiatives followed.
Three points about these programs deserve notice: first,
each has rapidly expanded its reach, in the process creating the
largest worldwide repository of images subject to facial recognition technology; second, emphasis has been placed not just on
data accumulation, but on information sharing between federal
agencies; and third, even within border security, the federal
government has increasingly invested in RBI technologies to
supplement its IBI capabilities.
Congress has played a key role in encouraging the Executive Branch to move into this area. The USA PATRIOT Act, for
instance, directed the Attorney General and the Secretary of
State jointly, through the National Institute of Standards
Technology, to develop and certify a technology standard that

91. See, e.g., Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-396, § 205, 114 Stat. 1637, 1641–43; Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-215, § 2,
114 Stat. 337, 337–39.
92. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 6.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 28.
95. Id.
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could be used to verify visa applicants’ identities. The object
was to develop a cross-agency, cross-platform system for shar97
ing law enforcement information and intelligence. The legislature directed that the system be easily accessible to all consular
officers overseeing visa applications, all federal inspection
agents at the border, and all law enforcement and intelligence
officers related to the admission of aliens into the United
98
States. The legislation went on to discuss biometrics in particular, requiring the Attorney General, in consultation with
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation, to
conduct a study on the feasibility of using biometric identifier
systems with access to the FBI’s IAFIS at consular offices over99
seas and at U.S. borders. In 2002, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act took the technology a step further. The legislation required that all persons applying for
visas have fingerprints and digital photographs collected dur100
ing the visa application interview. The information must be
101
cleared through IDENT prior to a visa being granted. The
State Department subsequently initiated a Biometric Visa Program, enabling overseas posts to install the necessary hard102
ware and software.
White House interest in using technology to solve the prob103
lem reflected Congress’s approach. Homeland Security Presi96. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 403(c)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 344
(2001).
97. Id. § 403(c)(2), 115 Stat. at 344.
98. Id. § 403(c)(3), 115 Stat. at 344.
99. Id. § 1008(a), 115 Stat. at 395. The subsequent report, due within
ninety days, was to be submitted to the Committee on International Relations,
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
Id. § 1008(b), 115 Stat. at 395.
100. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 303(b)(2), 116 Stat. 543, 553.
101. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-1001, BORDER SECURITY:
STATE DEPARTMENT ROLL OUT OF BIOMETRIC VISAS ON SCHEDULE, BUT GUIDANCE IS LAGGING 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/244011
.pdf.
102. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 9.
103. Pursuant to Executive Order 13228, October 8, 2001, the Bush Administration established two new bureaucratic agencies: the Office of Homeland
Security (lodged within the Executive Office of the President), and the Homeland Security Council (HSC), which was chaired by the President. HAROLD C.
RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22840, ORGANIZING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY: THE HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL RECONSIDERED 1 (2008) available
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/103696.pdf. On October 29,
2001, the HSC held its first meeting; simultaneously, the President announced
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dential Directive (HSPD) 6 laid out the framework for developing a terrorism screening program, requiring that the Attorney
General, Secretary of State, Secretary of Homeland Security,
and Director of Central Intelligence submit information to the
104
Terrorist Threat Integration Center. A consolidated Terrorist
Screening Center Database would collect and correlate data for
use in quickly identifying potential threats. HSPD-11 subsequently established a more comprehensive approach to terrorist
screening, even as it specified that the information obtained by
105
the center take account of biometric identifiers. National Security Presidential Directive 59/HSPD-24 later squarely addressed federal coordination of the collection, storage, use,
analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic

the creation of HSPDs to “record and communicate presidential decisions
about the homeland security policies of the United States.” Id. at 2. Like the
equivalent documents for the National Security Council, the first directive outlined the organization and operation of the HSC. Id. The second, issued the
same day, detailed immigration policies, and the third such document, which
followed nearly five months later, created the Homeland Security Advisory
System. Id. Over the course of the two administrations, twenty-three HSPDs
were issued, some of which were classified and some of which were concurrently issued as National Security Presidential Directives. Id. The unclassified
documents, published in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
were neither published in the Federal Register nor reproduced in the Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Id. at n.7; see also HAROLD C.
RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-611 GOV, PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES:
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 6–7 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
crs/98-611.pdf. Upon passage of the Homeland Security Act on November 25,
2002, a reconstituted HSC, located within the Executive Office of the President, became responsible for providing advice to the President on matters involving homeland security, including overseeing and reviewing federal homeland security policies. REYLEA, supra, at 3.
104. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, Integration and
Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism, 39 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1174 (Sept. 16, 2003) [hereinafter HSPD-6], available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-2003-book2-doc-pg1174.pdf.
Homeland Security Presidential Directives, initiated in the wake of 9/11, focus
on matters related to homeland security. See National Security Presidential
Directives [NSPD], FEDERATION AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/nspd/index.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (listing both National Security Presidential Directives and Homeland Security Presidential Directives).
As of the time of writing, twenty-five such documents have issued. Id.
105. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1709 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.
gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-7.html; see also Biometrics: A Decade of
Progress Since 9/11: Maturation of Federal Biometric Activities, FBI BIOMETRIC CENTER OF EXCELLENCE (2011), http://www.biometriccoe.gov/
Resources/Online_Library.htm.

430

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:407

and contextual information of “known and suspected terror106
ists.”
Numerous departmental programs followed the lead set by
Congress and the White House. In March 2003, for example,
responsibility for U.S. ports of entry by air, land, or sea trans107
ferred from the former INS to DHS. In consultation with the
Department of State (DOS), DHS established U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), an auto108
mated system aimed at foreign nationals. In 2004, the program began integrating biometrics from non-citizens collected
109
at international ports of entry.
These programs appear to collect a significant amount of
information and, through their use of biometric identification,
generate new knowledge. This runs somewhat counter to agency claims. DHS asserts, for example, that US-VISIT is not a
single system or database, saying instead that it “integrates
and enhances” existing systems and allows for interface with
110
other DHS agencies, DOS, and others. Nevertheless, the pro111
gram itself collects data directly from travelers. Although
DHS stated at the inception of the program that it did not anticipate that the program would use data mining technology,
112
nothing in the original design prevents this from occurring.
106. Press Release, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/ HSPD-24: Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security (June 5, 2008) [hereinafter HSPD-24], available at http://www
.biometrics.gov/Documents/NSPD59%20HSPD24.pdf.
107. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER SECURITY: USVISIT PROGRAM FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHALLENGES AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 1 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, US-VISIT],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07248.pdf.
108. Id. US-VISIT is operated by a special program office that reports to
the DHS Deputy Secretary and is used by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, to whom responsibility for U.S. immigration laws governing the admissibility of aliens, cargo, agriculture, and animals has been given. Id. at 1–2.
109. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 9.
110. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UPDATED PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR
TECHNOLOGY (US-VISIT) PROGRAM: INTERNATIONAL LIVE TEST—PHASE II:
TESTING OF ICAO-COMPLIANT E-PASSPORTS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES 2
(2005) [hereinafter PHASE II], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_update_12-22-2005.pdf.
111. The information includes name, date of birth, gender, country of citizenship/nationality, passport number, country of issuance, travel document
type, date of issuance, U.S. destination address, arrival and departure information, a digital photograph, digital fingerscans, and, in some cases, unique
and individually assigned RFID tag numbers. Id. at 3.
112. Id. at 7.
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DHS, moreover, simultaneously noted that the information
113
would be shared with other agencies, many of which make
use of data mining technologies. The program, in turn, draws
114
on other agencies’ databases and watch lists.
115
US-VISIT has steadily expanded over time. Initially focused on entry data, in 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act required the collection of biometric exit
116
data for all individuals subject to US-VISIT. Implementation
of this requirement has been delayed, principally owing to fea117
sibility and limited resources. There has been some effort to
address the issue through further use of technology: namely,
embedding radio-frequency identification (RFID) chips in I-94
Arrival/Departure forms, thus allowing the government to record individuals departing from the country using RFID read118
ers mounted on posts. The system, which has been erected
along certain points of entry along the southern border, has
been less than effective, owing in some measure to the failure
113. Id. at 10. DHS shares both biometric and biographic information collected by the program with DOS, DOJ/FBI, DoD, and “other agencies at the
[f]ederal, state, local, foreign, or tribal level who are lawfully engaged in collecting law enforcement information (whether civil or criminal) and national
security intelligence information.” Id. Note that data mining itself also lacks a
legal framework. For discussion of this point and a list of national security data mining programs in this area, see Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining:
The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008); see
also Defense of Privacy Act and Privacy in the Hands of the Government: Joint
Hearing on H.R. 338 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law and the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 108th
Cong. 17–24 (2003) (statement of James X. Dempsey, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Democracy & Tech.) (drawing attention to the absence of effective legislation on
data mining techniques).
114. See GAO, US-VISIT, supra note 107, at 16–17; US-VISIT Biometric
Requirements to Include Legal Permanent Residents, LAB. IMMIGR. L. (Dec. 18,
2008), http://www.laborimmigration.com/2008/12/us-visit-biometric-requireme
nts-to-include-legal-permanent-residents. This includes, inter alia, comparing
the information from the applicant to data stored in IDENT. Enrollment of
Additional Aliens in US-VISIT; Authority to Collect Biometric Data From Additional Travelers and Expansion to the 50 Most Highly Trafficked Land Border Ports of Entry, 73 Fed. Reg. 77,473, 77,477–78 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 215, 235).
115. For a discussion of the incremental expansion of the program see U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE USVISIT PROGRAM 4 (2005) [hereinafter DHS, UPDATE FOR US-VISIT], available
at http://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0905/usv_pia3.pdf.
116. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 7208, 118 Stat. 3817, 3817–23.
117. GAO, US-VISIT, supra note 107, at 39.
118. Id. at 44.
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of the readers to perceive RFID chips in passing vehicles, and
the placement of the posts on nearby hillsides—not along the
119
sidewalks being used by pedestrians leaving the country.
The number of individuals whose biometric information
has been collected by US-VISIT has exponentially increased as
additional classes of travelers have been added to the program.
Initially, U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents were ex120
empt from US-VISIT, as were certain non-citizens. In 2006,
DHS expanded the system to include additional classes of aliens and to enable the database to receive information not just
directly from travelers, but also from the U.S. Citizens and
Immigration Service Image Storage and Retrieval Sys121
tem/Biometric Support System.
In 2009, DHS further expanded the system, issuing a new rule that extended the program to nearly all aliens, including lawful permanent residents
(with an exception for Canadian citizens seeking short-term
business or pleasure, or individuals traveling on A and G vi122
sas).
Between the program’s inception in January 2004 and the
final rule change of January 2009, the program screened more
than 130 million aliens when they applied for admission to the
123
United States. DHS claims that the program has been suc119. Id. at 46–51.
120. Privacy Impact Assessment and Privacy Policy Notice, 69 Fed. Reg.
2608, 2614 (Jan. 16, 2004); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED STATES
VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR TECHNOLOGY (US-VISIT) PROGRAM 3 (2006) [hereinafter DHS, VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS], available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_addaliens
.pdf; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT INCREMENT 2C PROOF OF CONCEPT
(2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/US-VISIT_
2CPOCCONOPSPhase1.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT PROGRAM, INCREMENT 2, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 13 (2004) [hereinafter
DHS, INCREMENT 2], available at http://epic.org/privacy/us-visit/us-visit_
pia2.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT PROGRAM PRIVACY
IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE: INTERNATIONAL LIVE TEST 10 (2005), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_livetest.pdf;
PHASE II, supra note 110, at 6.
121. DHS, VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS, supra note 120, at 2.
122. See Enrollment of Additional Aliens in US-VISIT; Authority to Collect
Biometric Data from Additional Travelers and Expansion to the 50 Most Highly Trafficked Land Border Ports of Entry, 74 Fed. Reg. 2,837, 2837 (Jan. 16,
2009) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.§ 235.1).
123. Enrollment of Additional Aliens in US-VISIT; Authority to Collect Biometric Data From Additional Travelers and Expansion to the 50 Most Highly
Trafficked Land Border Ports of Entry, 73 Fed. Reg. 77,473–74 (Dec. 19, 2008)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 215, 235). Note that most persons entering the
United States enter through land ports of entry. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
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cessful, citing adverse action taken against more than 3,800 aliens based on information obtained through the US-VISIT bio124
metric screening process. DHS, however, defines “adverse action” rather broadly—namely, denial of admission, expedited
removal, general detention, or arrest pursuant to a criminal ar125
rest warrant. It is not clear whether the biometric element of
the programs has substantially altered security at the border.
Efforts to strengthen DHS’s underlying database, IDENT,
continued post-9/11, prompting the department to issue a new
126
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). Unlike the original INS
database, which focused on INS’s area of responsibilities, the
integration of INS into DHS brought with it a correspondingly
127
broader application for the information. DHS does not just focus on immigration and naturalization; it is responsible for all
128
of homeland security. Accordingly, by 2007 IDENT had become “the primary DHS-wide system for the biometric identification and verification of individuals encountered in DHS mis129
sion-related processes.” This meant that biometric data was
now paired with biographical and encounter data contributed
by a wide range of organizations, such as U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, Transportation SeFICE, GAO-07-499T, HOMELAND SECURITY: US-VISIT HAS NOT FULLY MET
EXPECTATIONS AND LONGSTANDING PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
NEED TO BE ADDRESSED 5 (2007) [hereinafter GAO-07-499T HOMELAND SECURITY], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07499t.pdf. In fiscal year

2004, for instance, 335.3 million entered via land ports, 75.1 million through
air ports, and 14.7 million via sea ports. Id. at 7. A greater percentage of aliens, however, are processed at air ports of entry. Id. In fiscal year 2004, for
instance, only 1.4% of those entering through land ports were processed
through US-VISIT, with 42.2% of those entering through air ports and 38.8%
of those arriving into sea ports being processed by US-VISIT. Id.
124. GAO-07-499T HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 123, at 10.
125. Enrollment of Additional Aliens in US-VISIT; Authority to Collect Biometric Data from Additional Travelers and Expansion to the 50 Most Highly
Trafficked Land Border Ports of Entry, 73 Fed. Reg. at 77,474.
126. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR
THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) (2006) [hereinafter DHS, IDENT 2006], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_final.pdf. See discussion infra Part II.A.5
for more detail on the statutory framing for PIAs.
127. See DHS, IDENT 2006, supra note 126, at 2.
128. Id.
129. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE
FOR THE ENUMERATION SERVICES OF THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) 2 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_enumeration.pdf.
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curity Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as organizations outside of DHS, such as the State Department,
DOJ, FBI, DoD, “and other governmental organizations that
collaborate with DHS in pursuing DHS national security, law
enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and other DHS mis130
sion-related functions.” DHS, in turn, began sharing the information with federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or interna131
tional government agencies, as well as contractors.
The new PIA noted that for DHS’s security purposes special conditions would henceforth apply—notice, for instance,
may not be provided to the individual prior to the collection of
information in either a national security or law enforcement
132
context. In similar fashion, the opportunity or right to decline
to provide information in such contexts may be nonexistent.
Whether an individual has a right to consent to a particular use of
their data depends on the purpose of the collection . . . . [I]n most cases, because of the DHS national security, law enforcement, immigration, or DHS-mission related purposes for which the information is
133
collected, no such right exists.

Information collected under IDENT can be retained for up to
134
seventy-five years.
To assist IDENT in its functions, DHS created a biometric
135
watch list. It also anticipated the creation of new biometrics
databases that would feed into other systems, such as the
136
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). Additionally, DHS initiated a program called Secure Communities—essentially an immigrant fingerprinting program, in
which FBI prints from booked offenders are run against IDENT

130. DHS, IDENT 2006, supra note 126, at 3.
131. Such transfers are governed by memoranda of understanding or other
interagency security agreements. Id. at 9 (outlining contributors); id. at 13
(discussing contractors).
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 10–11.
134. PHASE II, supra note 110, at 8.
135. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT PROGRAM, INCREMENT
1, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 4 (2003) [hereinafter DHS, INCREMENT 1],
available at http://epic.org/privacy/us-visit/us-visit_pia.pdf. Note that the initial privacy impact assessment was published in the Federal Register of January 4, 2004, but was subsequently amended to correct a technical error (incorrect telephone number). See Privacy Impact Assessment and Privacy Policy
Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,608, 2,611 (Jan. 16, 2004).
136. See DHS, INCREMENT 1, supra note 135, at 4.
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137

to find out whether they are in the country illegally. In 2007,
the Coast Guard began submitting fingerprints from migrants
138
against the FBI’s IAFIS, DHS’s IDENT, and DoD’s ABIS.
In addition to the above initiatives, following 9/11, the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), part of DHS,
139
integrated biometrics into its immigration benefits system.
The Department created what is called the Biometric Storage
System, with the aim of creating a centralized repository of all
biometric data captured by USCIS from applicants filing immi140
gration applications. Ten-print fingerprint and associated biographic information for biometric-based background checks on
those applying or petitioning for immigration benefits are in141
cluded.
Biographic data includes the Alien Registration
Number, first and last name, date and country of birth, gender,
aliases, height, weight, race, class of admission, address, as
142
well as other biographic information.
INS’s initial objections to ten-print capture and analysis
were soon replaced (in a post-9/11 environment) by a ten-print
standard. In 2006, the State Department similarly deployed a
143
ten-print pilot program. By the following year, all State Department visa-issuing points had adopted ten-print collec144
tions.
Also in 2007, DHS US-VISIT began collecting tenprints at all U.S. airports and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) ten-prints for full search against the FBI Criminal
Master File. The same year, USCIS similarly moved to a ten145
print system for its Biometric Storage System.
Outside of DHS, the Department of State maintains two
major biometric databases: the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) and the Automated Biometric Identification System. The former, CCD, is one of the largest Oracle-based data
137. Aliya Sternstein, FBI to Launch Nationwide Facial Recognition Service, NEXTGOV, Oct. 7, 2011, http://www.nextgov.com/technology-news/2011/
10/fbi-to-launch-nationwide-facial-recognition-service/49908.
138. Biometrics: A Decade of Progress Since 9/11, supra note 105.
139. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
BIOMETRIC STORAGE SYSTEM 2 (2007) [hereinafter DHS, BIOMETRIC STORAGE
SYSTEM], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_
cis_bss.pdf.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 4.
143. Biometrics: A Decade of Progress Since 9/11, supra note 105.
144. Id.
145. DHS, BIOMETRIC STORAGE SYSTEM, supra note 139, at 2.
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warehouses in the world. As of December 2009, it contained
over 100 million visa case files and 75 million photographs,
146
with some 35,000 cases added per day. The CCD provides a
gateway to IDENT (discussed supra Part I.A.) and
IAFIS/IAFIT (discussed supra Part I.A.), as well as the Department of State Facial Recognition system and the
147
NameCheck system. It stores biographic and biometric information about U.S. persons (citizens and lawful permanent
148
residents), as well as foreign nationals. While some of the information is provided by applicants, other information (such as
names, addresses, birth dates, race, identification numbers,
and country of origin) is obtained via commercial databases or
149
public records. The data is used to screen applicants, register
150
facial images for FRT, and report on particular applicants.
The information is shared with a number of external agencies
and programs, such as US-VISIT, DHS/CBP, Army Intelligence
and Security Command, the FBI, the Government Printing Office, the DHS Interagency Border Inspection/Treasury Enforcement Control System, the DHS Terrorist Screening Cen151
ter, and others. Because the CCD is a data warehouse used to
store and process data collected by other systems and does not
collect information directly from individuals, it is not required
to provide notice of the purpose, use, or authority of the collec152
tion of information.
In June 2011, DOS issued a PIA for its Automated Biometric Identification System, a facial recognition program designed to help the State Department evaluate visa and passport
153
applications. The system is designed to recognize several photos of the same person in different databases on a scale “expo-

146. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONSULAR CONSOLIDATED DATABASE (CCD)
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PIA) 1 (2010) [hereinafter CONSULAR CONSOLIDATED DATABASE (CCD) PIA], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/93772.pdf.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 5–6.
151. Id. at 14–16.
152. Id. at 17.
153. Note that ABIS is a commercially available off-the-shelf product developed by a private company, L-1 Identity Solutions. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (ABIS) PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
109132.pdf.
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nentially larger than those which a human could review.”
ABIS incorporates databases relating to visa, passport,
Watchlist Gallery, and Passport Lookout Tracking System images, making it, according to the State Department, “the larg155
est facial recognition system deployed in the world.”
ABIS grew directly from the USA PATRIOT Act and the
Enhance Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act demands
156
positive identification of visa applicants. By 2011, the FRT
157
system contained records on over 139 million individuals. It
is expected to grow to 210 million person records by 2012, with
approximately 25 million additional records added annually in
158
subsequent years. The system was designed to include not
only face templates, but also demographic data, such as date of
159
birth, gender, and place of birth. The Department of State
notes that the retention of the information depends upon the
160
specific type of record, with no further details provided.
Interestingly, the State Department does not actually own
the system. Instead, it leases it from a private company, which
means that both government employees and contractors have
161
access to the information. As with many aspects of the biometrics infrastructure, the government is heavily dependent
upon non-governmental, for-profit businesses, subject to different rules than government agencies. Potential misuse of the
system, DOS notes, includes not just delays in processing applications, but blackmail, identity theft or assumption, account
takeover, physical harm, discrimination, and emotional distress. Improper use may further lead to financial loss, loss of
public reputation and public confidence, and civil liability for
162
the Department of State.
2. Authentication
Along with the identification of individuals traveling across
U.S. borders, the 9/11 attacks spurred new initiatives focused
154. Id.
155. Id. The Watchlist Gallery includes photos from the National Counterterrorism Center. Id. at 3.
156. See id. at 2.
157. Id. at 3.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2–4, 6.
160. Id. at 6.
161. See id. at 4–5.
162. Id. at 4.
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on authenticating the identity of transportation workers, government employees, and military personnel with access to secure areas. Most of these initiatives appear to be designed with
immediate biometric identification in mind; the widespread collection of such data, however, when paired with video technologies, allows for expansion into the realm of remote biometric
identification.
The Federal Aviation Administration, for instance, with
the support of the Department of Defense, created the Aviation
163
Security Biometrics Working Group. It had less than two
months to consider the efficacy of integrating biometric tech164
nologies into the nation’s airport security infrastructure. Of
particular concern was the role the federal government could
play in advancing technology to ensure the development of new
and effective systems. Interoperability across agencies would be
165
critical.
Congress kept step with the Executive. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, required federal cooperation with airport operators to strengthen
access control in secured areas and to consider using biometric
166
access control systems to verify identity. The following year,
Congress passed two new laws, incorporating biometric technology into cross-border functions: the Enhanced Border Secu167
rity and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 and the Maritime
168
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). The latter statute embraced the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), requiring that it contain biometric information
169
to help regulate unescorted access to all MTSA secure areas.
170
In 2007, TWIC enrollment and issuance began.
163. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-785T, AVIATION SECURITY:
CHALLENGES IN USING BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 12 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04785t.pdf; BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT
POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 7.
164. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 7.
165. See id.
166. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71,
§ 106(a), 115 Stat. 597, 609 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 114).
167. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-173, § 202(a)(4)(B)(i), 116 Stat. 543, 549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
168. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295,
§ 102, 116 Stat. 2064, 2073.
169. Id.; see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1151T, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL: A STATUS UPDATE 1 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
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In 2004, HSPD-12 required the development of new standards to govern identity cards granting access to federal gov171
ernment locations and systems. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 authorized the Chief
Information Officers Council, in conjunction with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, to develop recommen172
dations on information technology standards. The Personal
Identity Verification (PIV) standard for Federal Employees and
Contractors and the Federal Information Processing Standard
173
(FIPS 201) established standards for identity credentials and
required that biometric information be included in the PIV
174
card. A number of departments subsequently began using biometrics as part of their identity management systems. In
2009, the Department of State, for instance, issued a PIA for
changes to its Identity Management System, a database storing
the information collected from persons requiring personal ID
175
cards. Biometric information was one of a series of categories
d081151t.pdf (statement of Stephen M. Lord, Acting Dir., Homeland Sec. &
Justice Issues).
170. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 10.
171. Directive on Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal
Employees and Contractors: Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD
-12, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1709 (Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter HSPD12], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2004-08-30/pdf/WCPD2004-08-30-Pg1709.pdf.
172. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107347, § 101, 116 Stat 2899, 2905–06 (codified as 44 U.S.C. § 3603). Note that in
2006, Congress passed the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of
2006, amending MTSA to direct DHS to, inter alia, implement TWIC at the
ten highest-risk ports by July 1, 2007. Security and Accountability For Every
Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 104, 120 Stat. 1884, 1888–91 (2006)
(codified as 46 U.S.C. 70105(i)(2)(A)).
173. CHARLES WILSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-76-1, INFORMATION SECURITY
iv (2007), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-76-1/
SP800-76-1_012407.pdf. This document is considered a companion document
to FIPS 201. It covers the technical acquisition and specifications for formatting PIV biometric credentials, including the procedures and formats for facial
images. The purpose of adopting clear criteria is to ensure universal interoperability and a high level of performance. Further information regarding biometric data suitable for FBI background investigations is included in SP 80076. Id.
174. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FIPS
PUB. 201-1, PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
AND CONTRACTORS 33 (2006), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/
fips201-1/FIPS-201-1-chng1.pdf.
175. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (2009) [hereinafter IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PRIVA-
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of data that would be collected and potentially shared with oth176
er agencies.
While many of these systems are designed to address authentication at the point of access, the accumulation of such information, if then paired with sequential recording (e.g., at
multiple points of movement) or with video technologies, shifts
the underlying considerations from IBI to RBI.
3. Investigations and Intelligence Gathering
Yet another area in which the post-9/11 era witnessed a
movement into biometric technologies is in the realm of investigations and intelligence gathering. These initiatives blur the
line between law enforcement and national security. The federalization of local information impacts the relationship of local
and state authorities to the federal government. Perhaps most
importantly, these initiatives move the government into a position where it can collect information (1) about multiple people;
(2) from a distance; (3) in public space; (4) absent notice and
consent; and (5) in a continuous and on-going manner—
expanding the use of biometrics from immediate identification
to RBI.
Following the attacks, the FBI’s Biometric Center of Excellence quickly became a “hub for developing new and advanced
biometric capabilities to solve crimes and protect national secu177
rity.” Like the expansion of the INS biometric database to incorporate the breadth of the DHS mission, the FBI’s enhanced
national security role swept within it more applications, ranging from investigations to intelligence gathering, for which
technology offered new opportunities. In addition to an expanding role for the FBI, the new context suggested the need for
greater vertical and horizontal interoperability. As the FBI explained, “Criminal, Homeland Security, and Counterterrorism
missions are converging and creating a need for greater integration of [law enforcement] and intelligence information
178
among all levels of government.”

CY IMPACT

ASSESSMENT], available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/
122507.pdf.
176. Id. at 2, 4–5.
177. KIMBERLY J. DEL GRECO, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SEARCH
ANNIVERSARY: THE NEXT 40 YEARS 10 (2009) [hereinafter SEARCH ANNIVERSARY], available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-CJISsearchbrief.pdf.
178. Id. at 12.
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The first step was to expand IAFIS to include both classified and so-called “sensitive but unclassified” information in accordance with the Homeland Security Information Sharing
179
Act. Attorney General Ashcroft issued a memorandum that
stated that the Department of Justice’s overriding priority is
180
the prevention of terrorist activity. He ordered the FBI to expand its collection of counterterrorist information and directed
the Legal Attaché Offices to obtain biometric information on all
known or suspected foreign terrorists (KSTs) held by the Department of Defense and other federal agencies, as well as for181
eign entities. Biometric and biographic information from these various sources was subsequently folded into IAFIS.
These changes radically expanded the database. By 2008,
IAFIS housed “the largest collection of digital representations
of fingerprint images, features from the digital fingerprint im182
ages, and criminal history information in the world.” At that
183
point, it held information on more than 56.8 million people.
By 2009, this number had grown to at least 63.3 million sub184
jects. By February 2012, the database covered more than 72.9
185
million subjects. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the
179. 6 U.S.C. § 481 (2006).
180. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Orders New
Steps to Share Information Relating to Terrorism with Federal Agencies as
well as State and Local Government (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2002/April/02_ag_211.htm.
181. Privacy Impact Assessment: Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System National Security Enhancements, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/iafis (last visited
Nov. 2, 2012).
182. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18.
183. Privacy Impact Assessment for the Fingerprint Identification Records
System (FIRS) Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS) Outsourcing for Noncriminal Justice Purposes—Channeling, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 5, 2008), http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact
-assessments/firs-iafis.
184. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
SERVICES DIVISION, NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION 5 (2009) [hereinafter
NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION], available at http://www.search.org/files/
pdf/DELANEY-Spring09.pdf.
185. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System: Fact Sheet,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_
biometrics/iafis/iafis_facts (last updated Oct. 16, 2012). This massive fingerprint and data repository evolved to serve five functions. Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System: Five Key Services, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis_
services (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
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U.S. population is estimated to run around 312 million peo186
ple. This means that the Bureau holds fingerprint records on
almost one-quarter of the U.S. population. Even allowing for a
number of non-citizens in the database, this represents a significant percentage of the population. The acquisition of this information is heavily dependent on state and local police departments. (See discussion infra Part I.B.6).
IAFIS is not the only biometric database held by the FBI.
Even as it expanded IAFIS, the Bureau began developing a new
version of the database. Known initially as Next-Generation
IAFIS, the initiative quickly became labeled Next Generation
Identification. With this shift came an expansion in the use of
biometric technologies from immediate identification to RBI. It
also resulted in the incorporation of ever more records. The
Government Accountability Office, for instance, puts the number of biometric records in the FBI’s system at approximately
187
ninety-four million.
The problem the Bureau was trying to address in expanding its capabilities was anonymity—a condition that, from the
Bureau’s perspective, facilitated crime and created a national
188
security threat. The FBI argued, in particular, that increasingly sophisticated methods of masking identity demanded in189
creasingly sophisticated methods of detecting it. The current
technologies proved insufficient. Behavioral biometrics, pass190
words, PINs, and ID cards easily could be bypassed. And fingerprint technology had significant weaknesses: some ten percent of the population had worn, cut, or unrecognizable
191
prints. The solution was to move beyond a unimodal biometric identifier (e.g., fingerprints), and towards multimodal
biometric identifiers, such as FRT, and voice, iris recognition
technologies.

186. State & County QuickFacts: USA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
187. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-276, DEFENSE BIOMETRICS:
DOD CAN BETTER CONFORM TO STANDARDS AND SHARE BIOMETRIC INFORMATION WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES 12 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d11276.pdf.
188. See SEARCH ANNIVERSARY, supra note 177.
189. Id. at 8.
190. Id.
191. Multimodal Biometrics, BIOMETRICNEWSPORTAL.COM, http://www
.biometricnewsportal.com/multimodal-biometrics.asp (last visited Nov. 2,
2012).
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The gains from such an approach could be substantial: biometric data could be used to obtain new information, such as
tying individuals to places and activities, targeting specific in192
dividuals, and revealing movement patterns. The Bureau illustrated the point by noting the potential use of these technologies to scan individuals at political rallies, connecting persons
193
in attendance to two or more events. By deploying enhanced
remote capabilities, the Bureau could not just engage in investigations of individuals suspected of criminal or other activity,
but, together with closer ties with the Department of Defense
and the Department of State, it could perform an intelligencegathering function. In 2009, for example, the FBI’s Criminal
Justice Information Services (CJIS) explained that “[r]apid
DNA processing technology” would help to “provide on-location
DNA results for federal, state, and local crime investigations,
194
military, and the Intelligence community.” NGI would replace the IAFIS system, offering “state-of-the-art biometric
195
identification services.” The project was expected to cost some
196
$1 billion.
It is important to underscore the extent to which NGI represents a change in how the Bureau uses biometric technologies. NGI relies in part on remote biometric identification to
support investigatory and intelligence-gathering functions and
thus represents something different in kind from what has
been used before.
NGI itself includes seven components. (See Figure 2). Each
component is itself substantial and involves associating biometric information with biographic data, providing a fuller picture of the target in question and allowing for the generation of
new knowledge about individuals.
The first NGI program, Advanced Fingerprint Identifica197
tion Technology (AFIT), replaced IAFIS with an automated
facial recognition search capability, as well as a broader range
of data (such as name, address, social security number, telephone number, e-mail address, photograph, or other unique
192. SEARCH ANNIVERSARY, supra note 177, at 6.
193. See id. at 5–7.
194. Id. at 9.
195. Id. at 10.
196. Sternstein, supra note 137.
197. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CJIS ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about
-us/cjis/annual-report-2011/annual-report-2011.
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identifying number, code, or characteristic) which, when combined, indirectly identify an individual (such as a combination
of gender, race, birth date, geographic indicator, license number, vehicle identifier including license plate, and other de198
scriptors). Under the new program, information can be obtained from federal, state, or local government entities,
199
commercial data aggregators, or other private actors.
AFIT has been given a functionality that previously did not
exist within IAFIS: rapid fingerprint search of what is called
the Repository for Individuals of Special Concern. According to
the FBI, this database will be populated by records of “Known
200
and Suspected Terrorists” (echoing HSPD-24) as well as “oth201
er persons of special interest.” The Bureau does not explain
what is meant by “Suspected Terrorists,” nor does it publicly
define individuals of “special interest”—a seemingly unlimited
202
category. Both fingerprint and facial recognition capabilities
203
are included. Under development is the system’s relationship
204
to something called the International Terrorist File.

198. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18.
199. Id.
200. HSPD-24, supra note 106.
201. CRIM. JUST. INFO. SERVICES DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, (2009) [hereinafter NEXT GENERATION
IDENTIFICATION, http://www.biometriccoe.gov/_doc/FBI_CJIS_0209_NGI_One
Pager020409.pdf. A PIA released in July 2012 explains that its purpose is “to
identify persons who present special risks to the public or law enforcement
personnel or heightened investigative interest.” Privacy Impact Assessment,
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)/Next Generation Identification (NGI) Repository for Individuals of Special Concern (RISC),
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact
-assessments/iafis-ngi-risc (last visited Nov. 2, 2012), [hereinafter RISC PIA].
202. See also CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DOCUMENT FOR THE REPOSITORY
FOR INDIVIDUALS OF SPECIAL CONCERN (RISC) PILOT PROJECT 9 (2010), available at https://www.fbibiospecs.org/docs/RISC_Pilot_Technical_Specifications_
Document_3.0.pdf (declining to define the term “special concern” and instead
simply stating that the aim of the RISC pilot is “to provide the capability to
receive and store biographic and fingerprint information associated with individuals marked as special concern”). The PIA for the program specifically contemplates further expansion, to include categories such as missing persons or
protection order subjects that have associated biometrics; in such a case, the
PIA would be annotated to reflect further additions of categories of records.
RISC PIA, supra note 201.
203. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV.,
supra note 202, at 19–22.
204. Id. at 13, 25–26.
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Domestic as well as foreign agencies provide names and in205
formation for the RISC database. For the former, local law
enforcement serves as the front line of intelligence collection ef206
forts. RISC essentially allows police officers to use mobile devices to obtain thousands of fingerprints to then run them
207
against the database. Within seconds, the officer will receive
a response—and the agency which first entered the biometric
208
information into the database will be informed of a hit. Pilot
state programs have been run by Ohio, Florida, Maryland,
209
Georgia, and Texas. Government Computer News reported
that the system began operating in March 2011; by August
2011, it had begun supporting 18,000 law enforcement agen210
cies. In 2011, the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment reported to Congress that the database, comprised of “the worst of the worst,” had expanded to include
211
some 1.2 million fingerprint records.
The second capability incorporated into NGI is what is
212
called a “Rap Back Service.” This function provides for private and public employers to enroll employees in the program,
at which point the FBI will collect the employees’ biometric da213
ta. The gathering of IBI is paired with RBI: employers will
205. Id. at 9.
206. RISC PIA, supra note 201 (“This information will have been collected
and submitted to the FBI by federal, state, local, tribal and some foreign agencies and instrumentalities incident to their lawful mission.”).
207. Id. (“The fingerprints will be captured by a mobile fingerprint device
and transmitted wirelessly to the user agency’s existing criminal justice infrastructure, then on to the RISC.”).
208. Id.; see also Alice Lipowicz, FBI Mobile Fingerprint System Puts Criminals at RISC, GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS, Aug. 26, 2011, http://gcn.com/articles/
2011/08/25/fbi-fingerprint-check-system-national-database-mobile.aspx.
209. INFO. SHARING ENV’T, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 70 (2011),
available at http://www.nctc.gov/itacg/docs/ISE-Annual-Report-to-Congress
-2011.pdf; see also William M. Kalaf, Arizona Law Enforcement Biometrics
Identification and Information Sharing Technology Framework 16 (Mar. 2010)
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available at http://
www.hsdl.org/?view&did=27191 (listing Ohio, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota
as running RISC pilot programs).
210. Lipowicz, supra note 208.
211. INFO. SHARING ENV’T, supra note 209, at 70. By June 13, 2011, more
than 75,000 total live queries had been submitted, yielding more than 1,300
hits. Id.
212. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics, WASH.
POST, Dec. 22, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/12/21/AR2007122102544.html (providing a brief overview of the Rap
Bank Service).
213. Id. (“[E]mployers could ask the FBI to keep employees’ fingerprints in
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subsequently be notified by the Bureau “of criminal and, in limited cases, civil activity of enrolled individuals that occurs after
the initial processing and retention of criminal or civil finger214
print transactions.” Notably, this includes both criminal and
civil activities—activities that could relate to otherwise protected First Amendment activities. It essentially expands the
biometric data collected by the FBI and creates a reportingback mechanism that may take account of everything from attendance at political rallies, to parking violations, to formal
215
charges related to serious crimes.
The third function of NGI relates to Disposition Reporting
Improvements (DRI). NGI DRI are designed to provide a more
complete criminal history database. This system appears to incorporate the Interstate Identification Index into the FBI Iden216
tification Records.
A fourth NGI initiative creates a new National Palm Print
System, which complements the fingerprint system by populating a parallel database with known and unknown palm
217
prints. Criminal and noncriminal justice agencies across the
country will be able to search the database, as well as use la218
tent palm prints to search the data repository.
An Enhanced IAFIS Repository (EIR) provides the fifth aspect of NGI. This capability will create compatibility between
existing civil and criminal data bases, and ensure that the Bu-

the database, subject to state privacy laws, so that if [sic] employees are ever
arrested or charged with a crime, the employers would be notified.”).
214. 5 Things You Should Know About the FBI’s Massive New Biometric
Database (Alternet), UNCOVER THE TRUTH (2012), http://uncoverthetruth.org/
category/foia-documents/page/2 (quoting FBI document that describes features
of the Rap Back Service).
215. Id. No PIA is yet available from the FBI in regard to the Rap Back
Service.
216. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 (2006), available at http://www
.justice.gov/olp/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) maintains a criminal history record repository, known as the Interstate
Identification Index (III or ‘Triple I’) system, that contains records from all
states and territories, as well as from federal and international criminal justice agencies.”).
217. Next Generation Identification, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Nov.
2, 2012).
218. Id.
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reau can conduct what is called single identity management.
According to the Bureau, “[t]he EIR will support the search and
retrieval services for new biometric modalities, to include the
iris, and provide administrative functions for special population
220
files.” Precisely what these functions are, or who constitute
221
the special population, is not spelled out.
The sixth NGI program centers on iris recognition. This
technology will allow the government to search a nationwide
222
database of iris scans to quickly identify persons “of interest.”
The FBI has made almost no information available about details of this program—such as the distance at which iris technologies could work (although private industry reports developing iris scans at a distance with the assistance of government
grants, even as commercial systems are now available that
223
claim accuracy two or more meters from the target). Nor is
there any information about how this database will be populated, by whom, or how the information is to be kept, used, and
shared. No PIAs have yet issued.
The seventh component, and one of the most important aspects of NGI for remote biometric identification, is the Interstate Photo System (IPS). This project draws heavily on FRT
219. NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 201 (“The EIR capability will allow compatibility between existing civil and criminal repositories
as well as new repositories by providing single identity management.”).
220. Id.
221. Id. (mentioning only Rap Back Service features).
222. See Matt Bewig, FBI Prepares Billion-Dollar Iris Recognition Database, ALLGOV (July 8, 2012), http://www.allgov.com/news/where-is-the-money
-going/fbi-prepares-billion-dollar-iris-recognition-database?news=844739
(“[T]he FBI plans to test a nationwide database for searching iris scans to
more quickly identify persons ‘of interest’ to the government.”).
223. See, e.g., Charlie Leocha, New Iris Scanning System Scans 30 Passengers per Minute at a Distance, CONSUMER TRAVELER (Apr. 26, 2010), http://
www.consumertraveler.com/today/new-iris-scanning-system-scans-30-passen
gers-per-minute-at-a-distance (reporting that Sarnoff Corporation won “Best
New Product Award and Best Biometrics and Identity Solution at the Security
Industry Association New Product Showcase” for a system allowing remote iris
scanning and explaining that “[t]his technology was developed under a government grant to create an iris recognition at a distance solution”); Tom
Olzak, The Future of Iris Scanning, TECH REPUBLIC (July 6, 2010), http://
www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/the-future-of-iris-scanning/3978
(citing
Sarnoff’s Iris On The Move (IOM) scanning system); see also Registered Traveler Programs, AOPTIX TECH., http://www.aoptix.com/identity-solutions/high
-throughput/applications/registered-traveler-programs (last visited Nov. 2,
2012) (technology allows remote iris scans at a distance of two meters); HUMAN RECOGNITION SYS., http://www.hrsid.com/mflow (last visited Nov. 2,
2012) (technology allowing for passage through airports).
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and data mining technologies—and the database on which it is
224
built is rapidly growing. As of 2009, IAFIS included more
225
than 6.75 million photos. By February 2012, this number had
226
increased to more than 114.5 million photos. This number is
227
expected to increase substantially.
Three factors (in addition to the sheer power of new technologies) are influencing the rapid expansion of this database.
First, NGI IPS incorporates media obtained not just from law
enforcement, but from private businesses, social networking
sites, government agencies, and foreign and international entities, as well as individuals such as acquaintances, friends, and
228
family members. This means that data derives from more
sources. Second, as a structural matter, many of the limits previously placed on the collection of photos have been eliminat229
ed. There are fewer restrictions, for instance, on the number
of photos that can be submitted, new provisions to allow for
bulk transfers of photos, new technologies to provide for the incorporation of video surveillance feeds, and new ways to submit
230
descriptions of personal features. These enhancements, “al224. NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 184, at 19−20.
225. Id. at 5.
226. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System: Fact Sheet,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis_facts.
227. See NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 184, at 19–20, 30
(noting the new functionality of allowing for the bulk submission of photos and
the aim of providing law enforcement with “a large scale facial recognition investigative tool”).
228. The program’s PIA explains that images will be obtained not just from
law enforcement, but “from other sources (such as security cameras, friends,
family) . . . . Authorized noncriminal justice agencies and entities will be permitted to submit civil photographs along with civil fingerprint submissions
that were collected for noncriminal purposes. . . . Selected foreign and international agencies may similarly contribute criminal and civil photo submissions
for retention in the NGI IPS.” Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next
Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18,
at § 1.2.1.
229. Id. §§ 1.6, 1.7, 2.3.
230. See id.; Stan Shyshkin, The FBI’s Biometric Recognition System Is
Now a Reality, BRICKHOUSE SECURITY (Oct. 12, 2011), http://blog.brickhouse
security.com/2011/10/12/fbis-biometric-recognition-system. Specifically, enhancements include eliminating the restriction of ten photo sets per FBI record, allowing the submission of photos with all arrests supported by fingerprints and/or an FBI number/Universal Control Number (FNU/UCN),
allowing bulk submission of photos linked with FNUs/UCNs, allowing submission of photos with civil types of transactions, allowing submission of photos
other than facial, allowing investigative search of photos using biographical
criteria, and providing an automated facial recognition search capability. Pri-
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low more photos to be retained in the system[,] . . . allow
searches using better physical descriptor algorithms and facial
recognition technology, and . . . allow more direct retrieval of
231
such photos by an authorized requestor.” Third, a broader
range of information qualifies for inclusion. That is, the media
initially submitted may not, at first, provide identification related to arrest or conviction—instead, it may be merely contex232
tual data that can subsequently be mined for information.
The FBI explains:
IAFIS currently can collect and retain latent fingerprints from as
yet unidentified individuals associated with criminal activity or otherwise having a lawful investigative or national security interest
(such as fingerprints lifted from a crime scene). NGI IPS will also add
an analogous functionality to collect and retain other images (such as
those obtained from crime scene security cameras). Even though such
images may not initially suffice to identify the particular individual in
question, the images may later serve to directly or indirectly identify
233
the individual if supplemental identifying information is located.

The functionality of IPS is broader than the specific example
provided. It is not just security cameras at the scene of a crime
contributing data, but information from civil agencies, social
network sites, private entities, and the like. By populating the
database in this manner, photos and footage that may not initially be linked to a particular individual may be maintained in
a common photo file and later associated with an identified in234
dividual. Subjects included in the database may be unaware
that their image or actions were even recorded—much less then
235
fed into the system.
vacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18, at §§ 1.4, 1.7; see also Shyshkin,
supra.
231. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18.
232. See id.
233. Id. The system is not to be used for data mining to discern, “previously
unknown or predictive patterns,” but rather in relation to specific queries. Id.
234. See NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 184, at 19; Privacy
Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18 (“Photos which upon submission cannot be sufficiently linked to a particular identity will be maintained in a common photo file, though they may later be associated with an identified
individual’s file if determined to be related.”).
235. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18 (noting that individuals may not be provided direct notice of collection of information incident to
law enforcement response” to their possible involvement in criminal activities).
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The FBI acknowledges that biometric technology, since its
emergence in the 1960s, had been plagued by inaccuracy and
236
technological challenges. Recent studies by the National Research Council of the National Academies underscore this concern: “[N]o biometric characteristic, including DNA, is known to
be capable of reliably correct individualization over the size of
237
the world’s population.” Combined with problems due to environmental factors, injury, illness, data integrity, image quality,
and the like, systems relying on biometric identification are
238
bound to exhibit a high rate of error. The question, however,
is not whether the Bureau will make broader use of biometrics,
239
but how soon it can be deployed. The FBI is planning for a
nationwide release of the system to all criminal justice profes240
sionals in 2014. The system is being developed by private
241
contractors Lockheed Martin and Security Solutions.
236. See infra notes 822−32.
237. COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMMS. BD., BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 30 (Joseph N. Pato & Lynette I. Millett, eds., National Research Council of the National Academies 2010), available at http://
www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12720&page=R1.
238. Id. at 1−14.
239. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18 (“The FBI thus considers that incorporation of this technology into IAFIS promises to provide substantial benefits to law enforcement and national security, but that at the
same time any facial recognition capability must be carefully assessed and
tested prior to implementation to ensure that [it] is sufficiently reliable to provide the desired benefits and minimize erroneous identifications.”). NGI is being implemented in phases. In January 2012, the system will be used in Michigan, Washington, Florida, and North Carolina. Shyshkin, supra note 230;
Sternstein, supra note 137.
240. Shyshkin, supra note 230.
241. D.J. Pangburn, FBI Introduces Next Generation Facial Recognition
Technology, DEATH & TAXES, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.deathandtaxesmag
.com/152857/fbi-introduces-next-generation-facial-recognition-technology;
Sternstein, supra note 137. Note that privacy advocates have come out strongly against NGI. The Electronic Frontier Foundation argues that it “will result
in a massive expansion of government data collection for both criminal and
noncriminal purposes.” Jennifer Lynch, FBI Ramps Up Next Generation ID
Roll-Out—Will You End Up in the Database?, ELECT. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct.
19, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/fbi-ramps-its-next-generation
-identification-roll-out-winter-will-your-image-end. Concern turns in part on
the fact that individuals engaged in a range of otherwise constitutionallyprotected activities could be swept up into the database. Pangburn, supra note
241. A staff attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights points out that
“‘[t]he federal government is using local cops to create a massive surveillance
system.’” Kerry McQueeney, Face Recognition Software to Be Launched by FBI
to Help Police Catch Wanted Criminals, DAILY MAILONLINE (Oct. 8, 2011, 8:47
AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2046780/Face-recognition-soft
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NGI is not the Bureau’s only biometric initiative. The FBI’s
Biometric Center of Excellence (created post-9/11 and housed at
the Bureau) has various other projects underway. Like DHS
and the State Department, DOJ is emphasizing the importance
242
of information sharing. The FBI, for instance, collaborated on
the Action Plan implementing HSPD-24, which formalized the
sharing of this information with federal, state, and local enti243
ties. Nevertheless, NGI presents perhaps the clearest example of how technologies otherwise employed for immediate biometric identification purposes are now transforming into
remote biometric identification systems.
4. Military Applications
The use of biometrics has quickly moved beyond civilian
applications like border security, authentication, and law enforcement, to the military domain. Even within the military,
the technologies have evolved to impact a broad range of DoD’s
244
mission activities. It involves not just what DoD refers to as
“friendly biometrics” (e.g., identification of soldiers, contractors,
and other personnel), but also matching biometric data found
at the scene of attacks, engaging in counter-IED efforts, identifying detainees, providing further information about individuals held in custody, confirming targets for both manned and
unmanned attacks, and confirming the identity of those
245
killed. Military applications represent one of the most significant leaps forward in biometric technologies, with developments ranging from the deployment of handheld systems to the
246
use of widespread biometric enrollment for census taking.
Many of these initiatives bridge the gap between IBI and RBI,
suggesting a shift to the latter sphere.
ware-launched-FBI-help-police-catch-wanted-criminals.html#ixzz1dMSAFcUt.
The Cato Institute further notes that having mug shots from bookings means
that even nonconvicted people would be in the system. Sternstein, supra note
137.
242. SEARCH ANNIVERSARY, supra note 177, at 6.
243. Id.
244. See BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 25.
245. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT FY09, at
14, 27, 33 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/biometric09.pdf.
246. Thom Shanker, To Track Militants, U.S. Has System That Never Forgets a Face, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14identity.html?pagewanted=all (“[T]he government can scan through millions of digital files in a matter of seconds, even at
remote checkpoints, using hand-held devices distributed widely across the security forces.”).
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In 2004, DoD’s ABIS, designed to work with the FBI’s
247
IAFIS, became operational. (Note that DoD and the State
Department operate separate ABIS systems.) This system was
the first multimodal fusion database in existence at the federal
level. By 2009, DoD’s ABIS had evolved into the Next Generation ABIS (NG-ABIS), a system that now combines fingerprint,
palm print, FRT, and iris analysis with biographic and encoun248
ter data. DoD’s standards have correspondingly evolved away
from individual transactions and, instead, towards application
249
profiles.
ABIS encompasses an electronic database and a set of
software applications designed to support the storage, retrieval,
and search of data collected from “persons of national security
250
interest.” Exactly what this means, or what limits might apply, is not entirely clear. At a minimum, information from individuals seeking access to U.S. installations and bases is fed into
251
the repository, as is data obtained by soldiers in the field.
252
Handheld devices collect fingerprint, face, and iris scans.
DoD’s Biometrics Fusion Center, upon receiving transmitted
images from the field, conducts a search of “all appropriate domestic and international databases” and forwards match results to those inquiring as well as to the intelligence communi253
254
ty. Such repositories include, inter alia, IAFIS and IDENT.

247. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 10. The two
systems share a common interface; additionally, DoD’s Electronic Biometric
Transmission Specifications are based on the FBI and ANSI standards. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 1.
248. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 1, 6.
249. Id. at 6.
250. Id. at 1.
251. See Memorandum from Gordon R. England, Acting Deputy Sec’y of
Def. to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Under Sec’ys of Def., Commanders of the Combatant Commands & Dirs. of the
Def. Agencies 2 (July 15, 2005) [hereinafter DoD Memorandum], available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/dsd050715iraq.pdf.
252. See, e.g., BOB CARTER, LOCKHEED MARTIN, DOD BIOMETRICS, DOD
ABIS: QUALITY EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL MULTI-MODAL BIOMETRIC DATA
2 (2006), available at http://biometrics.nist.gov/cs_links/quality/workshopI/
proc/carter_dod_abis_multi-modal_quality_for_publication.pdf. Note that the
collection of this data is not without difficulty: cluttered backgrounds, legacy
data, non-frontal poses, inconsistent lighting, multiple heads, and low resolution prove to bedevil face data quality for efficient application of FRT. Id. at
13.
253. DoD Memorandum, supra note 251, at 2.
254. See infra Part I.B.5.
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In addition to the database itself, DoD has now created a
Biometrically Enabled Watch List (BEWL). The so-called
BEWL Tiger Team was created in 2010 to consider BEWL
255
stakeholders and the appropriate standards. The creation of
256
such a list echoes that established by DHS.
In 2006, DoD established Defense Biometrics as its office
257
for biometric enterprise management. The Biometrics Task
258
Force, in turn, became the executing agency. At the same
time, the Defense Science Board launched a Task Force to
259
study the use of biometrics in DoD.
Agencies, working
through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
and the National Security Council, began to design government-wide biometric systems that would be operable between
260
agencies. By 2006 DoD had published a Biometrics Concept
of Operations. Various Combatant Command (COCOM) strate261
gies subsequently evolved, based on this document. Military
branches have further integrated biometrics into their planning
262
and strategy documents.
Military applications of biometric technologies continue to
evolve. Confirmation of both Osama bin Laden and Muammar
Gaddafi’s deaths, for instance, came through the use of facial
263
recognition technology. Increasing interest has been shown in
264
DoD’s domestic role along the U.S. border.
In September
255. DOD BIOMETRICS COLLABORATION FORUM, supra note 26, at 22−23.
256. Id. at 15 (noting that technologies “[a]llow[] matches against
watchlists, DoD, FBI, and DHS biometric databases”).
257. See Biometrics: A Decade of Progress Since 9/11, supra note 105.
258. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 10.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. DOD BIOMETRICS COLLABORATION FORUM, supra note 26, at 27−28
(describing and identifying strategies involving COCOMs).
262. The USMC, for instance, has adopted an Identity Operations (IdOps)
Strategy 2020, which is focused on coordinating planning and resourcing activities aimed at institutionalizing and integrating IdOps within the USMC. It
includes USMC Biometrics and Forensics strategies. DOD BIOMETRICS COLLABORATION FORUM, supra note 26, at 11−13, 16, 20.
263. Jake Tapper, Facial Recognition Technology Used to Confirm
Gadhafi’s Death, ABC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/
politics/2011/10/facial-recognition-technology-used-to-confirm-gadhafis-death.
264. The DoD biometrics community (Biometrics Identity Management
Agency, Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, and Special Operations
Command) has partnered with DHS and CBP to consider how biometrics could
be used along the borders. DOD BIOMETRICS COLLABORATION FORUM, supra
note 26, at 10−11 (di scussing the poor oversight and implementation of the
civilian project to secure the U.S. border and noting, “[t]he DoD has broad ex-
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2011, reports surfaced that DoD, in conjunction with Georgia
Tech Research Institute, had begun testing autonomous aerial
265
drones that combined FRT with targeting abilities.
Considerable resources are being spent on biometrics, reflecting the fact that myriad military biometric applications
present themselves. Between 2007 and 2015, DoD plans to
266
spend $3.5 billion on biometrics. Institutional arrangements
are becoming formalized: in 2010, the Biometrics Task Force
transitioned to the Biometrics Identity Management Agency, a
267
centralized DoD hub for biometric data management. The
Secretary of the Army now serves as DoD Executive Agent for
268
biometrics.
5. Interoperability
In addition to the individual biometric programs and databases that integrate RBI technologies are renewed efforts to
ensure cross-agency access to information. Both the executive
and legislative branches emphasize the importance of such interoperability. This is significant to the extent that it suggests
movement towards a sort of supra-national RBI system. Such
interoperability, moreover, is fueled by multiple sources of
funding, providing greater resources to generate growth. Simultaneously, it reflects diffuse accountability. That is to say, no
one committee is tasked with considering the implications of
the overall system. A handful of examples illustrate how efforts
to encourage inter-agency sharing of data are expanding federal capabilities with regard to RBI.
In 2003, NSTC chartered a subcommittee on biometrics
with the explicit aim of coordinating the multitude of initiatives
269
launched across the federal government. Three years later,
government agencies, “working through the NSTC, [began] the
process of designing government-wide biometric system inperience in using biometrics and other sensors to contribute to secure borders,
Ports of Entry and cities”).
265. John P. Mello, Jr., Facial Recognition: Facebook Photo Matching Just
the Start, PC WORLD, Sept. 21, 2011, http://www.pcworld.com/article/
240363/facial-recognition-facebook-photo-matching-just-the-start.html.
266. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-276, DEFENSE BIOMETRICS:
DOD CAN BETTER CONFORM TO STANDARDS AND SHARE BIOMETRIC INFORMATION WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES (2011) [hereinafter GAO-11-276], available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/317368.
267. Id. at 4−5.
268. DoD Memorandum, supra note 251, at 3.
269. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 9.
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270

teroperability.” The following year, agencies, working with
both the NSTC and the National Counterterrorism Center, initiated a project to improve biometric coordination with regard
271
to known and suspected terrorists. This was followed in June
2008 with HSPD-24, which underscored the importance of
adopting mutually compatible methods and procedures to collect, store, use, analyze, and share biometric information across
272
federal agencies. The directive sought to ensure that the objectives described in previous executive orders and directives
273
could be accomplished. The policy henceforward would be for
agencies to use integrated processes and interoperable systems
to “make available to other agencies all biometric and associated biographic and contextual information associated with persons for whom there is an articulable and reasonable basis for
274
suspicion that they pose a threat to national security.” The
Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the
heads of other agencies would henceforward be required to
“[m]aintain and enhance interoperability among . . . biometric
and associated biographic systems[] by utilizing common information technology and data standards, protocols, and inter275
faces.” To assist in interoperability for the new and emerging
biometric fields—and particularly for facial recognition—new
276
standards were issued.
270. Id. at 10.
271. Id.
272. HSPD-24, supra note 106, at 788; see also BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 11.
273. HSPD-24, supra note 106, at 788–89.
274. Id. at 790.
275. Id.
276. See BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 10–11.
For examples of such standards, see SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS, NAT’L SCI. &
TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS STANDARDS 2–3 (2006), available at http://www
.biometrics.gov/Documents/biostandards.pdf; NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS—DATA FORMAT FOR THE INTERCHANGE OF FINGERPRINT
FACIAL, & OTHER BIOMETRIC INFORMATION—PART 1, at 1 (2007), available at
http://www.nist.gov/itl/ansi/upload/Approved-Std-20070427-2.pdf (adopted to
include data fields to support best practices application levels for the capture
of facial images and a new record type for iris data); SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, NSTC POLICY FOR ENABLING THE DEVELOPMENT, ADOPTION AND USE OF BIOMETRIC STANDARDS 3
(2007), available at http://www.biometrics.gov/Standards/NSTC_Policy_Bio_
Standards.pdf; NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS—DATA
FORMAT FOR THE INTERCHANGE OF FINGERPRINT FACIAL, & OTHER BIOMETRIC
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Congress also took steps that underscored the importance
of interoperability: in 2004, for instance, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act required the President to
establish an Information Sharing Environment “for the sharing
of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national
security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy
277
and civil liberties.” It established a Program Manager for the
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) who, in consultation with the interagency Information Sharing Council, is responsible for overseeing the implementation and management
278
of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE). The PM-ISE
assisted the President in developing and submitting an ISE
279
Implementation Plan to Congress. This plan focused on five
areas (intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs) and called for these communities to be
280
granted expedited access to protected terrorism information.
“We envision a future,” the Plan, issued in 2006, stated, “that
represents a trusted partnership among all levels of government
in the United States, the private sector, and our foreign partners, to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of
281
the United States of America.” More directly, the plan specified the importance of ensuring access to personally identifiable
information (fingerprints, photographs, and biometric indicators) for information discovery and search functions across fed282
eral agencies.
Not only did Congress pass statutes that reinforced the
283
importance of sharing information across federal agencies,
INFORMATION—PART 2: XML VERSION viii (2008), available at http://www
.nist.gov/itl/ansi/upload/Approved-XML-Std-20080828.pdf (adopted to support
modern data exchange protocols such as web services).
277. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664–70 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. INFO. SHARING ENV’T, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN xiii (2006), available at
http://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/ise-impplan-200611_0.pdf.
281. Id. (emphasis in original).
282. Id. at 45.
283. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No 108-458, § 7402, 118 Stat. 3638, 3850 (increasing the authority of
the Department of Homeland Security to utilize private sector resources that
would assist in preventing, or responding to, terrorist acts); Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 201(a),
116 Stat. 543, 547 (“Federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence
community shall . . . share any information . . . relevant to the admissibility
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but it repeatedly drew on its public hearings and oversight
mechanisms to press the executive on the failure of specific
284
programs to further integrate.
With such strong messaging coming both from the White
House and Congress, agencies have worked to ensure the interoperability of their systems. It is not that there was no previous effort to do this: more than one year before the 9/11 attacks, for instance, DOJ developed an initial implementation
plan for interoperability of INS’s IDENT and the FBI’s
285
IAFIS. But it was not until after the attacks that INS (and its
successor, DHS), together with DOJ and DOS, made substan286
tial progress.
The first step in developing interoperability between IAFIS
and IDENT consisted of deploying approximately 150 IDENT
and IAFIS workstations to border locations, enabling simulta287
neous fingerprint checks. Following this, in 2004, updated
hardware and software enabled integration of the two data288
bases into a single workstation.
The FBI then reverseengineered IAFIS with the capability to store biographic and
biometric information from the IDENT apprehension database—at the same time allowing other federal, state, and local
enforcement agencies to submit fingerprints to IDENT for veri289
fication. Integration of the systems continued. These initiatives prompted DHS to issue a PIA for IDENT/IAFIS Interopand deportability of aliens . . . .”); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296, § 102(a),(b)(3), 116 Stat. 2135, 2142–43 (creating the position of Secretary of Homeland Security and requiring the Secretary to “take reasonable
steps to ensure that information systems and databases of the Department [of
Homeland Security] are compatible with each other and with appropriate databases of other [federal] Departments”); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 10756, § 701, 115 Stat. 272, 374 (2001) (authorizing the establishment of enhanced information-sharing systems between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies).
284. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-792, at 714 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (supporting
the coordination of law enforcement agencies and allocating funds to various
coordination programs); H.R. REP. NO. 108-280, at 47 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (requesting a report from the Department of Homeland Security detailing its prior efforts to coordinate and share information with other law enforcement
agencies).
285. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY 2
(2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/US-VISIT_IDENT
-IAFISReport.pdf.
286. Id. at 2–3 (outlining the progress of IDENT/IAFIS interoperability after 9/11).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 3.
289. Id.
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290

erability. The Department envisioned a phased approach, in
which federal, state, and local entities would eventually be
291
brought into the information sharing environment. By 2008,
DOS had begun submitting all ten-print checks against IAFIS,
292
using IDENT/IAFIS interoperability. That same year DHS,
DOS and the FBI signed a Memorandum of Understanding
293
(MOU), as IDENT and IAFIS became fully interoperable. The
following year a similar MOU between DoD and the FBI was
signed, as the Bureau began research on the enhanced capabil294
ity IAFIS/Next Generation Identification. In 2005, efforts began to integrate US-VISIT into the IDENT/IAFIS environ295
ment. In 2006, DHS and the FBI adopted an Interim Data
296
Sharing Model (iDSM) to provide for interoperability.
Similar initiatives have now begun to mark DoD’s relationship with DHS with regard to ABIS and IDENT. In 2011, for
instance, DoD and DHS signed an MOU to establish a policy
framework for moving forward with interoperability, leading to
297
direct connectivity between the two databases.
DoD’s relationship with DOJ and the FBI is significantly
more developed—at least with regard to the interoperability of
ABIS and IAFIS. From the beginning, ABIS was designed to be
interoperable with the FBI’s IAFIS. In 2005, DoD’s ABIS and
298
the FBI’s IAFIS became fully interoperable. This paved the
way for the military to begin exchanging latent prints (e.g.,
from improvised explosive devices found in the field) with
299
IAFIS in 2007. These two systems have continued to evolve
290. See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
FOR THE INTERIM DATA SHARING MODEL (IDSM) FOR THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT)/INTEGRATED AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IAFIS) INTEROPERABILITY PROJECT (2006),

available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_
idsm.pdf.
291. Id. at 2–3, 8–9.
292. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV. INTEROPERABILITY INITIATIVES
UNIT, BIOMETRIC INTEROPERABILITY 9 (2011) [hereinafter BIOMETRIC INTEROPERABILITY], available at https://www.fbibiospecs.org/FacialRecogForum/
Forum2/_Uploads/facial%20recog%20forum%20110211_1.pdf.
293. See id. at 4, 9.
294. See id. at 4.
295. See id. at 12.
296. See id. at 9.
297. See id. at 15.
298. Id. at 9.
299. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT., THE NATIONAL BIOMETRICS CHALLENGE 15–16 (2011), available
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in tandem. This means that a soldier in the field can collect biometric information and, through the Biometric Fusion Center,
run it against the FBI database. Any matches in the results are
then transmitted back to the soldier and potentially distributed
to intelligence agencies. The type of information may include
not just biometric data, but past criminal record, the biometric
subject’s address, contact information, birth date, death date,
place of death, citizenship, ethnicity, height, weight, blood type,
marital status, group membership, encounter data, and other
300
physical, social, and civic characteristics. This information
then becomes part of the military database.
The DoD-FBI relationship has continued to evolve. In
2010, for instance, groundbreaking occurred for the joint
301
FBI/DoD Biometric Technology Center. By March of 2011,
DoD had adopted a standard for the collection of biometric information to facilitate sharing that information with other fed302
eral agencies. The standards have been applied in some, but
303
not all, of its collection devices.
6. State and Local Government
Federal forays into this area are now extending to state
and local government, raising parallel questions about statutory and constitutional framing, as well as concerns about the extent to which state and local initiatives are being folded into
the federal framework.
Minnesota, for instance, runs CriMNet, which emphasizes
304
biometric identification and information sharing. The state
uses mobile biometric identification devices for officers in the
field, employs an automated fingerprint identification system
during booking, and checks targets against the FBI’s Repositoat http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/BiometricsChallenge2011_protected
.pdf.
300. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 16–24.
301. See Elizabeth Montalbano, FBI Plans Biometrics Tech Center,
INFORMATIONWEEK GOV'T (Dec. 5, 2011, 3:40 PM), http://www.information
week.com/government/information-management/fbi-plans-biometrics-tech
-center/232200748.
302. See BIOMETRIC INTEROPERABILITY, supra note 292, at 2.
303. For instance, one handheld device, used primarily by the Army, is responsible for thirteen percent of the biometric records held by DoD—i.e., approximately 630,000 records. GAO-11-276, supra note 266. Because this device
does not conform to the standards, the information contained cannot be
checked against the FBI’s approximately 94 million records. Id.
304. Kalaf, supra note 209, at 19, 25.
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305

ry for Individuals of Special Concern. Similarly, Wisconsin
uses an Automated Fingerprint Identification System, as well
306
as FAST ID, a mobile biometric identification system.
Such systems can be found at the local level as well. Los
Angeles County, California, for example, maintains two sepa307
rate biometric identification systems. The Los Angeles Regional Identification System supplies biometric information to
law enforcement agencies and provides mobile identification
308
capabilities to law enforcement officers. Los Angeles County’s
system also has been integrated into the Los Angeles Police
Department’s centralized repository as well as the Regional
309
Terrorism Information and Integration System. In Florida,
the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office has begun tapping into the
state’s Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles’ photo archives, allowing officers in the field, equipped with digital
cameras, to quickly cross-check individuals detained against
310
the photo bank. The sheriff’s office claims that between the
launch of the program in 2004 and July 2011, some 700 arrests
311
had been generated.
The spread of biometric technologies to state and local government is driven in part by the availability of new technologies and by state initiatives. It has also been driven, however,
by federal efforts to obtain more information. The Maricopa
County (Arizona) Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) explained to Congress
how the local collection of information feeds directly into federal initiatives:
As outlined in the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan state/local centers will become a part of the National Intelligence Program. As such if these centers provide direct support to
ongoing Federal programs that require funding . . . then the Federal
government should provide continued funding support. An example of
this effort is the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office Facial Recognition
Program. Working in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Justice
the Facial Recognition Program has been provided with access to the

305. Id. at 25.
306. Id. at 21, 61.
307. Id. at 20.
308. Id. at 20, 48.
309. Id. at 49.
310. Glenn Bischoff, Video: Facial Recognition Technology Nabs Criminals
in Florida, URGENT COMMC’NS. (Oct. 26, 2011, 5:42 PM), http://urgentcomm
.com/mobile_data/news/pinellas-facial-recognition-20111026.
311. Emily Steel, How a New Police Tool for Face Recognition Works, WALL
ST. J. BLOGS (July 13, 2011, 7:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/07/13/
how-a-new-police-tool-for-face-recognition-works.
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Federal Joint Automated Booking System and all of the Federal arrestee’s photographs. In addition the MCSO is partnering with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to support their violent gang and
criminal investigations through the use of the Facial Recognition Program. The MCSO is also working with agencies and fusion centers
nationwide to establish a facial recognition network that will support
criminal investigations and the recovery of missing and abducted
312
children.

Federal information, in turn, is then provided to local entities,
further blurring the federalism divide. The Maricopa County
Sheriff Department’s Facial Recognition Unit, for instance, is
building a database to match suspect photos with millions of
313
images drawn from dozens of federal agencies. State and local governments are thus both active participants in building
federal biometric databases as well as consumers of federal initiatives.
The new technologies available to state and local government offer mobile biometric capture across a range of remote
biometric identification technologies. For example, the Mobile
Offender Recognition and Information System, known as
314
MORIS, incorporates FRT, iris scans, and fingerprinting. Police officers equipped with the device can take a picture of a
person’s face from a distance of two to five feet away, which is
315
then analyzed according to 130 distinguishing points. This
312. The Way Forward with Fusion Centers: Challenges and Strategies for
Change: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Information Sharing,
and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 110th
Cong. 44 (2007) (statement of Norman Beasley, Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office) (examining federal challenges and
strategies to improve homeland security and terrorist threat information sharing among federal, state, and local agencies through the establishment and
utilization of fusion centers).
313. Id. at 50. Numerous agencies participate in the program “includ[ing]:
FBI, ATF, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, TSA, ICE, U.S. Border Patrol, Arizona Department of Public Safety, Arizona National Guard, Arizona Department of Corrections, Arizona Department of Revenue, U.S. Department of
State, Arizona Motor Vehicle Department, Arizona Attorney General’s Office,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Air Marshal Service, Rocky Mountain
Information Network, Phoenix Police Department, Phoenix Fire Department,
Glendale Fire Department, Mesa Fire Department, Mesa Police Department,
Glendale Police Department, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service,
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Scottsdale Police Department, Tempe Police Department, Arizona Department of Economic Security, Arizona Department of Liquor License and Control, and the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.” Id.
314. Steel, supra note 311.
315. Id.
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information can then be compared to existing databases. In a
similar manner, the officer can hold the device five to six inches
from an individual’s eye for a high-resolution image, or use a
small metallic rectangle attached to the camera to scan the in317
dividual’s fingerprints. In 2010, police officers in Brockton,
Massachusetts became the first police department to test the
device, which by July 2011 was ready for deployment—with
318
applications for iPhone and Android in the works.
The funding for many state and local initiatives derives in
part from federal agencies. Pilot programs, such as NGI, leverage investments in research and development to deploy new
technologies. In some cases, the federal government continues
to provide services to allow state and local actors to take full
319
advantage of the technologies. Money also has been made
available for the purpose of helping local entities to develop
their own systems. DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, for instance, has issued grants to develop MORIS320
type devices.
In sum, what the state and local initiatives in this area
demonstrate is the extent to which such technologies are becoming more common. They also show how federal initiatives in
this area influence the collection of such information, and the
way in which the line between law enforcement and national
security is becoming increasingly blurred. The availability of
resources is also tied to federal initiatives. Yet there are no federal statutes that address the difficult questions that accompany broader use of these technologies and the movement to remote biometric identification.
II. STATUTORY GAP
Congress has clearly and emphatically given federal agencies the authority to collect, analyze, and share personally identifiable information (PII). Such limits as have been introduced
on the exercise of these powers, however—specifically in relation to (1) protecting PII; (2) obtaining information for use in
criminal investigations; and (3) collecting foreign intelligence—
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Heaton, supra note 29; Aliya Sternstein, Facial Recognition Apps
Spark Privacy Concerns in Congress, NEXTGOV, Oct. 19, 2011, http://www
.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20111019_1039.php.
320. Steel, supra note 311.
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at best, only weakly apply, and at worst, fail altogether to address the types of technologies at work in remote biometric
identification.
Within the first category, broad gaps in the 1974 Privacy
Act, its amendments, and the 1990 Computer Act, paired with
explicit exemptions in the Privacy Act and the 2002 EGovernment Act, remove most biometric systems—much less
RBI technologies such as facial recognition—from such restrictions.
The second category, dominated by Title III of the 1968
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and, subsequently, Title I of the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
says nothing about RBI generally, much less facial recognition
technology. Moreover, while the latter two statutes address audio recording, they do not address silent video recording.
The third category, governed by the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and its subsequent amendments, only
addresses certain types of electronic communications and remains silent on the collection, and construction and use of databases populated with biometric and tracking technologies.
Such rules as do apply to electronic surveillance would be almost impossible to translate to RBI systems. Targeting, the duration for which orders can be issued, minimization procedures,
and special certification all depend upon distinguishing between U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons—a distinction almost
meaningless in the context of RBI. The specificity otherwise required by statute, moreover, runs counter to the orientation of
the technologies involved in this new and emerging area. This
lack of statutory guidance thus drives us back upon constitutional analysis in considering the programs currently being developed by the federal government.
A. PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
321

At the most general level, the Department of Justice,
322
323
Department of State, Department of Homeland Security
321. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 533, 534 (2006) (recognizing DOJ’s authority to
acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification and other records, and to
exchange them with other federal officials and state and local government entities); see also 50 U.S.C. § 404o (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (supporting the DOJ’s
responsibility to disseminate terrorism information); Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-544, pmbl., 86 Stat. 1109, 1109 (“Making appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and related agencies.”). In addition, record-keeping authority has been delegated to the director
of the FBI. 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.85, 20.1−20.3, 20.20−20.25, 20.30−20.38 (2012); see
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also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (2006) (immigration and asylum authorities); id.
§ 1225(b) (2006) (screening and asylum considerations), subsection (b)(1)(D)
invalidated by United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1087 (9th
Cir. 2011); id. § 1357(a) (2006) (interrogation of aliens); id. § 1360(a) (2006)
(establishment of a central index with the names of all aliens admitted or denied admission, their sponsors, and any other relevant information the Attorney General shall require); id. § 1365a(b) (2006) (integrated entry and exit
system to be implemented by the Attorney General); id. § 1379(1) (2006) (directing the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to develop and certify
a technology standard, including appropriate biometric identifier standards to
verify the identity of persons applying for a U.S. visa or seeking to enter the
United States); 44 U.S.C. §§ 3301−3312 (2006) (exchange of records); see also
Hammons v. Scott, 423 F. Supp. 625, 628 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (stating that the
FBI maintains arrest records).
322. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (giving the Department of State the authority to collect data in order to grant or deny visa applications); see also id.
§ 1324 (2006) (providing the authority for seizing property and evidence related to bringing in and harboring certain aliens); id. § 1365a (giving the Department of State the authority to maintain a database related to alien entry
and exit); id. § 1379 (giving the Attorney General and the Secretary of State
the authority to develop and certify a technology standard to verify the identity of aliens). More specific authority to collect personally identifiable information (PII) is given to the State Department with regard to ABIS, see U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (ABIS) PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 3 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/109132.pdf (relying on the following as legal authority: “Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1101, as amended[,]
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1104 (Powers and Duties of the Secretary of State)[,] 22 U.S.C
2651(a) (Organization of Department of State)[,] INA, 8 U.S.C. 1202(f) (Confidential Nature of Visa Records)[,] Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649)[,]
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
1996[,] Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208)[,] Legal
Immigration Family Equity ‘LIFE’ Act (Part of HR 5548, 2000)[,] USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (HR 3162) (P. L. 107-56)[,] Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (HR 3525)[,] and Child Status Protection Act
(HR 1209) 2002”), the Consular Consolidated Database, see CONSULAR CONSOLIDATED DATABASE (CCD) PIA, supra note 146, at 3–4 (relying on the following as legal authority: “8 U.S.C. 1401–1503 (2007) Acquisition and Loss of
U.S. Citizenship or U.S. Nationality; Use of U.S. Passports)[,] 8 U.S.C. 1101–
1503 (Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended)[,] 18 U.S.C. 911,
1001, 1541–1546 (2007) (Crimes and Criminal Procedure)[,] 22 U.S.C. 211a–
218, 2651a, 2705[,] Executive Order 11295 (August 5, 1966)[,] 31 FR 10603
(Authority of the Secretary of State in granting and issuing U.S. passports)[,]
8 U.S.C. 1185 (Travel Control of Citizens)[,] 8 U.S.C. 1104 (Powers and Duties
of the Secretary of State)[,] 22 U.S.C. 3904 (Functions of the Foreign Service,
including protection of U.S. citizens in foreign countries under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and assistance to other agencies)[,] 22
U.S.C. 1731 (Protection of naturalized U.S. citizens in foreign countries)[,] 22
U.S.C. 2705 (Preparation of Consular Reports of Birth Abroad)[,] 8 U.S.C.
1501 (Adjudication of possible loss of nationality)[,] 22 U.S.C. 2671(b)(2)(B)
(Repatriation loan for destitute U.S. Citizens abroad)[,] 22 U.S.C. 2670(j) (Provision of emergency medical, dietary and other assistance)[,] 22 U.S.C. 2151n–
1 (Assistance to arrested citizens) (Repealed, but applicable to past records)[,]
42 U.S.C. 1973ff–1973ff–6 (Overseas absentee voting)[,] 42 U.S.C. 402 (Social
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Security benefits payments)[,] Sec. 599C of Public Law 101-513, 104 Stat.
1979, as amended (Claims to benefits by virtue of hostage status)[,] 50 U.S.C.
App. 453, 454, Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, July 2, 1980 as amended
by Presidential Proclamation 7275, February 22, 2000 (Selective Service registration)[,] 22 U.S.C. 5501–5513 (Aviation disaster and security assistance
abroad; mandatory availability of airline passengers manifest)[,] 22 U.S.C.
4196; (22 U.S.C. 4195, repealed, but applicable to past records) (Official notification of death of U.S. citizens in foreign countries; transmission of inventory
of effects)[,] 22 U.S.C. 2715b (notification of next of kin of death of U.S. citizens in foreign countries)[,] 22 U.S.C. 4197 (Assistance with disposition of estates of U.S. citizens upon death in a foreign country)[,] 22 U.S.C. 4193,
4194[,] 22 U.S.C. 4205–4207[,] 46 U.S.C. 10318 (Merchant seamen protection
and relief)[,] 22 U.S.C. 4193 (Receiving protests or declarations of U.S. citizen
passengers, merchants in foreign ports)[,] 46 U.S.C. 10701–10705 (Responsibility for deceased seamen and their effects)[,] 22 U.S.C. 2715a (Responsibility
to inform victims and their families regarding crimes against U.S. citizens
abroad)[,] 22 U.S.C. 4215, 4221 (Administration of oaths, affidavits, and other
notarial acts)[,] 28 U.S.C. 1740, 1741 (Authentication of documents)[,] 28
U.S.C. 1781–1783 (Judicial Assistance to U.S. and foreign courts and litigants)[,] 42 U.S.C. 14901–14954; Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, (Assistance with Intercountry adoptions under the Hague Intercountry Adoption
Convention, maintenance of related records)[,] 42 U.S.C. 11601–11610, International Child Abduction Remedies Act (Assistance to applicants in the location and return of children wrongfully removed or retained or for securing effective exercise of rights of access)[,] 22 U.S.C. 4802 (overseas evacuations)”),
and the Identity Management System, see IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM,
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 175, at 3 (relying on the following as
legal authority: “5 U.S.C. 301; Federal Information Security Management Act
(FISMA)[,] National Defense Authorization Act, Act (Pub. L. 104-106, sec.
5113)[,] Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12, Policy for a
Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, August 27, 2004[,] Federal Property and Administrative Act of 1949, as amended[,] Executive Order 10450—Security Requirements for Government Employees[,] Executive Order 10865—Safeguarding Classified Information
Within Industry[,] Executive Order 12958—Classified National Security Information[,] Executive Order 12968—Access to Classified Information[,] Executive Order 12829—National Industrial Security Program[,] and 5 CFR 731—
OPM part 731, Suitability”).
323. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 121(a)–(d) (2006) (creating an Office of Intelligence and Analysis within DHS and giving it the responsibility of accessing, receiving, and analyzing law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from local, state, and
federal agencies, as well as private sector entities, with an eye towards integrating such information in support of the Department’s responsibilities as
well as those of the National Counterterrorism Center); id. §§ 141, 121(d)(11)–
(12) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (giving DHS the authority to disseminate information to other federal agencies, as well as state and local government—and
private actors—with the only meaningful restriction being that it be done consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods as established
by the director of National Intelligence, as well as the protection of sensitive
law enforcement information consistent with guidelines established by the Attorney General); id. § 121(d)(14) (giving DHS the authority to establish and
utilize advanced technologies “including data-mining and other advanced analytical tools, in order to access, receive, and analyze data and information in
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and Department of Defense each have broad authority to collect personally identifiable information on U.S. citizens. To
DHS, in particular, Congress has provided explicit authority to
develop new technologies to acquire and store information relevant to any of its law enforcement, border, or national security
325
functions.
Specific biometrics provisions supplement these
furtherance of” the Department’s responsibilities “and to disseminate information acquired and analyzed by the Department, as appropriate”).
324. Outside of war, DoD does not appear to have the general authority to
collect personally identifiable information on U.S. citizens within domestic
bounds. Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 3013 (2006) (authorizing the DoD to collect information only for the Department of the Army). Information-sharing instruments, however, allow it to access information obtained by other federal agencies. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,356, Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism
Information to Protect Americans, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,599 (Sept. 1, 2004). DoD
does have primary authority to collect information on active enlisted personnel, such as the Total Army Personnel Database Active Enlisted. See DEP’T OF
DEF., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PIA) FOR THE TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL
DATABASE ACTIVE ENLISTED (TAPDB-AE) 3 (2008), available at http://ciog6
.army.mil/Portals/1/PIA/TAPDB-AE_2010-07-30-101117.pdf (relying on the
following legal authority: “10 U.S.C. 3013, Secretary of the Army[,] Army Regulation 600-8-6, Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting[,] and E.O.
9397 as amended (SSN)”); see also PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PIA) FOR
THE INSTALLATION ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM—DRUM 3 (2008), available at
http://ciog6.army.mil/Portals/1/PIA/IACS-DRUM_23JUN2010.pdf (relying on
the following legal authority: “10 U.S.C. 3013, Secretary of the Army[,] Army
Regulation 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program and E.O. 9397, as
amended (SSN)”). Numerous Executive Orders reach the same purpose. See,
e.g., HSPD-12, supra note 171; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM NO. M-05-05, ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES: HOW
TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF COMMERCIAL MANAGED SERVICES (Dec. 20, 2004),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/
fy2005/m05-05.pdf; DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 1000.25, DOD PERSONNEL
IDENTITY PROTECTION (PIP) PROGRAM (July 19, 2004), available at http://
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/100025p.pdf. DoD also cites a number
of Executive Orders in support of its general collection of biometric data. See
DEP’T OF DEF., MEMORANDUM NO. DTM-05-006, DOD POLICY FOR BIOMETRIC
INFORMATION FOR ACCESS TO U.S. INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES IN IRAQ
(July 15, 2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/
pdf/dsd050715iraq.pdf (relying on the legal authority of “HSPD-6 . . . HSPD-11
. . . [, and] Exec. Order 13,356”).
325. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 202(1)–(4) (2006) (giving the Secretary of DHS responsibility for securing the borders); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2006) (granting
the Secretary of Homeland Security the administration and enforcement of all
laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens and U.S. borders); IDENT System of Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,080, 31,081 (June 5, 2007)
(giving DHS special authority with regard to the borders, as well as biometric
collection and analysis systems); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2006) (screening
and asylum considerations), subsection (b)(1)(D) invalidated by United States
v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011). As with other departments, myriad other sections of the code underscore the Department’s role
in this area. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(e) (2006) (discussing outreach program
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326

broader powers. DHS is further empowered to mine such information and then share it with any federal, state, or local en327
tities, or private actors, deemed necessary. Intelligence agencies appear to have similarly broad authority that could be
328
applied to PII. The limits established, however, all but disappear when confronted by the types of programs under question.
for DHS to work with the State Department and the Attorney General to address the issue of U.S. persons bringing in and harboring aliens); id. § 1357(h)
(2006) (focusing on the protection of juveniles applying to the Secretary of
Homeland Security for consent for special immigrant status).
326. New legislation in 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security
to “develop a plan to accelerate the full implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data system.” Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4042(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3724 (to be codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1365b(c)(1)). Congress demanded that the Secretary submit a report
detailing the current functionality of the entry and exit data system (including
a list of ports of entry and other DHS and Department of State locations where
biometric entry data systems were in use, and a listing of the databases and
data systems with which the entry and exist data system were interoperable),
as well as what resources would be required to resolve any deficiencies in the
current system. Id. § 7206, 118 Stat. at 3818 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1365b(c)(2)). The statute required that by December 26, 2007, the new biometric program would be up and running, with a phased implementation of a
registered traveler program to take place soon thereafter. Id.
The U.S. Coast Guard’s collection of personally identifiable information
supports its law enforcement and other missions. See 14 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)
(U.S. Coast Guard Primary Duties); id. § 89 (2006) (U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement); 19 U.S.C. § 482(a) (2006) (search of vehicles and persons). The
agency, in turn, functions within DHS’s broader grant of authority for the collection and analysis of biometric and other data. See discussion infra Part
II.A.2. The specific biometric programs discussed above, US-VISIT and
IDENT, cite overlapping statutory authorities that enable the collection of PII
for the purposes so stated. For example, the PIAs for US-VISIT list the following statutory authority: “the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Public Law 104-208; The Immigration and
Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA),
Public Law 106-215; The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000
(VWPPA), Public Law 106-396; The USA PATRIOT Act, Public Law 107-56;
and The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (‘Border Security Act’), Public Law 107-173,” and “[t]he Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, (IRTPA) Public Law 108-458, § 7208.” DHS, UPDATE
FOR US-VISIT, supra note 115, at 15 n.10; DHS, VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT
STATUS, supra note 120, at 4 n.3. For IDENT, the statutory authority for
maintenance of the system turns on the authorities of each agency that contributes to the IDENT database. See Privacy Act; IDENT System of Records,
72 Fed. Reg. 31,080, 31,081 (June 5, 2007) (listing as statutory authority: “6
U.S.C. 202, 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1158, 1201, 1225, 1324, 1357, 1360, 1365a, 1365b,
1379 . . . 1732; [and] 19 U.S.C. 1589a”).
327. 6 U.S.C. § 124h (2006).
328. Amendments to the 1947 National Security Act instruct the Director
of National Intelligence to determine the requirements and priorities for, and
manage and direct the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of,
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1. Privacy Act of 1974 and Systems of Records Notice
The Privacy Act of 1974 is the main legislation governing
the federal collection, use, and disclosure of personally identifi329
able information. The statute falls short, however, of providing for robust protection of the types of technologies that mark
the biometrics realm. Reporting requirements, for instance, are
330
limited to data associated with specific individuals. The act
only applies to federal entities—not state and local govern331
ments. And only U.S. citizens and permanent residents fall
332
within the legislation’s requirements.
national intelligence, and intelligence related to national security—understood
as:
[A]ll intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside the United States,
that . . . pertains . . . to more than one United States Government
agency; and that involves—(i) threats to the United States, its people,
property, or interests; (ii) the development, proliferation, or use of
weapons of mass destruction; or (iii) any other matter bearing on
United States national or homeland security.
50 U.S.C. § 401a(5) (2006). The intelligence community undertaking the collection, analysis, and dissemination of such information includes the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, CIA, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, other DoD offices conducting reconnaissance, the intelligence
elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and USMC, FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of Energy, the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research at the Department of State, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury, elements of DHS concerned with the
analysis of intelligence information (including the Coast Guard), and any other entities designated by the President. Id. § 401a(4). Agencies use information-gathering functions to bypass limits that might otherwise apply to
agencies’ collection of PII. The CIA, for instance, is statutorily prevented from
assuming any police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security
functions. 5 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1) (2006). It is not clear, however, precisely what
the CIA can and cannot do within its broader authorities. See Grant T. Harris,
Note, The CIA Mandate and the War on Terror, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 529,
532–33 (2005). Similarly, Executive Order 12,333 of 1981 and Attorney General guidelines restrict the CIA in its collection of information about U.S. citizens: it is only allowed to collect information for an authorized intelligence
purpose, amongst which international terrorism is included. See Exec. Order
No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,950 (Dec. 8, 1981). Exactly what constitutes international terrorism, however, is not clear—nor do there appear to be
any limits on whether the individual about whom the information is sought be
the target of the investigation, or merely related in some way to an investigation itself. See id. (failing to define “international terrorism”).
329. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
330. Id. § 552a(b).
331. See id. § 552a(b) (applying restrictions to an “agency,” not a “nonfederal agency”).
332. Id. § 552a(a)(2).
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Not all data collection qualifies for protection. Instead, notice must only be provided for information contained in a “sys333
tem of records.” The Act defines a “record” as:
[A]ny item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual
that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual,
334
such as a finger or voice print or a photograph . . . .

A record is thus created where biometric information, such as
fingerprint, voice, or facial recognition data, is stored and as335
signed to a particular individual. A “system of records” is understood then as “a group of any records . . . from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual . . . or other
336
identifying particular.” So, where the government maintains
a group of biometric records, from which information is retrievable by a marker assigned to an individual in regard to whom
the information is stored, it is maintaining a system of records
and is thus, at the outset, subject to the Privacy Act’s provi337
sions.
On the other hand, if the government maintains a video
surveillance program in which it stores the biometric information of passersby, without correlating such information to
particular individuals, such a system does not appear to fall
within the Privacy Act. The linking of data to individuals is es338
sential to the formation of a “record.” Nor does the statute
appear to apply to automated video- or photo-matching systems, which would merely correlate images, without tying them
to particular persons. A system of records thus occurs only at
the point “when agencies use the Privacy Act record as a key to
339
retrieve information from these files.” Pari passu, the legisla333. See id. § 552a(d).
334. Id. § 552a(a)(4).
335. Id.
336. Id. § 552a(a)(5).
337. The fact that the agency has the capability to retrieve individual records does not subject it to the provisions of the Privacy Act. Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,952 (July 9, 1975); Privacy Act of 1974, 52 Fed.
Reg. 12,990, 12,991 (Apr. 20, 1987). Rather, the agency must actually retrieve
records by an identifying particular. Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. at
28,952; Privacy Act of 1974, 52 Fed. Reg. at 12,991.
338. Privacy Act of 1974, 52 Fed. Reg. at 12,991 (“In order to carry out . . .
call detail programs, agencies will have to link numbers and names so that
they can determine who is responsible for what call. It is at this point, that the
telephone number meets the Privacy Act definition of a ‘record.’”).
339. Id.
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tion appears not to apply to programs focused on developing biometric technology through the widespread accumulation of data that is not tied to particular individuals.
Under the statute, each agency maintaining personally
identifiable databases must publish a system of records notice
340
(SORN) in the Federal Register. SORNs may be issued in regard to federal government-wide initiatives, as well as depart341
ment-wide programs and sub-department agency initiatives.
All federal agencies must adopt and publish minimum standards with respect to the collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of personal information contained in such sys342
tems. The legislation restricts the transfer of data absent a
written request by or with the prior consent of the individual to
whom the information pertains unless such a request is made
by another government agency head, so long as the agency
head makes a written request which maintains the record specifying the specific portion desired, and the purpose for which
343
the record is sought.
Outside of specified (albeit broad) exemptions, discussed
below, upon request, the legislation requires each agency that
maintains a system of records to grant access to the individual
from whom the information was collected, in order to give the
target the opportunity to correct any errors in the infor344
mation. The agency must then either promptly correct the
portion of the record considered inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely or incomplete, or promptly inform the individual of its refusal to amend the record and the appeals process to be fol345
lowed.
340. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4).
341. SORNs, for instance, have issued not just from the DHS as a whole,
but also from DHS’s sub-departments: Customs and Border Protection, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Intelligence and Analysis Unit, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the National Protection and Programs Directorate, the Office of Health Affairs, the Office of Inspector General,
Operations, Science and Technology, the Transportation Security Administration, Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Secret Service. See System
of Records Notices (SORNs), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs
.gov/system-records-notices-sorns (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (listing all general
federal, departmental, and sub-agency SORNs related to DHS).
342. 5 U.S.C § 552a(e)–(f).
343. Id. § 552a(b)(7).
344. Id. § 552a(d)(1).
345. Id. § 552a(d)(2)(B). The statute sets a limit of ten days either to make
the corrections or to notify the individual that the information will remain untouched. Id. § 552a(d)(2)(A).
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Two important points about this legislation, outside of the
exemptions, deserve notice. First, the statute does not regulate
state and local governments or private entities. Thus, any biometric information gathered by state or local governments is ex346
empted from the Act’s requirements. The agency using such
data is only subject to the much weaker expectation of due dili347
gence and is under no statutory obligation to inform the individual that personally identifiable information has been col348
lected on the target or to correct any errors in the same.
IAFIS, for instance, is part of the Fingerprint Identification
Records System, portions of which are exempt from access and
349
amendment under the Privacy Act. This database relies in
part on local law enforcement fingerprint data, which does not
fall subject to the Privacy Act. Thus, while the FBI’s role in
maintaining and disseminating the identification records carries the responsibility of undertaking such activities in a re350
sponsible manner, any errors in the state collection of biometric data are not subject to the same amendment
351
requirements as federally-generated information.
Second, the Privacy Act applies only to U.S. citizens and
352
not to companies, non-resident aliens, or foreigners. The purpose of this limitation was, in part, to ensure the exclusion of
economic regulatory activity, as well as intelligence files and
databases devoted to foreign nationals, “or maintained by the
346. Id. Federal agencies implementing biometric programs cite this exception—the PIA, for instance, issued by the FBI in regard to the Repository for
Individuals of Special Concern, specifically notes that “[t]he user agencies that
contribute the underlying information to the NGI and NCIC [National Crime
Information Center] likely do not provide any sort of Privacy Act Statements
or similar actual notice to the individuals from whom or about whom the information pertains. This is because non-federal contributors are not subject to
the Privacy Act, federal contributors are usually exempted from the Privacy
Act’s individual collection notice provisions in connection with criminal law
enforcement activities, and/or provision of individual notice incident to criminal law enforcement activities is typically impracticable.” RISC PIA, supra
note 201, § 6.1.
347. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i).
348. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
349. 28 C.F.R. § 16.96(e), (f) (2010).
350. See Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v.
Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1028–29 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
351. Cf. Shadd v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 721, 724 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(suggesting that the FBI may have less of a duty to correct errors resulting
from state collection of information), aff’d mem. 535 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1976).
352. Congress accomplished this limitation through the definition of “individual” as “a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.” See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (2006).
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State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and other
agencies for the purpose of dealing with nonresident aliens and
353
people in other countries.” Thus, biometrics systems relating
to non-citizens entering and leaving the country, living within
U.S. bounds, or located overseas, fall entirely outside the statute.
2. Exemptions to the Privacy Act
The Privacy Act contains a number of general and specific
exceptions, which prove particularly important in the realm of
RBI. It could be argued that they obliterate any substantive
impact that the Privacy Act might otherwise have on this rapidly-emerging field.
First, the statute provides a general exemption for records
354
maintained by the CIA. Although this provision is permissive—not required—it provides for the head of any agency to
promulgate rules to exempt (with some exceptions) systems of
355
records maintained by the intelligence agency.
Thus, biometric programs launched by the CIA—targeting U.S. citizens
or non-citizens—could develop outside important aspects of the
Privacy Act’s protections.
The CIA, for instance, is not required to provide individu356
als with access to records. It is not required to establish and
promulgate procedures whereby an individual can be notified
(at the individual’s request) if the system of records contains a
353. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 75 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6916, 6993.
354. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1).
355. Id. The exceptions include: subsection (b) (relating to the conditions of
disclosure); subsections (c)(1) & (2) (requiring agencies to keep an accurate accounting of the date, nature or purpose of any disclosures of the records and
the name/address of the person/agency to whom the disclosure is made); and
subsection (e)(4)(A)–(F) (publication in the Federal Register of the existence
and nature of the system). Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 19 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6931 (“The Committee also wishes to
stress that this section is not intended to require the C.I.A. and criminal justice agencies to withhold all their personal records from the individuals to
whom they pertain. We urge those agencies to keep open whatever files are
presently open and to make available in the future whatever files can be made
available without clearly infringing on the ability of the agencies to fulfill their
missions.”).
356. The following sections are included in the CIA’s general exemption
from the requirements of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3)–(4) (requiring
an agency to disclose the information made in a request) and 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(d) (requiring each agency maintain records but exempted by the CIA).
See id. § 552a(j).
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record pertaining to him; nor must the agency provide procedures on how to gain access to the records or to contest their
357
content. The CIA is not required to reveal the categories of
358
records in the system. Nor must it maintain records “with
such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is
359
reasonably necessary to assure fairness.” The agency cannot
be subject to civil remedies for failing to comply with requests
to obtain information or to amend records; nor may a court or360
der the agency to amend the individual’s record in any way.
The courts similarly may not enjoin the CIA from withholding
361
records and order the production to the complainant.
A second general exemption exists for criminal law en362
forcement records. The legislation allows law enforcement
agencies to exempt records relating to the identification of
criminal offenders and alleged offenders, data compiled for
criminal investigations, and reports developed at any stage of
the criminal law process from arrest or indictment through re363
lease from supervision.
Specific exemptions, located under subsection (k) of the legislation, further reflect the statute’s general aversion to regulating matters related to national security. The head of any
federal agency may promulgate rules to exempt certain record
systems where they deal with classified information or the

357. The following sections are similarly included in the general exemptions for the CIA pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1) of the Privacy Act:
§ 552a(e)(4)(G)–(H) (requiring the agency to notify an individual that a record
is being kept on him or her upon requires) and § 552a(f) (requiring the agency
to establish rules to carry out the provisions of the section). See also id.
§ 552a(e)(8) (reasonable effort to serve notice not required to be provided to
individuals included in the system of records when any record is made available to any person under compulsory legal process when such process becomes a
matter of public record).
358. The CIA’s exemption also includes § 552a(e)(4)(I) (requiring an agency
to maintain only information about an individual that is relevant to that agency’s purpose). Id. § 552a(j)(1).
359. Id. § 552a(e)(5).
360. The CIA’s exemption also includes § 552a(g)(1)–(2) which makes an
agency liable under civil remedies for failing to comply with information requests or to amend records. Id. § 552a(j)(1).
361. Section 552a(g)(3), allowing a court to enjoin an agency from withholding records, is also included the CIA exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(j)(1). Id. Note, however, that criminal penalties for misuse of the information may still apply. See id.
362. Id. § 552a(j)(2).
363. Id.
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364

identity of informers. Under such circumstances, the federal
agency may prevent information about the records from being
365
made available to the individual named in the record. It is
not, moreover, required to maintain only such information “as
is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agen366
cy” as required by statute or Executive Order. Precisely on
such grounds, biometric systems have already been exempted
from the Privacy Act via notices published in the Federal Reg367
ister. The statute also allows for a specific exemption for
“other administrative purposes”—a provision that has already
368
been put to use.
The Department of Homeland Security’s automated biometric identification system, for instance, incorporates information pertaining to civil and criminal law, including immigration, investigations, national security, and intelligence
369
activities. It also contains unique identifiers and encounter
history information which is used to place the biometric infor370
mation in context. The information is collected by or on behalf of DHS and its components and may contain personally
identifiable data collected by domestic or foreign intelligence
371
agencies. In July 2006, DHS published a notice of proposed
rulemaking to exempt portions of IDENT from one or more
372
provisions in the Privacy Act. No responses were received by
the Department, which made the rule final within a year of its
373
initial filing.
DHS made use of its overlapping authorities to claim multiple exemptions. The waiver, it claimed, was necessary to protect national security, immigration, border management, and

364. Id. § 552a(k)(5).
365. See id. (exempting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3), § 552a(d), and
§ 552a(e)(4)(G)–(I)). Note also that the agency is therefore not required to establish procedures and rules whereby individuals can be notified as to whether
such records are being maintained in regard to the individual or the procedures to be followed to gain access to the same. See id. (exempting 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(f)).
366. Id. (exempting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)).
367. See infra notes 371–78, 403–14 and accompanying text.
368. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)–(12).
369. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions, 72 Fed. Reg.
38,749 (July 16, 2007) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 5).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 38,751.
372. Id.
373. Id.
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374

law enforcement activities. The Department evinced further
concern that revealing such data would undermine the physical
safety of informants and officials and lead to the release of clas375
sified information. Additionally, DHS stated, “[d]isclosure of
information to the subject of the inquiry could also permit the
376
subject to avoid detection or apprehension.” DHS followed
this notice with a second proposal for rulemaking in July 2011,
exempting the terrorist screening database from Privacy Act
requirements because of criminal, civil, and administrative en377
forcement requirements. It applies, inter alia, to the USVISIT program for inclusion into the DHS Enterprise Biomet378
rics Service. Various other exemptions have been invoked for
379
programs collecting biometric and other data.
Later amendments to the Privacy Act have done little to
increase its traction with regard to biometric collection systems. In 1988, for instance, Congress amended the Privacy Act
to address the use of records in automated matching pro380
grams. This statute added procedural requirements for agen381
cies to follow regarding computer matching activities. It provided for notice and the opportunity to refute adverse
382
information before denial or termination of a benefit. The legislation also required that agencies create data protection
383
boards to oversee their computer matching activities. Each
agency proposing to make significant changes in their records
systems or matching programs became required to provide adequate notice to the Committee on Government Operations of
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of
Homeland Security/ALL—030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database System of Records, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,315, 39,316 (July 6, 2011) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. pt. 5).
377. Id. at 39,315.
378. Id. at 39,316.
379. See, e.g., 75 Fed. Reg. 5,487 (Feb. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R.
pt. 5) (exempting most of the data incorporated into the Automated Targeting
System-Passenger from Privacy Act requirements related to access to information, opportunities to challenge data, and collection of information).
380. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-503, § 5, 102 Stat. 2507, 2512–13 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(o)).
381. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1) (2006).
382. Id. § 552a(o)(1)(D).
383. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at 3
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opcl/1974privacyact.pdf; see 5
U.S.C. § 552a(a)(8)–(13), (e)(12), (o), (p), (q), (r), (u) (2006).
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the U.S. House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Office of Management
and Budget, in order to facilitate an examination of the impact
384
on individual privacy rights. Two years later, Congress enacted the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Amend385
ments of 1990. The statute clarified due process protections;
however, the exemptions still apply.
3. E-Government Act of 2002
386

The E-Government Act of 2002 ostensibly further enhanced protection of personal information. Signed by President
George W. Bush in December 2002, the legislation entered into
387
force in April 2003. The statute requires that agencies engaged in collecting personal information issue a PIA prior to
developing or procuring technologies that collect, maintain, or
disseminate personally identifiable information from or about
388
members of the public. While the changes did not address
continual monitoring of programs underway, their design was
to provide notice that such programs were being initiated. Any
major systems changes entailing new privacy risks would re389
quire the publication of new PIAs. Examples might include
converting paper-based fingerprint systems to electronic databases or the use of new technologies to significantly alter how
information is managed in the system—such as by using new
relational database technologies or web-based processing to ac390
cess multiple data stores for biometric and other data. Similarly, significant merging of government databases would re391
quire a PIA, as would new interagency activities.
Other
examples might include an alteration in the character of data
or when new biometric or video surveillance information—or,
392
indeed, contextual data—is added to the system.
384. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(r) (2006).
385. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 7201, 104 Stat. 1388-334, 1388-334–35 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. 522a(p)).
386. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899.
387. Id.
388. Id. § 208, 116 Stat. at 2921–23.
389. See, e.g., Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Dir., OMB, to Heads of
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, attachments A, B (Sept. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Bolten
Memo], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22/#4.
390. See id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
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PIAs must analyze and describe the information to be collected (e.g., its nature and source), why the information is being
collected, what its intended use is, with whom the information
will be shared, what opportunities individuals have to deny or
grant consent, how the information will be secured, and whether the initiative satisfies the definition of a system of records
393
under the Privacy Act. PIAs must then consider the impact of
394
the system on individual privacy.
The statute, however, once again reflected congressional
aversion to providing public oversight of matters related to national security. The statute allows for public dissemination of
the PIA to be suspended for security reasons or to protect classified (i.e., national security), sensitive (e.g., potentially damaging to a national interest, law enforcement, or free competi395
tion), or private information. Under the legislation, national
security systems are understood as telecommunications or information systems:
[O]perated by the Federal Government, the function, operation, or use
of which—(A) involves intelligence activities; (B) involves cryptologic
activities related to national security; (C) involves command and control of military forces; (D) involves equipment that is an integral part
of a weapon or weapons system; or (E) subject to paragraph (2), is
396
critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions.

The head of the agency or a designee may limit notice and reporting of tracking activities initiated by the agency which relate to authorized law enforcement, national security, and/or
397
homeland security purposes.
4. Oversight and Guidance
In light of the exemptions embedded in the legislation, one
possible recourse for ensuring that agencies do not overreach
might be through oversight bodies. Here, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) bears the responsibility
for overseeing implementation of the Privacy Act and the
398
PIAs. The role of this agency, however, has been extremely
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208(a)–(b), 116
Stat. 2899, 2921–22; see also Bolten Memo supra note 389, at attachments A,
C.
396. 40 U.S.C. § 11103(a)(1) (2006).
397. Bolten Memo, supra note 389.
398. See Guidance on Privacy Act Implications of “Call Detail” Programs,
52 Fed. Reg. 12,290, 12,290 (Apr. 15, 1987); Guidelines on the Relationship of
the Debt Collection Act of 1982 to the Privacy Act of 1974, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,556,
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deferential to agencies exercising their powers of exemption. No
recourse, moreover, to the courts exists. Executive agencies, in
turn, have attempted to expand their authorities further by using exemptions in the Privacy Act to block requests for data
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Under guidelines issued in 1975, OMB explained that the
purpose of the measure was “to assure that personal information about individuals collected by Federal agencies is limited to that which is legally authorized and necessary and is
maintained in a manner which precludes unwarranted intru399
sions upon individual privacy.” The agency nevertheless gave
enormous deference to the exemptions included in the act, mentioning them dozens of times with little or no further com400
ment. OMB also further expanded its reach, noting that the
exemption which provided for notice of disclosure for “routine
uses” could extend to foreign as well as state and local enti401
ties. Records exempted from the Act’s requirements could
still “be disseminated to other agencies and incorporated into
their non-exempt records systems” where they would continue
402
to be exempt from notice and challenge.
15,556 (Apr. 11, 1983); Office of Mgmt. & Budget: Implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741, 56,741 (Dec. 4, 1975); Heads of Executive Departments and Establishments: Responsibilities for the Maintenance of
Records About Individuals by Federal Agencies, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,948
(July 9, 1975); Memorandum from Robert P. Bedell, Deputy Adm’r, Office of
Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to the Senior Agency Officials for Info. Res. Mgmt.,
7 (May 24, 1985) [hereinafter Bedell Memo] (providing an update of Privacy
Act Guidance); Bolten Memo, supra note 389; Memorandum from Jacob J.
Lew, Dir. of the OMB, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 20, 2000),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/m01
-05.html; Memorandum from Sally Katzen, OMB, to Chief Information Officers (Nov. 3, 1997) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/katzen_prwora.pdf; Memorandum from James T.
Lynn, Dir. OMB, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Oct. 3, 1975).
399. Responsibilities for the Maintenance of Records About Individuals by
Federal Agencies, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,948 (July 9, 1975).
400. See, e.g., id. at 28,950 (listing the exemptions); id. at 28,954 (noting
that an agency may not rely on a provision in FOIA for “refusing access to a
record to the individual to whom it pertains, unless such refusal of access is
authorized by an exemption within the Privacy Act”); id. at 28,956 (requiring
that information be provided upon inquiry “unless the system has been exempted from this provision pursuant to subsections (j) or (k)”); id. at 28,957
(discussing denial of access and carving out an exception for the exemptions).
For examples where OMB directly discussed the sections covering the exemptions see id. at 28,971–73 (noting the exemption of CIA and criminal law enforcement records).
401. Id. at 28,955.
402. Id. at 28,971.
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OMB noted that while judicial review could be sought for
specific exemptions, no recourse to the courts could be sought
403
for the general exemptions within the Act. Even the provision
of judicial review of exemptions under subsection (k) was subject to conditions that diminished its effectiveness. For one, it
was undermined by the initial decision to exempt the system of
records: it would be difficult to even know about, much less to
establish standing with regard to, a secret system of records.
While notice might be required of the existence of the exemption, such notice could be abbreviated and made rather cryptic
404
in its form. OMB explained that the only information that
had to be released was the name of the system, the specific provisions of the Act from which the system was to be exempted,
405
and a general explanation of why. For another, even where
the existence of and details about such systems could be established, the courts were to narrowly consider “the propriety of
406
the exemption which denies him access to his files.” That is,
the courts could only inquire into whether the exemption itself
407
could be justified—not the particular case at hand. In the
realm of national security, assumedly, there would be little reason to question whether such an exemption was a legitimate
408
exercise of state authority.
Starting in 1980, the Department of Justice began using
the exemptions in numerous statutes governing disclosure to
block requests submitted under the Freedom of Information
409
Act. In March 1984, OMB conformed its “guidance” on the re403. Id. at 28,969 (noting “that systems of records covered under subsection
(j) (general exemptions) are permitted to be exempted from” judicial review).
404. See Responsibilities for the Maintenance of Records About Individuals
by Federal Agencies, 40 Fed. Reg. at 28,948, 28,970 (July 9, 1975) (discussing
subsections (a)(5), definitions, and (e)(4), public notice); see also id. at 28,971
(noting that a description of the system to be exempted should only be described where “possible”).
405. Id. at 28,971.
406. Id. at 28,969 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 82 (1974)).
407. OMB explained that, consistent with the Senate Report,“[i]n deciding
whether the citizen has a right to see his file or to learn whether the agency
has a file on him, the court would of necessity have to decide the legitimacy of
the agency’s reasons for the denial of access, or refusal of an answer.” S. REP.
NO. 93-1183, at 82 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6996.
408. In 1975, OMB issued further guidance, noting that the procedures for
denials of requests to amend a record did not need to include a justice or judge;
instead, any agency official meeting the statutory criteria would suffice. Implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741, 56,743 (Dec. 4,
1975). Statutory criteria are laid out in 5 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (2006).
409. See, e.g., Doug Letter et al., Business Confidentiality After Chrysler,
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lationship between the Privacy Act and FOIA to the Government’s litigating position, publishing the change in the Federal
410
Register. The circuits subsequently split: the Third Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit rejected the Government’s argument,
while the Fifth and Seventh largely agreed that the Privacy Act
411
should be considered a FOIA (b)(3) statute. In 1984, the Supreme Court was set to hear argument on the question, but before it could do so, Congress passed legislation amending the
Privacy Act to exclude the statute from FOIA (b)(3) considera412
tions. OMB subsequently amended its guidance to conform to
the new statute, erecting a wall between the two pieces of legis413
lation. Where requests cited the Privacy Act, they would be
processed under that legislation alone; where they cited FOIA,
they would be processed under that statute alone; and where
they cited both or neither, two analyses would have to follow in
414
considering whether to grant the request for information.
As the digital revolution took hold, the executive branch
came up with new and innovative ways to avoid the Privacy
Act. This forced OMB to issue further guidance on the implications of call detail programs, inter-agency sharing of personal
data, and the E-Government Act. OMB recognized the particular challenges posed by new technology, noting in 1987 the
same problems that biometrics now pose to the applicability of
the statute:
Rapid growth in automated data processing and telecommunications technologies has created new and special problems relating to
the Federal Government’s creation and maintenance of information
about individuals. At times, the capabilities of these technologies
have appeared to run ahead of statutes designed to manage this kind
415
of information, particularly the Privacy Act.
FOIA UPDATE (1980), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates/
Vol_I_2/page4.htm.
410. Revised Supplemental Guidance on Implementation of the Privacy Act
of 1974, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,338, 12,338 (Mar. 29, 1984).
411. Compare Provenzano v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 799, 800 (3d
Cir. 1983), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 413 (1984), with Shapiro v. Drug Enforcement
Agency, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 413 (1984), and
Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690–91 (5th Cir. 1980), superseded by statute,
CIA Information Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209 (1984) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a), as recognized in Ely v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,
781 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986).
412. See H.R. Res. 5164, 98th Cong. (1984) (enacted).
413. See Bedell Memo, supra note 398.
414. Id. at 9.
415. Guidance on Privacy Act Implications of “Call Detail” Programs to
Manage Employees’ Use of the Government’s Telecommunications Systems,
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OMB has yet to issue specific guidance on the remote biometric
identification systems that are beginning to proliferate.
5. Privacy Impact Assessments Issued in Relation to
Biometric Collection Systems
Some PIAs have been issued for government biometric programs. Their chief value appears to be in informing the public
that new initiatives aimed at gathering personal information
are underway. They do little to address contrary concerns and
lack any stringent mechanism to revise the programs. In addition, they are often so broad as to make the issuance of a PIA
almost meaningless, in that they allow for significant further
growth of the programs absent any further public notification.
Agencies issuing PIAs are under no compulsion to address
public concerns raised in the course of the PIA process. Already
this effect can be seen in the biometrics realm. Starting in
2004, for instance, the Department of Homeland Security be416
gan issuing PIAs for development of its US-VISIT program.
US-VISIT soon expanded to become the DHS repository for
USCIS biometric (fingerprints and photographs) and biographic
data, with its targets extending to include lawful permanent
417
residents, individuals seeking asylum, and other aliens. In
response to a notice of proposed rulemaking that paralleled the
July 2006 PIA, DHS received a dozen submissions raising privacy concerns particularly in relation to “mission creep” (i.e.,
concern that US-VISIT was expanding beyond its original purpose in a way that those participating in the program had not
anticipated); the lack of judicial review for those impacted by
US-VISIT; privacy during the inspection process; and false
418
hits. Responding to claims of mission creep, which appeared
to be the area of greatest concern, Paul Hasson, the Acting Pri52 Fed. Reg. 12,290, 12,291 (Apr. 20, 1987).
416. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR
TECHNOLOGY (US-VISIT) PROGRAM IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NOTICE OF
PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE AUTHORITY TO PROCESS ADDITIONAL ALIENS
IN US-VISIT 3 (2006) [hereinafter US-VISIT PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE
AUTHORITY TO PROCESS ADDITIONAL ALIENS], available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_addaliens.pdf; DHS, UPDATE FOR
US-VISIT, supra note 115; DHS, INCREMENT 1, supra note 135.
417. See US-VISIT PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE AUTHORITY TO PROCESS ADDITIONAL ALIENS, supra note 416. Note that the program exempts
children under the age of fourteen and persons over the age of seventy-nine,
but includes lawful U.S. permanent residents. Id. at 3.
418. Id.
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vacy Officer, simply noted that DHS has always anticipated expanding the program to cover all aliens entering the United
419
States.
As if to underscore biometric program expansion, in 2006,
US-VISIT partnered with the United States Coast Guard
(USCG) to develop new technologies to provide for biometrics
collection and analysis capability at sea. Its first PIA, issued in
November 2006, announced the Mona Passage Proof of Con420
cept, to be conducted November 2006 through April 2007. The
program held national security and law enforcement applications. The aims were to develop biometric capabilities for DHS,
to provide information necessary to determine what to do in the
case of undocumented alien interdictions, to deter human
421
smuggling, and to help preserve life at sea. Handheld devices
obtained fingerprint and digital images, connecting biometric
information with biographic data (name, gender, date of birth,
nationality, departure point, date of departure, destination
point, and identity of the master of the U.S. vessel in ques422
tion). USCG vessels were equipped with stand-alone computers to correlate IDENT biometric data and associated fingerprint identification numbers with information corresponding to
KSTs, aggravated felons, previous deportees, and recidivists
423
from Caribbean countries. DHS updated the PIA in 2007 to
reflect the new ability to update the biometric databases located on the vessels by satellite technologies for analysis against
424
the IDENT database. In 2008, DHS issued a new PIA to reflect the expansion of the program at sea, “along with other re425
mote areas where DHS operates.” In addition to interdiction
419. Id.
420. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
U.S. COAST GUARD “BIOMETRICS AT SEA” MONA PASSAGE PROOF OF CONCEPT 2
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_
uscg_monapass.pdf. More than forty percent of the undocumented aliens interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard since 2004 tried to enter the United States
illegally through the Mona Passage, located between the Dominican Republic
and Puerto Rico. Id. at 3.
421. Id. at 2.
422. Id. at 3–4.
423. Id. at 4. The databases would be updated on a regular basis. Id.
424. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE
FOR THE U.S. COAST GUARD “BIOMETRICS AT SEA” PROGRAM 2 (2007), available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_uscg_monapass_
update.pdf.
425. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
U.S. COAST GUARD “BIOMETRICS AT SEA” 2 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_uscg_biometrics.pdf.
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of undocumented aliens and human trafficking, the systems
would be directed toward smuggling, drug interdiction, and
other illegal activities, thus including the relevant criminal his426
tory as well as other contextual and biographic data. Further
updates were issued in 2011, reflecting technological advances
427
in data transfer, storage, and encryption systems.
The U.S. Coast Guard is not the only entity at DHS to issue a PIA for emerging biometric programs. In July 2011, for
instance, the Transportation Security Laboratory, which focuses on new technologies to detect and mitigate the threat of improvised explosive devices, issued a PIA that outlined its intended use of iris and fingerprint recognition technology to
428
determine access to the facility.
DOJ, like DHS, has also issued a limited number of PIAs
in regard to biometric programs. The first such document appears to have been released in 2004, noting the proposed devel429
opment of a Biometrics-Reviewer Website/Database. The goal
of the program was to develop a prototype using information
voluntarily submitted by individuals familiar with biometrics
and interested in volunteering to serve on agency review pan430
els. Data to be obtained included name, employment type,
employer, biometric experience (e.g., years, type (operational,
research and development, test, and evaluation)), and modality

426. Id. at 2–3.
427. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/USCG/PIA-002(C), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE U.S. COAST GUARD “BIOMETRICS AT SEA” 2
(2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_
uscg_bass_update002c.pdf (describing the program’s replacement of encrypted
flash drives with the use of USB cables and encrypted hard drives to minimize
the gap in transferring biometric and biographic data from the system laptop
to the onboard computer connected to the USCG Data Network Plus). Note
that LEIDB/Pathfinder, another USCG database, does not contain any photographs or biometric data. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFO. DATA BASE (LEIDB)/
PATHFINDER 6 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/

privacy_pia_leidbpathfinder.pdf.

428. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/S&T/PIA-023, PRIVACY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR THE BIOMETRICS ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM AT THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY LAB 2 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/privacy/privacy-pia-st-tsl-bacs.pdf.
429. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA): Biometrics-Reviewer Website/Database, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Dec. 21, 2004), http://www.fbi
.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/biometrics [hereinafter FBI, BiometricsReviewer].
430. Id.
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431

(facial recognition, fingerprints, etc.).
The information,
housed at a contractor facility, would be available to the National Science & Technology Council’s Interagency Working
432
Group on Biometrics.
As aforementioned, a strong argument could be made that
PIAs provide little by way of limits on the federal development
of biometric programs. PIAs for the FBI’s Next Generation
433
Identification program, for instance, are incomplete. Thus
far, it appears that only two PIAs have been issued specifically
in relation to the program, which is designed with seven con431. Id. “Modality” refers to the application of biometric technologies to different physical attributes. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH. ET
AL., PRIVACY AND BIOMETRICS: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 12
(2006), available at http://www.biometrics.gov/docs/privacy.pdf. Fingerprint,
face, iris, voice, signature, and hand geometry are some examples of the different types of modalities being developed. Id.
432. FBI, Biometrics-Reviewer, supra note 429.
433. Prior PIAs related to the FBI’s biometric technologies include: Privacy
Impact Assessment: National Dental Image Repository, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2006), http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/ndir
(discussing the 2005 creation of the National Dental Image/Information Repository to facilitate the identification of missing, unidentified, and wanted persons by drawing on dental records, photographs, and x-rays of the head and
neck region); FBI, Biometrics-Reviewer, supra note 429; Privacy Impact Assessment: National DNA Index System (DNS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/dns
(discussing CODIS and noting that, although a notice for the National DNA
Index System had been published in the Federal Register in 1996, a PIA had
not previously been submitted); Privacy Impact Assessment: Computer Aided
Facial Recognition Project, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Feb. 19, 2004),
http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/facial-recognition (detailing a study at the University of Sheffield in England and elsewhere on the statistics of facial landmark geometry); Privacy Impact Assessment: Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System National Security Enhancements, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacyimpact-assessments/iafis (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). An additional PIA listed
on the FBI website lacks a date, but relates directly to biometric data. See Privacy Impact Assessment: DOJ/FBI-DHS Interim Data Sharing Model (iDSM),
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impactassessments/idsm (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (discussing pilot informationsharing initiative between DHS and DOJ/FBI); see also Privacy Impact Assessment for the Fingerprint Identification Records System (FIRS) Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) Outsourcing for Noncriminal Justice Purposes–Channeling, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (May
5, 2008), http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/firs-iafis (discussing the use of biometric data for noncriminal justice purposes); Privacy Impact
Assessment for the eGuardian Threat Tracking System, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/eguardian
-threat (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (discussing the use of suspicious activity reports to determine which cases require investigative follow-up).
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stituent parts and the incorporation of multiple new technologies in mind.
The first PIA, released in June 2008, focused on the Inter434
state Photo System (NGI-IPS). The assessment highlighted
enhancements to the existing system, such as the ability to retain more photographic images, new opportunities for local,
state, and federal agencies to submit photographs, and additional search capabilities, including automated searches using
435
facial recognition technology.
Although other government
agencies claimed that additional public information they collected would only be used to run against their existing data436
bases, and not kept for further data mining, the FBI’s PIA is
written to include the retention and future use of such images—even in cases where direct identification from the images is
437
not immediately possible.
The PIA offers little to mitigate concern about the new sys438
tem beyond the FBI’s existing standards and policies. At the
same time, it recognizes significant gaps in protection of individual privacy. Individuals may be unaware that their images
439
have been recorded—much less stored. For information submitted by criminal agencies, individuals have no opportunity or
right to refuse collection; for civil submissions, refusal to provide information may have an adverse impact on the govern440
ment benefit being requested. The PIA specifically notes that
the FBI is not responsible for authenticating or correcting data
441
in the system. The Bureau’s clear aim, moreover, in adopting
the system, is to allow the FBI to “provide additional function434. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18.
435. Id. § 1.7.
436. See supra text accompanying notes 110–14.
437. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18.
438. The PIA recognizes, for instance, that the FBI’s existing technology
protections, vetting of system users, existing access policies, training requirements, and audit policies will be applied to the new system. Id. § 8.1–8.7. In
turn, technologies to be incorporated into the IPS in the future will be “carefully assessed and tested prior to implementation to ensure that is [sic] sufficiently reliable to provide the desired benefits and minimize erroneous identifications, coupled with only employing facial recognition technology as an
investigative aid and not as a means of positive identification.” Id. § 9.3.
439. Id. § 6.1.
440. Id. § 6.2.
441. See id. § 7.4 (noting that, because the data on Identification Records is
submitted by local, state and federal agencies, those agencies are responsible
for authenticating and correcting that data).
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ality to further law enforcement needs and keep pace with
442
emerging technologies.” It is therefore remarkable that the
PIA itself fails to consider the many individual technologies
currently involved in IPS in any detail—even as it merely recognizes that future technologies must simply be considered in
terms of their level of accuracy, and not on their qualitative
impact on knowledge generation.
The second PIA, approved in January 2012, detailed the
FBI’s deployment of the Repository for Individuals of Special
443
Concern, one of the elements in AFIT (the revised IAFIS).
This document similarly underscores the ineffectiveness of the
Privacy Act. For instance, the PIA provides no detail on how biometric data obtained from local, state, federal, and foreign entities will be analyzed to determine if it meets the various sub444
categories for inclusion in the RISC. It reports that information is to be shared with a wide range of DOJ components,
445
as well as external domestic and foreign agencies. The PIA
notes that individuals will not generally have the opportunity
or the right to decline to provide information—nor will their
446
consent be required. The PIA itself serves as notice to individuals that their information may be contained in the data442. Id. § 9.3.
443. RISC PIA, supra note 201. During a meeting with the author, the FBI
suggested that the PIA had been issued in July 2010. As of April 2012, however, no such document was publicly available. Following inquiries and formal
requests for the PIA by the Georgetown Law Edward Bennett Library, in July
2012, the FBI placed a PIA on its website, indicating that the document had
been approved in January 2012. See id.; see also NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 184, at 14 (indicating that the RISC PIA was under consideration by the FBI’s Office of the General Counsel as of April 2009).
444. See RISC PIA, supra note 201, § 1.1 (“The RISC entails a specially collated subset of existing records . . . of known or appropriately suspected terrorists, wanted persons, registered sexual offenders, and other special interest
categories warranting more rapid biometric-based responses to inquiring users
in time-critical situations . . . .”).
445. Within DOJ the primary recipients will be the FBI, the DEA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, the U. S. National Central Bureau (INTERPOL), and the United
States Marshals Service (USMS). Id. § 4.1. It will be shared externally with
various authorized federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or international governmental agencies. Id. § 5.1.
446. Id. § 6.2 (“Because the information in the RISC subset is collected in
connection with law enforcement investigations and/or processing, individuals
generally do not have the right or opportunity to object to the collection of this
information by the source agencies, nor to the forwarding of the collected information for retention in the NGI and/or the NCIC, nor to the collation of the
RISC subset from information in the NGI.”).
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447

base. RISC-related information, moreover, is explicitly exempted from individual access, accounting, and amendment
448
provisions in the Privacy Act.
No PIAs have been issued for the other NGI programs,
such as Rap Back, the collection of palm prints, or the use of
iris technologies. It is thus unclear, on the criminal side,
whether the Rap Back program will focus on actual conviction
for federal offenses or merely arrest. The civil component is
equally undefined and apparently unlimited. Further, it is unclear whether the iris technologies incorporated in the program
will be IBI-type iris scans or RBI-type scans. The use of such
technologies in a remote manner shifts the discussion to one of
investigation and intelligence gathering, raising issues more
akin to FRT than to fingerprint or palm print biometrics.
Beyond the above PIAs, it is not known publicly the degree
to which the exemptions for classified, sensitive, or private information have prevented further notice of programs underway. In any event, the public’s ability to challenge any of the
programs thus revealed or to gain further information about
their operation is severely limited.
Congress has thus provided the executive with extensive
authority to gather personally identifiable information on individuals. Simultaneously, such limits as have been introduced
on these authorities appear less than effective with regard to
emerging biometric programs. But what about criminal statutes, which regulate the collection of information on individuals
in the context of investigation and prosecution—how do these
treat emerging biometric programs?
B. CRIMINAL LAW SURVEILLANCE
Strict guidelines limit law enforcement’s access to personal
information using electronic intercepts. The insertion of a judicial check on the exercise of state authority prior to the collection of data grew directly from circumstances remarkably close
to what is being recreated in the realm of RBI—i.e., concern
about the use of new technologies to remotely obtain information absent the target’s awareness. Existing statutes, however, fail to contemplate the type of technologies driving RBI.

447. Id. § 6.4.
448. Id. § 7.1.
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1. Precursor to Title III: Katz, Berger, and the Federal
Communications Act
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
449
Act of 1968 governs aural surveillance. Congress enacted the
statute in response to Katz v. United States and Berger v. New
York, two landmark Fourth Amendment cases, as well as to
perceived shortcomings in Section 605 of the Federal Commu450
nications Act.
In Katz, the petitioner had been convicted of placing a bet
from a telephone booth in Los Angeles to bookmakers in Miami
451
and Boston, in violation of a federal statute. At trial, the government introduced evidence derived from a listening device
452
that had been attached to the outside of the phone booth. In a
watershed decision authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the
Court famously announced that “the Fourth Amendment pro453
tects people, not places.” In his concurrence, Justice Harlan
laid out what has come to be known as the reasonable expectation of privacy test. The test incorporates a subjective element
(i.e., that the individual in question exhibit an actual expectation of privacy), as well as an objective element (i.e., that the

449. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–2522 (2006). For judicial application of Title III to silent video surveillance, see, for example, United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994)
(discussing application of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 to silent video surveillance); United States v. CuevasSanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Biasucci,
786 F.2d 504, 508–09 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing application of Title III and
FISA to silent video surveillance); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 880–
81 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Roberto Iraola, Lights, Camera, Action!—
Surveillance Cameras, Facial Recognition Systems and the Constitution, 49
LOY. L. REV. 773, 787 n.67 (2003) (“[W]hen the use of video camera surveillance has involved circumstances protected by the Fourth Amendment, some
courts have used Title III as a guide for the constitutional standard governing
the application for a warrant.”); Denise Troy, Comment, Video Surveillance—
Big Brother May Be Watching You, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 445, 449 (1989) (“Although Title III and the 1986 Act do not include video surveillance, federal
courts have borrowed the standards for audio surveillance when reviewing
video surveillance orders.”).
450. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967); see People v. Trief, 317 N.Y.S.2d 525, 529–30 n.5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1970), aff’d, 323 N.Y.S.2d 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). For a discussion of the
shortcomings of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, see infra text accompanying notes 463–68.
451. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 351.
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expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as rea454
sonable).
In the second case, Berger, the Supreme Court struck
455
down parts of a New York eavesdropping statute, which allowed for the use of an electronic surveillance device for sixty
days, with further extensions available without requiring a
456
showing of probable cause. The Court explained:
The Fourth Amendment commands that a warrant issue not only
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, but also “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” New York’s statute lacks this particularization . . . . It lays down no requirement for particularity in the warrant
as to what specific crime has been or is being committed, nor “the
place to be searched,” or “the persons or things to be seized” as specif457
ically required by the Fourth Amendment.

The statute in question failed to provide precise and discriminate requirements, making it possible to issue general warrants—instruments roundly rejected at the time of the found458
ing. The New York statute omitted any requirement that the
officer engaged in the surveillance believe that an offense had
459
been, or was about to be, committed. It failed to require that
the conversations, or property sought, be particularly de460
scribed. The statute lacked both notice and judicial supervi461
sion. This case, along with two cases decided immediately before Katz, underscored the importance of the warrant
462
requirement in the Fourth Amendment.
454. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
455. Berger, 388 U.S. at 44.
456. Id. at 43 n.1.
457. Id. at 55–56.
458. Id. at 58 (“New York’s broadside authorization rather than being
‘carefully circumscribed’ so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of privacy
actually permits general searches by electronic devices, the truly offensive
character of which was first condemned in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St.
Tr. 1029, and which were then known as ‘general warrants.’ The use of the latter was a motivating factor behind the Declaration of Independence.”).
459. Id. at 56.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 60.
462. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (contrasting the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement with the “indiscriminate, general
authority” granted to searches in the Colonies); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967) (“[O]ne governing principle [in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence] . . . has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is
“unreasonable” unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”); see
also David A. Sklansky, Katz v. United States: The Limits of Aphorism, in
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As with the current lack of a statutory regime in regard to
RBI, the federal statutes in place at the time of Berger and
Katz proved inadequate in addressing the use of new technologies. The Federal Communications Act provided that “no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
463
communication to any person.” Within three years of the
statute’s enactment, the Supreme Court fashioned an exclusionary rule to prevent the introduction of illegal wiretap evi464
dence in federal court.
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act was subject to a number of limitations that significantly undermined
its effectiveness. For instance, illegally obtained information
could not be introduced into federal court, but it could be used
465
in state proceedings. The statute only applied, moreover, to
information actually introduced into court—it did nothing to
regulate the wider problem of wiretapping generally (and subsequent use of such information outside of judicial proceed466
ings). Additionally, the statute only applied to wire communications, not to electronic bugs and other forms of
467
eavesdropping. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenback con468
sidered it the “worst of all possible solutions.” General wiretapping could continue unabated, even as evidence obtained
469
pursuant to probable cause was excluded from court.
2. Title III/Title I
Title III reached beyond Section 605 to govern federal and
470
state officials, as well as private actors. It took the Supreme
Court’s articulation of Fourth Amendment protections in Katz
and Berger and inserted parallel provisions directly into the
law. As originally drafted, however, Title III only applied to
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 223 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (describing the
“combined effect” of Warden, Camara, and other cases).
463. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48
Stat. 1064, 1103 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006)).
464. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937).
465. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
294 (3d ed. 2009).
466. Id. at 295.
467. Id. at 294.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 294–95.
470. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
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471

wire and oral communications. Eighteen years after its introduction, Congress extended it to apply to a third kind of communication: electronic communications. This legislation, the
1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), contained three parts which now form the statutory framework for
intercepts: the Wiretap Act (Title I of the 1986 act, updating Title III), the Stored Communications Act, and the Pen Register
Act.
ECPA understands “wire communications,” to which it
gives the greatest degree of protection, as
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable,
or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of
reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station)
furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign com472
merce.

An “aural transfer,” in turn, is understood as any communica473
tion, which, at any point, contains the human voice. It does
not need to be a major part of the communication, but merely
present, in some form, at some point in the course of the com474
munication. Thus, communications that initially may have
included a form of the human voice, but are subsequently
475
translated into codes or tones, still count as aural transfers.
The aural transfer must take place, at some point, across a
wire or similar medium, although it may be conveyed through
476
air at some point as well.
“Oral communication,” which receives slightly less protection, consists of communication “uttered by a person exhibiting
an expectation that such communication is not subject to inter477
ception under circumstances justifying such expectation.”
Such communications generally relate to the use of electronic
478
recording devices, such as bugs.
“Electronic communications” receive the lowest level of
protection. They consist of all non-wire and non-oral communi471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.

Id. § 2511.
Id. § 2510(1).
Id. § 2510(18).
Id.
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 465, at 297.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2006).
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 465, at 297.
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cations: i.e., “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole
or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign com479
merce.”
With RBI generally, and FRT more specifically in mind, it
is important to underscore again that the only types of communications explicitly covered include wire, oral, and electronic.
Title III, as amended by Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, thus neither explicitly prohibits nor does it,
480
on its face, overtly govern video surveillance. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report that accompanied the original statute, in reiterating Title III’s definition of “aural acquisition”
took this one step further, stating “[o]ther forms of surveillance
481
are not within the proposed legislation.”
Some judges and legal scholars have suggested that, as a
result, Title III/Title I are utterly irrelevant to consideration of
video surveillance generally, much less the pairing of video
surveillance with facial recognition systems, or the use of video
in any sort of biometric identification. Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals thus asks,
Does it really follow that, had Congress considered the matter directly, it would have treated video surveillance exactly the same as those
methods it did consider? I find it more plausible to infer that by choosing to exclude video surveillance from Title I Congress and the President were recognizing that it is different from wiretapping and should
482
not be treated the same.

In Judge Kozinski’s perspective, borrowing elements of Title
III/Title I and applying it to video surveillance amounts to legislative drafting—which the court should not be in the business
483
of doing. Instead, in Judge Kozinski’s view, the courts are
driven back to a Fourth Amendment analysis, outside of statu484
tory considerations.
Other judges, in contrast to Judge Kozinski, recognize the
limitations in the statute and its apparent omission of video
479. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
480. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 465, at 296 (discussing Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968).
481. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 61 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2178; see also United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 886 (7th Cir. 1984).
482. United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 545 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
483. Id. at 542–45.
484. Id. at 542–51; see also discussion infra Part III (Fourth Amendment
considerations).
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surveillance, but then nevertheless apply it to this realm.
Central here are the statute’s procedural protections. In crafting them, Congress drew from the Fourth Amendment discus486
sion in Katz and Berger.
Under the Wiretap Act, to perform an intercept absent the
subject’s consent, law enforcement officers must submit an application to a judge detailing the facts relied upon that would
487
justify an intercept order.
The officer must demonstrate:
probable cause that the target has committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an enumerated offense; particularity with
regard to the type of crime, location, type of communication to
be intercepted, and the identity of the target; necessity (other,
less intrusive methods cannot provide the necessary information); and minimization, so as to reduce the acquisition of ir488
relevant information. In light of the significant amount of information that can be obtained via technology, these
requirements set a higher bar than is otherwise required for a
standard search warrant.
The statute also regulates both who can request the wiretap and how quickly it must be executed. For oral communications, the application must be made by a federal investigative
or law enforcement officer with the approval of a high ranking
official at the Department of Justice and subsequently signed
489
by a federal judge. The order, in turn, must be executed with490
in thirty days (although an extension is possible).
The statute gives aggrieved targets the ability to challenge
the introduction of any wire or oral communication intercepted,
or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that the communication was unlawfully intercepted, the warrant was insufficient on its face, or the interception was not made in conformity
491
with the order of authorization. In 1984, the Supreme Court
carved out a good faith exception: where a law enforcement officer believed a warrant to be valid, the evidence would not be

485. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 541–42.
486. See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
487. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (2006).
488. Id. § 2518(3)(a) (probable cause); id. § 2518(3)(a), (b), (d),(4)(a)–(e)
(particularity); id. § 2518(3)(c) (necessity); id. § 2518(5) (minimization).
489. Id. § 2518(11)(a)(i). Qualified individuals include the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or an acting Assistant Attorney General. Id.
490. Id. § 2518(5).
491. Id. § 2518(10)(a)(i)–(iii).
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suppressed. In 1986, Congress amended the statute accord493
ingly. The exclusionary rule contained in the Wiretap Act
does not apply to electronic communications. Wire or oral communications that fall within the Wiretap Act are subject to exclusion, but not when they come within the ambit of the Stored
Communications Act (which does not have an exclusionary
494
rule). Violations of the Wiretap Act may lead to up to five
495
years imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000 per violation.
The Wiretap Act contains two important exceptions and a
carve-out. First, consent immediately removes a subject from
496
the statute’s protections. An individual can therefore record
his or her own conversations with others, even without informing others participating in the conversation—and can also allow law enforcement access to the conversation—without fall497
ing within the Wiretap Act requirements. A second exception
contemplated by the Wiretap Act centers on information obtained in the normal course of business. Communications service providers are allowed “to intercept, disclose, or use” the
communication in question “in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the
498
rights or property of the provider of that service.” An additional carve-out limits the reach of the statute. Where criminal
activity may be involved, a service provider is authorized to
provide intercepted communications to the appropriate authori499
ties.
In contrast to the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications
Act (SCA), as the name suggests, focuses on communications
that are not being carried en route but, instead, are being

492. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984).
493. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§ 101(e), 100 Stat. 1848, 1853 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.§ 2518(10)(c)).
494. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006).
495. Id. §§ 2511(4)(a), 2520(c)(2)(B).
496. Id. § 2511(2)(c).
497. It could be argued that the remote collection of biometric information
does not involve consent. As is readily acknowledged by the federal agencies
using RBI, targets in public spaces may be completely unaware that this information has been recorded, much less used in some way. See infra Part III
(Fourth Amendment considerations).
498. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006).
499. See id. § 2511(3)(b)(iv).
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500

stored. This legislation makes it an offense to intentionally
access a facility through which electronic communication services are being provided, or access and obtain, alter, or prevent
501
authorized access to wire or electronic communications. Electronic storage is understood in the same way as in the Wiretap
Act, i.e., “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
502
thereof.” The violation does not apply to the individual or organization providing the wire or electronic service; however,
disclosure of the contents of stored communications by service
503
providers is forbidden. There are a few exceptions to the nondisclosure requirement, one of which relates to providing the
504
information to law enforcement in a criminal law context.
The standards under the SCA are less rigorous than those
applied under the Wiretap Act. Less severe criminal penalties
505
apply. There is no exclusionary rule for information illegally
506
obtained. The judicial process, moreover, for obtaining access
to stored communications, is less rigorous than the procedure
adopted for intercepts under the Wiretap Act. Under the SCA,
for information held less than 180 days, the government is re507
quired to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause. If
the information has been held more than 180 days, the government must merely provide prior notice to the subscriber and
obtain an administrative subpoena, a grand jury subpoena, a
508
trial subpoena, or a court order. With subscriber notice, probable cause is not required for the latter; instead, it requires only “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds” to believe communications are relevant to a

500. Id. §§ 2701–2711. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the
Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004) (explaining the basics of the SCA).
501. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
502. Id. § 2510(17)(A).
503. Id. § 2702(a)(1)–(3).
504. Id. § 2702(b)(7).
505. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (2006) (SCA penalties), with id.
§§ 2511(4)(a), 2520(c)(2)(B) (Wiretap Act penalties).
506. But see id. § 2707 (setting forth a right to a civil action for equitable
relief, damages, and attorney’s fees).
507. Id. § 2703(a).
508. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(A)–(B).
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criminal investigation. Absent subscriber notice, however, the
510
government is required to obtain a warrant.
As aforementioned, neither Title III nor the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act specifically addresses video
surveillance. A case could be made, however, that where the
government intercepts a wire or electronic communication that
includes video images, such as emailing a video clip from an
iPhone or conducting a conversation by webcam, then the Wiretap Act applies. The storage of such information, moreover,
would fall within the Stored Communications Act. But it is
questionable the extent to which the statutory framework applies to RBI. The actual use of a surveillance camera mounted
in a public space does not involve the interception of communications (as defined under the Wiretap Act, involving use of a
511
cable or wire). Nor is the act of surveillance indicative of
stored communications or images. To the extent that RBI thus
depends upon video surveillance for its execution (as, for instance, in some cases of the application of FRT), it does not appear to necessarily come within this regime. To the extent that
the surveillance involves the use of audio, it may fall within
oral communications, and thus be subject to the Wiretap
512
Act —but here, a question presents itself as to whether individuals, by entering public space, are giving their consent to be
observed. Silent video surveillance, in turn, does not appear to
be covered.
Importantly, every circuit to address silent video surveil513
lance has concluded that Title III/Title I does not apply. Nevertheless, courts look to the standards laid out in Title III/Title
I and borrow them for analysis. In other words, Title III/Title I
509. Id. § 2703(d). Note that notice can be delayed up to ninety days. Id.
§ 2705(a).
510. Id. § 2703(b).
511. Id. § 2510(i).
512. Id. § 2510(2).
513. United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 90–91 (1st Cir. 2010); United
States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 679–80 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 538–41 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. MesaRincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1436–37 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. CuevasSanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251–52 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786
F.2d 504, 508–09 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 880–81
(7th Cir. 1984); see United States v. Ianniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455, 1466–67
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Order Authorizing Interception of Oral Commc’ns &
Videotape Surveillance, 513 F. Supp. 421, 422–23 (D. Mass. 1980); Sponick v.
Detroit Police Dep’t, 211 N.W.2d 674, 690 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); People v.
Teicher, 422 N.E.2d 506, 513 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1981).
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is seen as providing “guidance in implementing the [F]ourth
514
[A]mendment” in an area not specifically covered by Title
I/Title III. Even in circuits where there is pressure not to adopt
Title I as the standard, recourse to the statute ensues. The
Ninth Circuit, for instance, declined to use every technical requirement of Title I; yet it nevertheless insisted upon the presence of probable cause plus four of the statutory requirements
in the Wiretap Act:
(1) [T]he judge issuing the warrant must find that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(3)(c); (2) the warrant must contain “a particular description of
the type of [activity] sought to be [videotaped], and a statement of the
particular offense to which it relates,” id. § 2518(4)(c); (3) the warrant
must not allow the period of [surveillance] to be “longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, []or in any event
longer than thirty days” (though extensions are possible), id.
§ 2518(5); and (4) the warrant must require that the [surveillance] “be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the [videotaping] of [activity]
515
not otherwise subject to [surveillance] . . .,” [sic] id.

These four requirements—those of the best alternative, particularization, limited duration, and minimization—for the Ninth
Circuit, “comport with the demands of the Constitution, and
516
guard against unreasonable video searches and seizures.”
They also reflect the statutory framing put forward in the
517
Wiretap Act.
The statutory framing for criminal law thus fails to account for the types of technologies used in remote biometric
identification. But what of the national security realm? Is there
a better statutory construction here to which we could turn?
C. NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE
The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides
the principal framework for surveillance conducted under the
518
guise of national security.
This statute, and rules subse514. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d at 1438.
515. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 542 (additions and omissions in original)
(quoting Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 252).
516. Id.
517. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(A)–(D), (4)(A)–(E), (5) (2006).
518. At the time of the reconciliation debates between the Senate and
House bills, the House sought to include language making the Act the “exclusive statutory” means for the Executive to conduct electronic surveillance—
implying that the President had inherent surveillance powers outside the
statute. The Senate rejected this notion, saying that if the President were to
engage in electronic surveillance outside the parameters of FISA, upon judicial
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quently implemented by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
519
Court, contemplates the use of a range of techniques. It is unclear whether it covers the types of technologies used in remote
biometric surveillance. Even if RBI is included as electronic
surveillance within the meaning of the statute, restrictions
placed on the collection of information within FISA would be
difficult to maintain with regard to many of the technologies
under development.
1. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
At the most general level, FISA applies to surveillance
520
conducted in the United States.
(Surveillance conducted
overseas falls within the President’s inherent constitutional au521
thority, as channeled through Executive Order 12333.) The
threshold question for FISA thus turns on the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence—i.e., whether the surveillance in
question implicates a reasonable expectation of privacy in re522
gard to which a warrant would be required. Part III.B of this
Article delves into this question—noting, in the process, that
the Fourth Amendment standard applied in national security is
significantly weaker than that adopted in the world of criminal
law. Assuming, arguendo, that we are within the meaning of
review the Supreme Court should treat the President’s actions as consistent
with category three of Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer: i.e., against the expressed intent of Congress. 343 U.S.
579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The Senate view carried. 124
CONG. REC. 33,787 (1978). Note though that the FISA Amendment Act of 2008
added a new exclusive means provision. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 102, 122 Stat. 2436, 2459 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1812).
519. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1)–(4) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
520. See 2008 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 101,
122 Stat. 2436, 2448 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1812). But see 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(f)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (amending FISA to apply to non-U.S. persons outside the United States in some circumstances).
521. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981). In
limiting FISA to domestic surveillance, Congress did not explicitly authorize
the President to conduct surveillance overseas; it simply left the President’s
consitutional authority unchecked, but also unsupported. See also NAT’L SEC.
AGENCY, UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 18, § 4.1(d)(1)
(1993) (outlining surveilance authorities relative to the National Security
Agency).
522. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (“[T]he
installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in
the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a
wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes.”).
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the Fourth Amendment, however, the central question is
whether the techniques employed in remote biometric identification fall within FISA. The answer is far from clear.
FISA, as amended, authorizes the Executive Branch, subject to certain conditions, to collect information on foreign powers and agents of foreign powers, as well as groups “engaged in
523
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.”
Its cornerstone is the definition it adopts of electronic surveillance, understood in two distinct ways. First, as “the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device
524
of the contents of any wire or radio communication,” and second, as “the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or
other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to
acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communi523. Id. § 1801(a)(4). FISA has been amended and its temporary
provisions extended by the following instruments: Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 6(3), 98 Stat. 2779, 2804; Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§ 601–603, 112
Stat. 2396, 2404–13 (1998); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-567, §§ 602–604, 114 Stat. 2831, 2851–53 (2000); USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 901, 1003, 115 Stat. 272, 387,
392; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108,
§ 314(a), 115 Stat. 1394, 1402 (2001); 21st Century Department of Justice
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 305(b), 116 Stat. 1758, 1782 (2002);
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 898, 116 Stat. 2135,
2258 (2002); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638; USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 105–106, 120 Stat. 192,
195–200 (2006); USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments
Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-178, §§ 3–4, 120 Stat. 278, 278–81; Protect America
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552; FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008); Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2010, Pub. L. 111-118, 123 Stat. 3409 (2009); An Act to Extend Expiring
Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005 and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 until
February 28, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-141, 124 Stat. 37 (2010); FISA Sunsets
Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-3, 125 Stat. 5 (2011); PATRIOT Sunsets
Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (2011) (extending the
temporary provisions until June 1, 2015).
524. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); see also id. § 1801(f)(2)
(“[T]he acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United
States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in
the United States, but does not include the acquisition of those communications of computer trespassers that would be permissible under section
2511(2)(i) of title 18 . . . .”); id. § 1801(f)(3) (“[T]he intentional acquisition by an
electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio
communication . . . .”). For the purpose of this discussion, I treat these three
definitions under a similar category, as they all deal specifically with wire or
radio communications.
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525

cation.” RBI technologies do not appear to fall within the first
category; they may or may not be currently included in the second.
Central to the concept of electronic surveillance in the first
sense is the role of communication—that is, information “sent
526
by or intended to be received by a particular” person. It thus
requires the presence of a sender and a receiver. The statute
further defines “wire communication” in terms of a common
527
carrier.
Remote biometric identification involves the recording of
data—but not in the course of communication. Instead, it creates a record of an individual’s physical characteristics, or his
or her presence in certain locations or in the proximity of other
528
individuals. It is not limited to communication across a wire,
cable or like connection. Even where aural recording may occur
in conjunction with biometric identification of two or more persons, such recording takes place not by intercepting a communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like
connection, but by merely recording an open-air conversation.
There is no common carrier involved. RBI therefore does not
appear to fall within the current understanding of electronic
529
surveillance in the first sense.
It may, however, fall within the statute’s second basic understanding—i.e., the installation or use of a surveillance device used to acquire information other than from a wire or radio
communication. What is not clear is whether biometric technol525. Id. § 1801(f)(4).
526. Id. § 1801(f)(1).
527. Id. § 1801(l) (“[A]ny communication while it is being carried by a wire,
cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as
a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission
of interstate or foreign communications.” (emphasis added)). The statute does
not define “radio communication.” See id.
528. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(1) might be read as covering biometric information
obtained from private entities. The statute addresses orders for “tangible
things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)” sought
as part of an investigation “to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United
States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by
the first amendment to the Constitution.” Id. Photographs, video, fingerprint,
and other data could be considered tangible things under this definition. See
also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001)
(replacing former §§ 501–503 in Title V of FISA with new §§ 501–502 of FISA).
529. Similar concerns plague criminal provisions meant to govern surveillance. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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ogies have been included within FISA’s remit. Within this
broader framing, the statute itself does not limit the types of
530
technologies used. But in 2010, Chief Judge John Bates of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issued revised Rules of
Procedure, which specifically addressed new and emerging
531
technologies. The Court currently requires the government to
submit a legal memorandum, prior to the use of any new surveillance or search techniques which “(1) explains the technique; (2) describes the circumstances of the likely implementation of the technique; (3) discusses any legal issues apparently
raised; and (4) describes the proposed minimization procedures
532
to be applied.” The memo must accompany the government’s
initial application. A separate memorandum must be submitted
in support of the government’s position on each issue of first
533
impression. The most that could be said here is that it is not
clear whether any legal memo has been provided with regard to
technologies implicated in remote biometric identification. No
information is publicly available one way or the other.
Even if the collection of biometric information falls within
the definition of electronic surveillance, a question exists as to
whether FISA’s other requirements could be met by RBI. Consider, for instance, the statute’s strictures with regard to (a) the
target of surveillance, (b) the length of the warrant issued by
534
the court, and (c) the statute’s minimization requirements. In
identifying the target of surveillance, FISA sharply distin535
guishes between U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons. To engage in surveillance of a U.S. person, there must be probable
cause not that the individual engaged, is engaged, or will engage in illegal acts (i.e., the warrant requirement under Title
III), but that the individual is a foreign power or an agent
536
thereof. Inclusion as an agent of a foreign power occurs where
530. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
531. U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 11 (on file with
author).
532. Id. 11(b).
533. Id. 11(d).
534. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
535. Id. § 1801(a).
536. Id. § 1802(a)(1). A “foreign power” may be:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not
recognized by the United States; (2) a faction of a foreign nation or
nations, not substantially composed of United States persons; (3) an
entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or
governments; (4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activi-
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one of two conditions hold: either the target is engaged in espionage and clandestine intelligence activities; or the target is
537
engaged in sabotage or international terrorism. For a nonU.S. person to qualify as an agent of a foreign power, he or she
must instead act in the United States as an officer or employee
of a foreign power or member of an international terrorist
group, conduct clandestine intelligence activities within domestic bounds, or engage in international terrorism or activities in
538
preparation therefor. The duration of the warrant similarly
differs based on whether the target is a U.S. person or not. For
the former, the period of surveillance is granted up to 90
539
days. For the latter, the warrant can be extended for up to
540
120 days, with renewal for a period of up to one year. Minimization, moreover, is only required for information concerning
541
U.S. persons.
While the distinction between U.S. persons and non-U.S.
persons, like the distinction between foreign powers and agents
thereof, may be sustainable for IBI where the target is limited
and specific, it is less applicable to RBI where the indiscriminate scanning of multiple individuals occurs. It may be impossible to know, in a public space, which individuals are U.S. persons and which individuals are not. FRT, iris recognition
technology, and other remote technologies serve to identify
multiple individuals in crowds—in the process, necessarily
scanning out some people, even as they help to identify the target. The same difficulties evinced with regard to the target of
the surveillance extend to the duration of an order. Admittedly,
there is no limit to the number of times a FISA order may be
542
renewed. However, the fact that there is an order, and judicial approval, underscores the distinction. Similarly, which
ties in preparation therefor; (5) a foreign-based political organization,
not substantially composed of United States persons; or (6) an entity
that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
Id. § 1801(a)(1)–(6).
537. A third category, less significant than the first two, includes persons
who enter the United States under a false identity. Such U.S. persons must
knowingly enter the country under a false identity “for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assume[] a false or
fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power.” Id. § 1801(b)(2)(D).
538. Id. § 1801(b)(1).
539. Id. § 1805(e)(1).
540. Id. § 1805(e)(1)–(2).
541. Id. § 1801(h)(1).
542. See id. § 1805(d)(2).
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minimization procedures need to be adopted depends upon being able to distinguish the target—a process that can occur (in
the biometrics realm) only after multiple targets have been
scanned.
Other requirements in the statute similarly depend upon
this distinction. Attorney General certification, for instance, allows the Executive to bypass the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), for one year, where electronic surveillance
is directed at communications between foreign powers or from
543
property under their control. In the process, the Attorney
544
General must assert that “no substantial likelihood” exists
that a U.S. person will be party to the communications and
that every effort will be made to minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. per545
sons. In the case of RBI, it is unlikely that that this certification would be sufficient. For information gleaned from public
space—particularly within the United States—the likelihood
that a U.S. person may be involved may be substantial.
At a more general level, it is worth recognizing that the
very nature of RBI runs counter to the specificity that characterizes FISA. The application to FISC for electronic surveillance, for instance, must include either the identity of the tar546
get (if known) or a description of the target. It must include a
statement of facts supporting the claim that the target is a foreign power (or an agent thereof) and that the facilities to be
monitored currently are, or are expected to be, used by a for547
eign power or its agent. The application must describe the
“nature of the information sought and the type of communica548
tions or activities to be subjected to the surveillance.” A designated national security officer must certify that a significant
purpose of the surveillance is to collect foreign intelligence and
that “such information cannot reasonably be obtained by nor549
mal investigative techniques.” The application must specify
how the surveillance is to be effected (including whether physi550
cal entry is required) and include all previous applications
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.

Id. § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
Id. § 1802(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 1801(h)(1).
Id. § 1804(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 1804(a)(3)(A)–(B).
Id. § 1804(a)(5).
Id. § 1804(a)(6)(c).
Id. § 1804(a)(7).
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involving the “persons, facilities, or places specified in the application,” as well as actions taken by the court on these cas551
es. The document includes an estimate of time required for
surveillance and requires an explanation why authority should
552
not terminate at the end of the requested period.
What these requirements have in common is that they are
specific, targeted, and limited—characteristics more consistent
with IBI than with RBI. The act of collecting and storing broad
amounts of information on a number of individuals who do not
fit the requirements laid out in FISA as targets of surveillance
gives rise to concern about whether, and to what degree, remote biometric identification systems could be structured to
meet the approach adopted by Congress in passing the statute.
To summarize the statutory inquiry then, Congress has
granted the Executive broad authorities to obtain personally
identifiable information. While the Privacy Act and the EGovernment Act regulate records systems, they contain exceptions within which biometrics systems appear to fall. In the
criminal realm, Title III and Title I are looked to for instances
of wire, oral, and electronic communications. Yet neither statute directly regulates or prohibits silent video surveillance undertaken for domestic purposes, while questions of consent, an
exception in the Wiretap statute, bedevil audio recordings. As
for national security surveillance, FISA contemplates the use of
electronic surveillance in two primary senses. RBI does not fall
subject to the first; it may or may not currently be covered by
the second. Even if biometric programs are governed by FISA,
there are still significant hurdles to cross with regard to the
statute’s reliance on distinguishing between U.S. persons and
non-U.S. persons—to say nothing of the way in which the specific, limited, targeted nature of FISA runs directly contrary to
the types of activities subsumed within RBI. We are thus driven back upon constitutional considerations: specifically, the
553
Fourth Amendment.
551. Id. § 1804(a)(8).
552. Id. § 1804(a)(9).
553. United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 541–42 (9th Cir.1992); see
also United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1436–37 (10th Cir. 1990)
(“There must be probable cause supported by an oath or affirmation and a particular description of the place, persons, and things to be searched and
seized.”); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251–52 (5th Cir.
1987) (noting that since Title III does not include video surveillance techniques, the court will turn to the Fourth Amendment for guidance); United
States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he Torres court bor-
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III. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Despite the direct attack mounted by remote biometric
technologies on the core of how we conceive of privacy, Fourth
Amendment doctrine provides little by way of relief. Perhaps
the most vivid example is the recent decision in United States
554
v. Jones, which emphasized the doctrine of trespass—a concept irrelevant for the types of issues that arise with regard to
RBI. The Court’s treatment of other remote technologies, such
as aerial surveillance and thermal imaging, prove similarly inadequate in contemplating the challenge mounted by RBI. The
blurring of the line between criminal law and national security,
moreover, and the Court’s weaker standards in relation to the
latter, give rise to further concern.
Sharply increasing this concern are the myriad technologies that are under development but have not yet come of age.
That is to say, this Article has thus far addressed what could be
considered mainstream biometric technologies with RBI implications, such as facial recognition, iris scanning, fingerprinting,
and audio signatures. But what happens when we move into
future modalities, such as gait technologies, hormone sniffing,
and other signature detection technologies? Hyperspectral imagery, for instance, initially developed for mining and geology,
has evolved to encompass applications in both national security
555
and disease surveillance. Like facial recognition, the number
556
of patents being granted in this realm steadily increases. And
rowed four provisions of Title III implementing the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of particularity and minimization as a ‘measure of the government’s constitutional obligation of particular description in using television
surveillance to investigate crime.’” (quoting United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d
875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984)); Torres, 751 F.2d at 882–86 (stating that Title III has
implemented the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement).
554. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
555. E.g., Method & Sys. for Detecting Anomalies in Multispectral and
Hyperspectral Imagery Employing the Normal Copositional Model, U.S. Patent No. 7,263,226 col.1 l.30–45 (filed Dec. 4, 2006) (issued Aug. 28, 2007)
(“Hyperspectral sensors are a new class of optical sensor that collect a spectrum from each point in a scene. They differ from multi-spectral sensors in
that the number of bands is much higher (twenty or more), and the spectral
bands are contiguous. For remote sensing applications, they are typically deployed on either aircraft or satellites . . . . Hyperspectral sensors have a wide
range of remote sensing applications including: terrain classification, environmental monitoring, agricultural monitoring, geological exploration, and
surveillance. They have also been used to create spectral images of biological
material for the detection of disease and other applications.”).
556. E.g., Adaptive Wavelet Coding of Hyperspectral Imagery, U.S. Patent
No. 6,539,122 (filed Mar. 30, 1998) (issued Mar. 25, 2003); Multispectral or
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like the other forms of RBI contemplated in this Article, the
Court’s current jurisprudence has yet to grapple with the consequences, for RBI represents something different in kind—not
degree—from what has come before.
A. THE SHADOW MAJORITY IN UNITED STATES V. JONES
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
557
seized.” In United States v. Jones, the Court concluded that
the placement of a global positioning device constituted a
558
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, zeroed in on the instance of trespass that resulted from the placement of the de559
vice on the vehicle itself. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in her concurrence, did suggest that the Fourth Amendment was
concerned with rather more than just “trespassory intrusions
560
on property.” She explained, “even in the absence of a trespass, ‘a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
561
recognizes as reasonable.’” But, for Justice Sotomayor, “Katz’s
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test augmented, but did not
displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test that
562
preceded it.” She thus joined the majority on what she considered to be narrower grounds—a sort of constitutional de
minimis, which presented itself in the immediate case.
Setting aside the straightforward opinion and concurrence
on which the case was decided, it is possible to read Jones as a
split opinion, or as having what might be considered a shadow
majority. Justices Scalia, John Roberts, Anthony Kennedy,
Clarence Thomas, and Sotomayor applied the trespassory test
Hyperspectral Imaging Sys. & Method for Tactical Reconnaissance, U.S. Patent No. 6,831,688 (filed Apr. 8, 2002) (issued Dec. 14, 2004); Sys. & Methods
for Registering Reflectance and Fluorescence Hyperspectral Imagery, U.S. Patent No. 7,181,055 (filed Aug. 15, 2003) (issued Feb. 20, 2007).
557. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
558. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
559. Id. at 949–54.
560. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
561. Id. at 954–55 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)).
562. Id. at 955.
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563

without rejecting the reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Justices Samuel Alito, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer,
564
and Elena Kagan, in turn, adopted a “mosaic” theory, similar
565
to that which was put forward by the D.C. Circuit. Justice
Sotomayor did not join Justice Alito’s concurrence, precisely because she considered the trespassory test, which established a
566
constitutional minimum, sufficient. In her separate concurrence, however, she went on to endorse the mosaic theory
567
adopted by Justice Alito. She actually went even further,
suggesting that in future cases it might be applied more ag568
gressively to technologies not involving trespass.
It could thus be argued that five justices have indicated
that a mosaic theory could be applied to future cases involving
non-trespassory intrusions. Nevertheless, there is only one true
majority position that now forms part of the Court’s jurisprudence. This decision squarely centers on trespass. And here,
while GPS chips form part of a broader class of surveillance devices that must be physically attached to targets in order to
569
track their movement through public space, not all surveil563. Id. at 949–54.
564. See Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth
Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c
-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring
-a-fourth-amendment-search.
565. Compare United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558–66 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (arguing that the government’s constant GPS surveillance of defendant’s
whereabouts for twenty-eight days amounted to a search under the Fourth
Amendment), with Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In this case,
for four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every movement that respondent made in the vehicle he was driving. We need not identify with precision
the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line
was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”).
566. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
567. See id. at 955 (expressing agreement with Justice Alito that long-term
GPS surveillance violates reasonable expectations of privacy).
568. See discussion infra accompanying notes 731–33.
569. GPS, which originated as a network of twenty-four satellites, was
launched by the U.S. Department of Defense for military applications. What Is
GPS?, GARMIN, http://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
Since it was extended to civilian applications and updated to reflect new technological breakthroughs, GPS receivers use the satellites to triangulate their
position on earth—some with an accuracy of within fifteen meters. Id. Also included in this category are battery-operated devices (a.k.a. “beepers”) which
emit signals that can be picked up via radio frequencies. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.7(e) (4th
ed. 2011). Law enforcement uses of beepers, particularly in the realm of drug
enforcement, involve attaching a device to individuals or goods and then using
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lance devices involve the same element of contact. Factoryinstalled devices in cars or GPS chips in cell phones may prove
equally sufficient for transmitting the car’s whereabouts. As
Justice Sotomayor noted, “In cases of electronic or other novel
modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s trespassory test may
571
provide little guidance.”
Biometric collection devices like
cameras and video feeds enabled with facial recognition tech572
nology, or remote iris scanners, involve no physical touching.
For these, a more appropriate framing might therefore be the
test developed under Katz. Indeed, this was the position Justice
573
Sotomayor took in Jones. Yet the application of this test in
considering the advent of other remote technologies has yielded
a body of jurisprudence that proves similarly inadequate for
contemplating the challenges faced with regard to RBI.
B. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE SPACE: AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND
THERMAL IMAGING
Remote biometrics represents a new and emerging field,
which the Court has yet to confront. There are other technologies that give rise to parallel considerations. The Court has
here applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test to areas
such as aerial surveillance and thermal imaging, in the process
drawing a distinction between public and private space. In this
construction, however, looser standards apply to the former—
which is precisely the domain of interest with regard to RBI.
Yet it is this sphere which gives rise to some of the greatest
privacy concerns as RBI represents something different in
kind—not degree—to what has come before.
In United States v. Knotts, an opinion authored by (then)
Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that monitoring the
signal of a beeper placed in a container of chemicals en route to
a cabin did not invade the cabin owner’s legitimate expectation
574
of privacy. The Court grounded its decision in Katz: “A person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reaa receiver to monitor the target’s movement. Id.
570. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 961 (Alito,
J., concurring).
571. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
572. Note, however, with regard to iris scans, an argument could be marshaled that physical penetration of the body occurs.
573. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
574. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
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sonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place
575
to another.” The Court pointed to the diminished expectation
of privacy that derived from the function of the object of surveillance: i.e., transportation as opposed to one’s residence or
576
“the repository of personal effects.”
An automobile, the Court suggested, “has little capacity for
escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where
577
both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.” Thus,
while the respondent, as the owner of the cabin, had an expectation of privacy within his dwelling place, “no such expectation
extended to the visual observation of [his] car arriving on his
578
premises after leaving the public highway” —nor did it extend
to the movement of the container of chemicals outside the cabin
579
in the open fields. Similarly, again on the grounds of public
versus private space, in United States v. Karo, the Court found
that a beeper entering the home constituted a search within
580
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court has adopted a consistent approach in its treatment of other, emerging remote technologies, such as aerial
surveillance and thermal imaging. Consider first aerial surveillance. The so-called naked eye doctrine suggests that flying a
plane or a helicopter over an individual’s backyard does not
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend581
ment. In California v. Ciraolo, the Court thus held that any
member of the public flying 1000 feet above a home could observe the same information that any police officer could ob582
serve. Aerial observation of the curtilage, however, could become invasive, “either due to physical intrusiveness or through
modern technology which discloses to the senses those intimate
associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to po583
lice or fellow citizens.” The Supreme Court subsequently con575. Id. at 281.
576. Id. (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).
577. Id.
578. Id. at 282.
579. Id. Knotts centered on a combination of visual surveillance and limited
electronic monitoring of a vehicle. It left open the warrantless, extensive use of
a GPS chip to electronically monitor the totality of a target’s movements over
time. See id. at 284–85.
580. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984).
581. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986).
582. Id. at 215.
583. Id. at 215 n.3 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 14–15, California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (No. 84-1513)).

510

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:407

sidered a helicopter flying 400 feet above the ground. In Florida
v. Riley, the Court held that neither the home over which the
helicopter flew, nor the curtilage, was protected from an inspec584
tion that involved no physical invasion. Again, the public versus private distinction prevailed.
Similarly, the Court has held that taking aerial photographs of an industrial complex does not constitute a search
585
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
In Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, the Court determined that manufacturing plants were different in kind from what happens
586
within the curtilage of a home. The industrial nature of the
fixtures to be surveyed in this context more closely resembled
587
an open field than the privacy of a dwelling. In Dow Chemical, moreover, a standard map-making camera had been used,
588
a technology that could not see through walls. The Court was
careful to note that the pictures did not reveal any identifiable
589
human faces. The Court suggested, “[a]n electronic device to
penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions . . . would raise very different and far more se590
rious questions.”
In United States v. Jackson, the Tenth Circuit later relied
on Katz, Ciraolo, and Dow Chemical in holding that video cameras installed on telephone poles, capable of observing “only
what any passerby would easily have been able to observe,” did
591
not fall within a Fourth Amendment definition of privacy.
From these cases, we can conclude that the reasonable expectation of privacy depends, at the most general level, on the
nature of the location under surveillance. That is, surveillance
inside a home is given a much higher degree of protection than
surveillance of public space. Indeed, in United States v. Nerber,
a hidden video camera was used to film a narcotics transaction
592
in a motel room. After the informants left, the camera was
left running, and over the next three hours, recorded illegal ac584. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989).
585. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
586. Id.
587. Id. at 236–37.
588. Id. at 229.
589. Id. at 238 n.5.
590. Id. at 239.
591. United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2000), vacated, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000).
592. United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2000).
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593

tivity. The government conceded, and the court agreed, that
the audio surveillance conducted after they left the motel room
594
was inadmissible under Title III. But as far as the silent video recording was concerned, the court held that “considering
the totality of the circumstances of this case, including but not
limited to the nature of the governmental intrusion” the defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy that they
would not be subject to video surveillance once the informants
595
left. The expectation of privacy in a motel room was impacted
by the nature of the intrusion. Both of these elements, the place
and the nature of the intrusion, thus need to be taken into account.
596
Other technologies have pressed this point even further.
Consider thermal imaging: even if physical intrusion within the
home does not occur, and sensory enhancing technologies are
used to glean information about what happens inside the home,
the higher expectation of privacy that accompanies domestic
dwellings may give rise to a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The key case here is Kyllo v. United
597
States, which centered on detecting home-grown marijuana.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia,
held that the use of sense-enhancing technology to obtain information about the interior of the home, which could not have
been obtained without physical intrusion into that protected
area, constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth
598
Amendment.
In Kyllo, the fact that the thermal surveillance device was
599
not in general public use was relevant. This suggests that the
technology itself, and the ubiquitous nature of the technology,
may have an effect on an individual’s expectation of privacy. If
this is the test for RBI, though, then it is at least probative that
the commercial sector is largely unregulated with regard to its
use of biometric identification. It is, moreover, already taking
concrete steps to yield a profit from its use and clearly interest593. Id.
594. Id. at 604–05.
595. Id. at 600.
596. See, e.g., Kevin Gordon, Automatic License Plate Recognition, L. &
ORD., May 2006, at 10, 10 (2006) (describing technology that scans license
plates and automatically checks them against law enforcement databases).
597. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
598. Id. at 34–35.
599. Id. at 40.
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ed in developing further in this direction. A few examples will
suffice.
PittPatt, developed at Carnegie Mellon (and subsequently
bought by Google), is just one of many off-the-shelf technologies
that can identify individuals in photographs, matching them
with other images found online and then joining the images
with other personally identifiable information found on the In600
ternet. Facebook operates similar software, called Face.com,
which automatically identifies individuals in pictures uploaded
to the site and inquires whether users would like to tag the
601
photos accordingly. Viewdle’s Social Camera, in turn, uses
602
advanced technology to detect and tag photos. Currently in
its beta version, the application (developed for Android phones)
tags pictures based on FRT and then allows them to be synced
and shared through Facebook, Flickr, MMS, or e-mail, automatically tying the images to individual contact information al603
ready stored in the phone. In 2010, Apple acquired Polar
604
Rose, a company specializing in FRT.
RecognizeMe is an
iPhone app that allows for phones to be unlocked by facial
605
scanning.
Private use of FRT, paired with video technology extends
into public space. The Venetian hotel in Las Vegas, for instance, has now rolled out billboards that draw on the technology to advertise bars, clubs, and restaurants appropriate for

600. John Paul Titlow, As Facial Recognition Improves, New Privacy Controversies Await, READWRITEWEB (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.readwriteweb
.com/archives/facial_recognition_privacy_concerns.php. Somewhat disconcertingly, this technology may allow users to predict individuals’ Social Security
numbers using Facebook profile information such as date of birth. Mello, supra note 265.
601. Titlow, supra note 600; see also Daniela Minicucci, Face and Iris
Recognition Apps Both Thrilling and Threatening, GLOBAL NEWS, Sept. 28,
2011, http://www.globalnews.ca/technology/6442491279/story.html.
602. Minicucci, supra note 601.
603. Id.
604. Titlow, supra note 600.
605. This app was billed as “[t]he ONLY Facial Recognition app on App
Store,” “[t]he Most Popular & Astonishing app,” and “[o]ne of the TOP Apps of
2011.” Recognize Me 1.0, QARCHIVE, http://recognize-me.by-best-apps-and
-games.qarchive.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2012); see also Oliver Haslam,
RecognizeMe Brings Biometric Facial Recognition Security for Unlocking iPhone [Cydia Tweak], REDMOND PIE, May 18, 2011, http://www.redmondpie
.com/recognizeme-brings-biometric-facial-recognition-security-for-unlocking
-iphone-cydia-tweak.
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606

the demographic identified.
In Chicago, a startup called
SceneTap, links FRT to cameras located in dance clubs and
bars, allowing users to determine the best male to female ratios
607
before choosing their destinations. Adidas and Intel are working together to install digital walls in stores, with plans to target passers-by with shoe displays appropriate to their age and
608
gender. In 2011, Kraft demonstrated a “Meal Planning Solution” kiosk at the National Retail Federation Show, featuring
the use of FRT to determine which products to advertise to con609
sumers as they peruse the aisles in grocery stores. Privacy
advocates worry not just about such FRT usages, but the pairing of it to Facebook. In such instances, there would be substantially less guesswork: instead of assuming, for instance,
that women between certain ages were more likely to have
children at home, it could simply check the user’s Facebook account and find out precisely what ages the children were and
610
what their interests might be. This would allow companies
like Kraft to market their products directly to consumers as
they enter into stores—based on remote biometric technologies.
C. ELIMINATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMINAL LAW
AND NATIONAL SECURITY
A further consideration in the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is its traditional reliance on the distinction between criminal law and national security. Two observations
here are of note: first, the standards applied to the latter are
considerably weaker than those adopted in the former realm.
606. John Eggerton, Rockefeller Seeks FTC Report on Face Recognition and
Privacy, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 19, 2011, 5:06 PM, http://www.broad
castingcable.com/article/475505-Rockefeller_Seeks_FTC_Report_On_Face_
Recognition_And_Privacy.php; Shan Li & David Sarno, Advertisers Start Using Facial Recognition to Tailor Pitches, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, http://
articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/21/business/la-fi-facial-recognition-20110821.
607. Mello, supra note 265.
608. Li & Sarno, supra note 606.
609. Julia Carpenter, Matching Moms with Macaroni: New Kraft Kiosks
Scan Your Face to Recommend Recipes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2011,
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-01-18/news/27087917_1_kiosk-new-kraft
-recipe-ideas; Linda Tischler, Kraft Store Kiosk Scans Your Face Then Knows
What to Feed It [Video], FAST COMPANY (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www
.fastcompany.com/1716684/kraft-store-kiosk-scans-your-face-then-knows-what
-feed-it-video.
610. Kashmir Hill, Kraft to Use Facial Recognition Software to Give You
Macaroni Recipes, FORBES (Sept. 1, 2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kashmirhill/2011/09/01/kraft-to-use-facial-recognition-technology-to-give
-you-macaroni-recipes.
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Second, as a matter of both law and policy, the lines between
these areas are becoming increasingly blurred.
1. Fourth Amendment Standards with Regard to National
Security
In 1967, Katz dealt with the attachment of a device to the
611
outside of a telephone booth. The Court, considering new
technologies in the context of electronic surveillance, adopted a
doctrine based on the reasonable expectation of privacy for
criminal activity—but it did not settle the question of what to
612
do when national security matters were on the line. Justice
Byron White, in his concurrence, emphasized that the presumption against warrantless searches could be overcome by
pressing need: “We should not require the warrant procedure
and the magistrate’s judgment if the President of the United
States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized
613
electronic surveillance as reasonable.” Justice White’s words
pointed to a different set of rules: under some circumstances,
requirements otherwise applicable within criminal law might
alter.
Justice William Douglas, joined by Justice William Brennan, strongly objected to Justice White’s assertion and pointed
out a certain conflict of interest: “Neither the President nor the
Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they believe national security may be involved they are not detached,
614
disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be.”
The constitutional responsibility of the Executive is to “vigorously investigate and prevent breaches of national security and
615
prosecute those who violate the pertinent federal laws.” Justice Douglas concluded,
Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot
agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when the President and
Attorney General assume both the position of adversary-and616
prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate.

611.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
Id. at 358 n.23.
Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 359–60.
Id. at 360.
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The national security issue proved contentious, and a de facto
double standard evolved. Physical surveillance and electronic
bugging became subject to the reasonable expectation of privacy test, discussed above. But wiretapping, and surveillance
where national security might be involved, constituted a different sort of a question because, there, looser considerations
might satisfy constitutional demands. President Lyndon
Johnson explained in his 1967 State of the Union: “We should
protect what Justice Brandeis called the ‘right most valued by
civilized men’—the right to privacy. We should outlaw all
wiretapping—public and private—wherever and whenever it
occurs, except when the security of this Nation itself is at
617
stake . . . .”
The Executive thus carved out a special sphere for national
security surveillance, independent of criminal law standards
with regard to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Title III,
introduced the following year, focused on criminal law. In
enacting the statute, Congress specifically exempted national
security—leaving such investigations in the hands of the
618
executive branch.
In 1972, a landmark decision further addressed the question of the Fourth Amendment in the context of national security. In United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), the Supreme
Court held 8-0 that Title III did not authorize the Executive to
engage in electronic surveillance for national security purposes;
617. President Lyndon Johnson, State of the Union Address (Jan. 10, 1967)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index
.php?pid=28338.
618. Omnibus Crime Control Act and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3))
(“Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional power
of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security
of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be
deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the
Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of
any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in
the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial
hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and
shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement
that power.” (emphasis added)).
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rather, it simply reflected congressional neutrality. For the
Court, warrantless domestic wiretapping for national security
did not fall exclusively within the constitutional remit of the
620
Executive. While the duty of the state to protect itself has to
be weighed against “the potential danger posed by unreasona621
ble surveillance to individual privacy,” such “Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion
622
of the Executive Branch.”
Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority, recognized
that executive officers could hardly be regarded as neutral and
disinterested: “Their duty and responsibility are to enforce the
laws, to investigate, and to prosecute. . . . [T]hose charged with
this . . . duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize
623
constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.” He
highlighted the dangers: “[U]nreviewed executive discretion
may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
624
speech.” Domestic security surveillance thus did not fall under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement under the
625
Fourth Amendment. Justice Powell rejected the government’s
suggestion that national security matters are “too subtle and
626
complex for judicial evaluation.” Nor did he accept that “prior
judicial approval will fracture the secrecy essential to official
627
intelligence gathering.” The former would suggest that such
surveillance might not be warranted in the first place; the second had long been an aspect of ordinary criminal activity.
628
The Executive Branch largely ignored this decision. Under the guise of national security, the FBI, National Security
Agency (NSA), CIA, and DoD continued to operate domestic
619. 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972). This case is known as Keith, in accordance
with the name of the district court judge who initially ordered the government
to release a number of illegally-obtained conversations.
620. See id. at 316 (stating that “Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot
properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted
solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch”).
621. Id. at 314–15.
622. Id. at 316–17.
623. Id. at 317 (citation omitted).
624. Id.
625. Id. at 320.
626. Id.
627. Id.
628. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM 222
(2008).
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surveillance programs, many of which came to light in the
629
course of the Church Hearings. Like many of the biometric
programs discussed in Part I, above, each of these surveillance
efforts began as a limited inquiry but “gradually extended to
capture more information from a broader range of individuals
630
and organizations.”
The Executive responded to the public outcry that followed
the Church Committee’s findings with a series of actions to
curb surveillance in the national security realm. In 1976, President Gerald Ford banned the NSA from intercepting telegraphs and forbade the CIA from conducting electronic or phys631
ical surveillance of U.S. citizens.
Clarence Kelly, whom
President Richard Nixon had nominated to take over the FBI
following J. Edgar Hoover’s death in 1972, publicly apologized
632
for the Hoover era. Significant gaps, however, continued to
exist. For example, while the Privacy Act ostensibly regulated
the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of citizens’
633
personal data, as discussed in Part II supra, it also provided
634
certain exemptions for the CIA.
National security information held by any agency came to be exempted from certain
635
requirements.
Congress thus came to the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act with the aim of addressing national security surveillance. The law, as discussed in Part II supra, limits the
statute to foreign powers and to agents of foreign powers—
including groups “engaged in international terrorism or activi636
ties in preparation therefor.” While the previous discussion of
FISA focused on the type of surveillance being undertaken, the
relationship of the statute to the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is no less probative of the failure of the
legislature or the judiciary to take account of the unique
challenges of RBI.

629. See id.
630. Id. at 223.
631. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF
1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 496 (2004).
632. Id.
633. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
634. GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31730, PRIVACY:
TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAMS AND RELATED INFORMATION
ACCESS, COLLECTION, AND PROTECTION LAWS 6 (2003).
635. Id.
636. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2006).
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The reasonable expectation of privacy test is built directly
637
into FISA’s definition of electronic surveillance. The level of
probable cause needed, however, for an order to issue departs
638
from that required for a warrant within criminal law. This
639
change reflected Justice Powell’s position in Keith:
Given . . . potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish
to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those
already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. For the
warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest
640
to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.

Under Title III, the court must find “on the basis of the facts
submitted by the applicant that . . . there is probable cause for
belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is
641
about to commit” an enumerated offense. In contrast, FISA
637. See id. § 1801(f)(1), (3), (4) (“(1) [T]he acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio
communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known
United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired
by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes . . . (3) the intentional acquisition by an
electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio
communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes . . . (4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information,
other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.” (emphasis added)).
638. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 318–19
(1972).
639. Note that while the Court in Keith emphasized that the case related to
domestic security, rather than foreign security, the distinction quickly fell by
the wayside.
640. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322–23 (emphasis added). Justice Powell continued:
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the application and affidavit showing probable cause need not follow the exact
requirements of § 2518 but should allege other circumstances more
appropriate to domestic security cases; that the request for prior court
authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a
specially designated court . . . and that the time and reporting requirements need not be so strict as those in § 2518.
Id. at 323.
641. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2006). For wire and oral communications (e.g.,
telephone and microphone interceptions), § 2516(1) enumerates a long list of
predicate offenses that range from bank fraud, see id. § 1344, to unlawful pos-
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does not always require a showing of an imminent crime, or the
elements of a specific offense. Instead, it requires the court to
find “on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant” that
“there is probable cause to believe that . . . the target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a for642
eign power.”
FISA defines the phrases “foreign power” and “agent of a
foreign power” in a manner that may (or may not) require a
showing of criminal conduct. Five of its seven definitions of
criminal conduct can be satisfied without any showing of crimi643
nal activity. The fourth definition, which refers to “international terrorism,” does require some level of criminal conduct.
The term incorporates, inter alia, “activities that . . . involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdic644
tion of the United States or any State.” An organization may
be a “foreign power” under the fourth definition when it engages in “activities in preparation” for international terrorism—a
standard which may (or may not) be more expansive than criminal law, in which a substantial step towards completing the
645
crime generally constitutes attempt.
For a U.S. person to be included as an agent of a foreign
646
power, in turn, one of two conditions must hold: either the
session of a firearm, see id. § 922(g), and including espionage, see, e.g., id.
§ 794 (2006), assassination, see, e.g., id. §§ 351, 1751, sabotage, e.g., id. § 2155,
terrorism, see e.g., id. § 2332, and aircraft piracy, see 49 U.S.C. § 46502. 18
U.S.C. § 2518(1). For electronic communications (e.g., electronic mail or facsimile messages under Title III), any federal felony may serve as a predicate.
Id. § 2516(3) (2006).
642. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. III 2008); see also id. § 1805(b)
(requiring probable cause that the facilities to are to be used by a foreign power or an agent thereof).
643. See id. § 1801(a) (defining foreign power as (1) a foreign government
or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States; (2)
a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United
States persons; (3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government
or governments; (4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefor; (5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States persons; (6) an entity that is directed and
controlled by a foreign government or governments; (7) an entity not substantially composed of United States persons that is engaged in the international
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).
644. Id. § 1801(c).
645. See id. § 1801(a)(4).
646. The statute defines “agent of a foreign power” as
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target is engaged in espionage and clandestine intelligence activities or the target is engaged in sabotage or international
647
terrorism. (A third category, less significant than the first
two, includes persons who enter the United States under a
648
false identity.) For the first of these categories, an individual
engaged in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power may qualify as an agent only where such actions
“involve,” “may involve” or “are about to involve” a “violation of
649
the criminal statutes of the United States.” This standard
falls short of what would otherwise be constitutionally required
in criminal law.
In other words, special rules apply for national security.
Clandestine intelligence activities require something less than
650
probable cause for evidence of criminal activity. For sabotage
or international terrorism, the standard is closer to the crimi651
652
nal norm. For foreign powers, no criminal standard applies.
The Court has roundly rejected efforts to challenge the
constitutional sufficiency of FISA’s provisions on Fourth
any person who—(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence
gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the
United States; (B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power,
which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; (C) knowingly engages in sabotage
or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; (D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false
or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or (E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person
to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
Id. § 1801(b)(2).
647. Compare id. (establishing the definition of “agent of a foreign power”
that applies to all persons), with id. § 1801(b)(1) (establishing the definition of
“agent of a foreign power” that applies to any person other than a United
States person).
648. For fraudulent identity, a U.S. person must knowingly enter the country under a false identity “for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the
United States, knowingly assume[] a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power.” Id. § 1801(b)(2)(D). As a practical matter, it could be
argued that some crime will occur in conjunction with such designation, but
probable cause does not need to be demonstrated up front.
649. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A).
650. See id.
651. See id. § 1801(b)(2)(C).
652. See id. § 1801(a).
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Amendment grounds (as well as Fifth Amendment due process
grounds) because of the purpose for which the statute was cre653
ated: securing foreign intelligence information. That is to say,
the lesser probable cause standards in FISA meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, precisely because of the aims
of the statute itself. In United States v. Cavanagh, the Ninth
Circuit explained,
It is true . . . that the [FISA] application need not state that the surveillance is likely to uncover evidence of a crime; but as the purpose of
the surveillance is not to ferret out criminal activity but rather to
gather intelligence, such a requirement would be illogical. See United
States District Court, 407 U.S. at 322 . . . (recognizing distinction between surveillance for national security purposes and surveillance of
“‘ordinary crime’”) . . . . [T]here is no merit to the contention that he is
entitled to suppression simply because evidence of his criminal conduct was discovered incidentally as the result of an intelligence sur654
veillance not supported by probable cause of criminal activity.

In Keith, Justice Powell suggested that the legislative branch
could make finer distinctions than the judiciary in the context
655
of national security. The Supreme Court has since endorsed
this approach by rejecting petitions for certiorari challenging
656
FISA. And the Executive has made considerable use of its authorities under the statute. Thus, the three branches appear to
have reached agreement: a different constitutional standard
applies in the realm of national security.
The electronic surveillance provisions of FISA that might
apply to the acquisition of RBI have not remained static. The
2008 FISA Amendments Act (FAA) broadened the risk of inter653. See, e.g., United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 476–77 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1185–93 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d without opinion,
729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983), re-aff’d post-trial sub nom. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984), superseded by statute, USA PATRIOT Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 271, as recognized in United States v. AbuJihaad, 630 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2010).
654. United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1987).
655. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 323–24
(1972).
656. See, e.g., United States v. Squillacote, 532 U.S. 971, 971 (2001) (denying certiorari). The government purportedly subjected the petitioners to 550
consecutive days of round-the-clock telephone and physical surveillance under
FISA, in the course of which the government intercepted/transcribed several
psychotherapy suggestions, later using the information to “exploit” one of the
petitioner’s psychiatric vulnerabilities. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1,
Squillacote, 532 U.S. 971 (No. 00-969). The court of appeals found that the
government had made a sufficient showing to warrant FISA surveillance
without, though, giving the defense counsel any opportunity to examine or
challenge the government’s submissions in support of its FISA authority. Id.
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ception, lowering the government’s burden for demonstrating
657
probable cause and reducing FISC’s oversight abilities. The
Court has yet to determine the constitutionality of these weaker standards under the Fourth Amendment.
Prior to the FAA, the statute required the government to
658
identify the specific targets of surveillance. The court then
had to find probable cause that the target was a foreign power
or agent thereof and using (or about to use) the facility to be
659
monitored. Under the FAA, FISC now need only determine
that the general procedures to be followed comply with the subsections of the statute and with the Fourth Amendment—
meaning that the probable cause determination is no longer
particularized for non-U.S. persons believed to be outside the
660
United States. The legislation absolves the Attorney General
and Director of National Intelligence of providing the identity
of specific targets; instead, they must simply submit a written
document, certifying that the targets are not within domestic
661
bounds. FISC’s analysis must only consider the government’s
662
general procedures.
Following enactment of the statute, the ACLU filed a suit
challenging the FAA on both Fourth and First Amendment
grounds. The Southern District of New York dismissed the
claim on the grounds that the plaintiff could not demonstrate
663
standing. In March 2011, a three-judge panel of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the case, allow664
ing it to proceed. An effort to send the case for rehearing en
banc failed in September 2011, allowing the challenge to move
665
forward. The case, formerly Amnesty v. McConnell, then Amnesty v. Blair, and now Amnesty v. Clapper (in keeping with
successive Directors of National Intelligence), challenged the
657. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 125–26 (2d Cir.
2011).
658. See id.
659. See id. at 126.
660. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
661. See id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i)(I).
662. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)
(Lynch, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
663. Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (S.D.N.Y.
2009), vacated sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 150 (2d
Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, Amnesty Int’l USA, 667 F.3d at 164.
664. Amnesty Int’l USA, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011) reh’g en banc denied,
667 F.3d at 164.
665. Amnesty Int’l USA, 667 F.3d at 164.
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constitutionality of the new sections of the statute, which authorized “the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence
666
information.” In February 2012, the Obama Administration
667
filed a petition for certiorari, which the Court granted. Ar668
gument was heard on October 29, 2012.
666. 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
667. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, No. 111025 (filed Feb. 2012).
668. Docket No. 11-1025, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-1025.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). It
is worth noting here that the question of whether litigants have standing is an
important one for consideration of surveillance programs generally and, as
such, one that inevitably accompanies the use of RBI for national security
purposes. Efforts to bring suit in similar contexts, based on a generalized challenge to gathering intelligence, have fallen rather short. In United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, for example, the D.C. Circuit considered a suit lodged
against the President and the heads of various agencies, questioning the legality of Executive Order 12333. 738 F.2d 1375, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see U.S.
Intelligence Activities, Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4,
1981), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006). Appellants challenged
the instrument on Fourth Amendment grounds (protection against unreasonable searches and seizures), as well as the First and Fifth Amendments. United Presbyterian, 738 F.2d at 1377. The claim cited the immediate threat of being targeted for surveillance as depriving the appellants of their legal rights.
Id. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found the alleged grievances
insufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact standing requirement imposed
by Article III of the Constitution. “[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art.
III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to ‘show that
he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.’” Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, (1982), quoting Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). The injury or threat must
be “distinct and palpable,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975),
“concrete,” Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 221 (1974), “direct,” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494
(1974), quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923),
and “both ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” id.,
quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1969), and United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947).
United Presbyterian, 738 F.2d at 1378.
A similar challenge emerged in American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, which addressed the constitutionality of the National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretap program, believed at the time to be targeting individuals understood to be in contact with al Qaeda. 493 F.3d 644,
648–49 (6th Cir. 2007). The plaintiffs in the case included the ACLU, the
Council on American-Islamic Relations, the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, and Greenpeace, along with five authors and journalists, all
of whom had previously communicated with people in or from the Middle East.
District Court Judge Anna Diggs Taylor, the first to encounter the case, considered the program to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to
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2. Blurring of the Lines
The weaker Fourth Amendment standards that apply in
the realm of national security become more pressing when one
considers the gradual breakdown of the distinction between
criminal law and national security. Dual-use authorities, dualuse institutions, and new institutional relationships are contributing to this phenomenon, in the process transgressing important barriers.
Consider FISA. Post-9/11, Congress amended the legislation to allow it to be applied, under certain circumstances, to
criminal investigations. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review initially embraced the alterations, suggesting
broad agreement between all three branches of government.
What these changes suggest is that, at times, biometric surveillance used for criminal purposes may fall within a less rightsprotective, national security framing.
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, a wall had been erected between
intelligence and law enforcement. The USA PATRIOT Act,
however, changed the gathering of foreign intelligence from
the judge, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was precisely “to assure that
Executive abuses of the power to search would not continue in our new nation.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 774
(E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). Judge Taylor quoted
Justice Stewart’s opinion in Katz v. United States: “‘Over and again this Court
has emphasized that the mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes’ (citation omitted) and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 774–75 (quoting
Katz v. United States 389, U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Keith, Judge Taylor noted,
recognized that the clause did not assume executive officers were neutral and
disinterested parties to disputes. Id. at 775 (citing United States v. Dist. Court
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)). According to Judge Taylor, the Fourth
Amendment “requires reasonableness in all searches. It also requires prior
warrants for any reasonable search, based upon prior-existing probable cause,
as well as particularity as to persons, places, and things, and the interposition
of a neutral magistrate between Executive branch enforcement officers and
citizens.” Id. However much Congress conceded to the Executive in enacting
FISA (such as allowing for delayed warrant applications in exigent circumstances, providing for a single, specialized court, or extending the duration of
approved wiretaps from 30 days (under Title III) to 90 days), the Executive
had overstepped its authority in running the warrantless program and, in the
process, had violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 781–82. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned Judge Taylor’s decision. The ruling turned on
standing. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 493 F.3d at 648. In February 2008, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, ending any chance of the lawsuit moving
forward. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 552 U.S. 1179, 1179
(2008) (denying certiorari).
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“the” sole reason for surveillance, to merely a “significant” pur669
pose. Attorney General John Ashcroft quickly seized on this
power and issued guidelines that said such authorization could
be sought even if the primary ends of the surveillance related
670
to ordinary crime. These guidelines collapsed the wall between the FBI’s prosecution and intelligence functions.
Although the FISC had functioned secretly for nearly three
decades, in May 2002 it published an opinion for the first time
671
to protest the guidelines. The court required that the wall be
re-built. FISC centered its directive on the statutory minimiza672
tion requirement and raised concerns about abuse. The court
recognized the reasons a wall had been placed between intelligence gathering and criminal investigations and suggested that
“[t]he 2002 procedures appear to be designed to . . . substitute
the FISA for Title III electronic surveillances and Rule 41
673
searches.” By removing the wall,
criminal prosecutors will tell the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps
when they lack probable cause for a Title III electronic surveillance),
what techniques to use, what information to look for, what information to keep as evidence and when use of FISA can cease because
674
there is enough evidence to arrest and prosecute.

Such measures did not appear to be reasonably designed “to obtain, produce, or disseminate foreign intelligence infor675
mation.” And so, the court imposed conditions.
For the first time in the history of FISC, the government
676
appealed. The Executive argued that Congress’s intent in
669. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291
(2001); see also id. § 201, 115 Stat. at 278 (expanding the Attorney General’s
authority to conduct wire taps to obtain information about terrorism-related
crimes); id. § 207, 115 Stat. at 282 (expanding FISA authority with respect to
duration of surveillance orders).
670. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Dir. of the Fed.
Bureau of Investigation; Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., Counsel for
Intelligence Policy & U.S. Attorneys (Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www
.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html (“[The USA PATRIOT Act] allows
FISA to be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as long as a
significant foreign intelligence purpose remains.” (emphasis in original)).
671. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 621 (FISA Ct. 2002).
672. It noted, for instance, that in September 2000, the government had
admitted that it had made “misstatements and omissions of material facts” in
seventy-five of its FISA applications. Id. at 620.
673. Id. at 623.
674. Id. at 624.
675. Id. at 625 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1); 1821(4)(A)).
676. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
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changing the wording from “the” to “a significant” purpose was,
precisely, to eliminate the wall between intelligence and law
677
enforcement agencies. The attempt to impose minimization
standards was so intrusive as to “exceed the constitutional au678
thority of Article III judges.”
Six months later, a three-judge appellate court, appointed
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, issued its first opinion re679
versing the lower court’s ruling. The appellate court suggested that FISA was never meant to apply only to foreign intelligence information relative to national security, but that it could
680
also be used for ordinary criminal cases. The court went even
further: it interpreted the USA PATRIOT Act to mean that the
primary purpose of the investigation could, indeed, be criminal
investigations, “[s]o long as the government entertains a realistic option of dealing with the agent other than through criminal
681
prosecution.” Stopping a conspiracy, for instance, would suf682
fice.
This change suggests that for the collection of biometric
data as an aspect of foreign intelligence surveillance, at least
insofar as RBI uses new and emerging technologies (such as
FRT) to track individuals through public space, a FISA framing—with weaker standards than apply in criminal law—might
apply, even when the primary aim of the investigation is criminal in nature.
Paralleling the shift to dual-use authorities is the creation
and expansion of dual-use institutions which are responsible
for matters related to criminal law and national security. The
677. Id. at 732.
678. Id. at 722.
679. Id. at 746.
680. Id. at 727.
681. Id. at 735.
682. Id. To reach this conclusion, the appellate court rejected the Fourth
Circuit court’s finding in United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.
1980), a case that rejected warrantless search and surveillance once a case
crossed into a criminal investigation. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725–26.
The Fourth Circuit held that the “Executive Branch need not always obtain a
warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance,” but that the Executive should be
excused from obtaining a warrant only where surveillance was conducted
“primarily” for foreign intelligence purposes. Truong, 629 F.2d at 913. This
became the “primary purpose” test for FISA, which has since been followed by
other courts of appeals. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 726. The appeals
court suggested that Truong may even have been at fault for contributing “to
the FBI missing opportunities to anticipate the September 11, 2001 attacks,”
and added that “special needs” may provide further justification for departing
from constitutional limits. Id. at 744–45.
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FBI, for instance, functions as both a law enforcement organi683
zation and an intelligence agency.
Over the past decade,
there have been increasing efforts to construct procedures within the FBI which, as an operational matter, run the gamut. In
September 2008, for example, Attorney General Mukasey is684
sued new rules for domestic FBI operations. The goal was to
standardize criminal, national security, and foreign intelligence
investigative activities—i.e., to ensure the same approval, noti685
fication, and reporting requirements. The new rules recognized four broad authorities granted to the FBI: (1) to collect
domestic and foreign intelligence and conduct investigations to
detect, obtain information about, and prevent and protect
against federal crimes and threats to the national security; (2)
683. It is the lead agency for the investigation of all crimes for which DOJ
has primary or concurrent jurisdiction and which involve terrorism within the
United States’ statutory jurisdiction. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS 5
(Sept. 2008) [hereinafter AGG-DOM], available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/
readingroom/guidelines.pdf. Terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use of force
and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government,
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2012). Similarly, the term “[f]ederal
crime of terrorism” is defined as an offense (1) “calculated to influence or affect
the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against
government conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A) (2006), and (2) is a violation
of federal statutes related to, among others, the “destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities,” id. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i); see id. § 32, “violence at international
airports,” id. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i); see id. § 37, or “arson within special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction” of the United States, id. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i); see id.
§ 81.
684. AGG-DOM, supra note 683. The document replaced previous guidelines, which had been introduced between 1976 and 2006. The AGG-DOM replaced: (1) The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (May 30, 2002); (2) The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (Oct. 31, 2003); (3) The Attorney General’s Supplemental Guidelines for Collection, Retention, and Dissemination of Foreign
Intelligence (Nov. 29, 2006); (4) The Attorney General Procedure for Reporting
and Use of Information Concerning Violations of Law and Authorization for
Participation in Otherwise Illegal Activity in FBI Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence or International Terrorism Intelligence Investigations (Aug. 8,
1988); and (5) The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Reporting on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest (Apr. 5, 1976). AGGDOM, supra note 683, at 14; see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE xi (Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter DIOG], available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/FBI_
guidelines/domestic_investigations_and_operations_guide_part1.pdf (revising
the FBI’s internal policies to implement the AGG-DOM).
685. DIOG, supra note 684, at 1; see also AGG-DOM, supra note 683, at 5–
11.
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to provide investigative assistance to other federal, state, local,
or tribal agencies, and certain foreign agencies; (3) to conduct
intelligence analysis and planning; and (4) to retain and share
686
information.
DHS and other agencies, like the FBI, consider their responsibilities to extend from criminal law to national securi687
ty. Such institutional emphases similarly reflect in dual-use
programs and systems. The FBI’s Next Generation Identification, for instance, incorporates databases that extend from pe688
dophiles to “known or suspected terrorists.”
New institutional relationships further contribute to the
breakdown of barriers between criminal law and national security. Interoperability, in turn, is beginning to alter traditional
institutional relationships, with federal—and federalist—
implications. Efforts to create common platforms, to ensure
consistent collection of information, and to allow agencies access to other agencies’ data erodes important protections—
which is, of course, the aim. Such initiatives may take the form
of common standards, memoranda of understanding, the creation of new (joint biometrics) agencies and institutions, or the
formation of new networks (such as the Joint Terrorism Task
689
Forces). Each of these allows agencies to gain access to information to which it would not otherwise be privy, either because of bureaucratic divisions at the federal level, or because
of local/state primacy in regard to criminal law. To the extent
that data procurement and analysis reaches into intelligence
gathering, the blending of these worlds carry Fourth Amendment implications, lowering the standards that might other690
wise be applied in criminal law.
686. DIOG, supra note 684, at 3 (also noting that each of these must be
conducted consistent with the DIOG, as well as the AGG-DOM).
687. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-715T, HOMELAND SECURITY: INFORMATION SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES, CHALLENGES, AND KEY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 1–2 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/
109951.pdf.
688. NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 201.
689. Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task
Forces, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investi
gate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
690. An additional consideration not addressed in the text is the point at
which analysis becomes a search. That is, the collection of information may be
understood as falling outside of the contours of that search, but the analysis of
this same information may then move the discussion into the search domain.
Similarly, the collection of urine may not itself be a search, but urinalysis may
then be deemed to fall within its contours. See generally Nat’l Treasury Emps.
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D. DEGREE OF INTRUSIVENESS
Why does it matter? Why should the Executive’s sudden
expansion into this realm, the lack of a statutory framing, and
the inadequacy of Fourth Amendment doctrine in the face of
remote biometric identification give us pause? The reason is because the technologies at issue in RBI present a unique challenge to liberty. The level of intrusiveness represents something different in kind—not degree—from what has come
before. It alters the type of surveillance that can occur. It allows for prolonged surveillance to an extent not previously contemplated. And it carries significantly fewer resource limitations than might otherwise accompany individual search or
identification, allowing for significantly greater occurrence of
both.
1. Type and Kind of Surveillance
Since the onset of the digital revolution, courts have recognized the considerable power derived from the use of electronic
technologies. In the 1973 case of United States v. King, for instance, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Title III’s procedures
“were designed to protect the general public from abuse of the
691
awesome power of electronic surveillance.”
In Torres, the
Seventh Circuit suggested that “[t]elevision surveillance is
identical in its indiscriminate character to wiretapping and
bugging. It is even more invasive of privacy, just as a strip
692
search is more invasive than a pat-down search.” The Tenth
Circuit agreed that “video surveillance can be vastly more in693
trusive” than audio surveillance.
As different technologies combine, the level of intrusiveness may significantly deepen. Thus, Judge Richard Posner
recognized in Torres, “[w]e think it is . . . unarguable that television surveillance is exceedingly intrusive, especially in combination . . . with audio surveillance, and inherently indiscrim-

Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (holding that the urinalysis test
required as part of the U.S. Customs’ Service drug-screening program constitutes a search and is therefore subject to Fourth Amendment analysis); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1988) (holding that statecompelled collection and testing of urine constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment).
691. United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 505 (9th Cir. 1973).
692. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984).
693. United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1990).
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inate, and that it could be grossly abused—to eliminate person694
al privacy as understood in modern Western nations.”
Adding biometric recognition technology presumably takes
us further down the path. No longer are we discussing merely
audio or video surveillance. Nor is the information gleaned limited to physical movement of vehicles through space. Instead,
we are considering personally identifiable information, the loss
of anonymity, social association, the attribution of actions to
individuals, and the possibility of serializing this information to
generate new knowledge in the process. The difference is not
merely one of degree—which is how, thus far, the Court has
been considering parallel technologies.
Consider here continual surveillance using GPS devices—a
realm at least comparable to video surveillance paired with facial recognition in the tracking thereby made possible. In
Knotts, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, suggested that
the augmentation of human sensory faculties by science and
technology does not create a new category in terms of Fourth
Amendment protections. “Nothing in the Fourth Amendment
prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
695
and technology afforded them in this case.” Following a car
through public space using a beeper, therefore, did not consti696
tute a search.
To the extent that beepers or GPS merely augment law enforcement’s senses, creating a more efficient system, the differ697
ence may indeed be, more narrowly, one of degree. Accordingly, Judge Posner argued in United States v. Garcia that the
only difference between the police following a car around and
694. Torres, 751 F.2d at 882.
695. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
696. Id. at 278, 285. The Court left open whether the act of installing a device in a vehicle converts the tracking into a search. Id. at 279 n.*. See also
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–14 (1984) (noting that monitoring a
beeper is “less intrusive than a full-scale search,” but that it allows the Government to obtain information it could not have otherwise learned without a
warrant); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–97 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that the courts of appeals have been divided on the question of whether
installing a beeper turned a tracking into a search).
697. See, e.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir. 1976),
partially overruled by Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), as recognized in United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1976) (Ross, J., concurring);
Dunivant v. State, 273 S.E.2d 621, 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (comparing binoculars to beepers).
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observing the car’s movements via cameras mounted on lampposts or satellite imaging was one of technology, with no mean698
ingful Fourth Amendment implications. For Judge Posner,
GPS devices, technologically on the side of surveillance cameras or satellite imagery, do not constitute a search under the
699
Fourth Amendment.
Not everyone agrees. On the other side stands the argument that, even in relation to GPS, the reason for using the
technology in the first place is because it allows law enforcement to do something that it otherwise could not accomplish.
Such technologies therefore represent something different in
700
kind, not merely degree, from physical surveillance. The First
Circuit explained:
Use of a beeper to monitor a vehicle involves something more . . .
than magnification of the observer’s senses as in the use of a helicopter, binoculars, radar, or the like. Whether or not the beeper is legally
implanted by use of stealth or attached by a technical trespass to the
vehicle, it transforms the vehicle, unknown to its owner, into a messenger in the service of those watching it. While a driver has no claim
to be free from observation while driving in public, he properly can
expect not to be carrying around an uninvited device that continuous701
ly signals his presence.

What amounted to efficiency, then, for Judge Posner, added up
to a significant increase in the intrusiveness of the surveillance
for the First Circuit.
Judge Posner did recognize that there were limits to his
position. One significant difference for him, between the police
officer following the car around and using video, satellite, or
GPS technologies, was the potential for “wholesale surveil702
lance.” He wrote:
It would be premature to rule that such a program of mass surveillance could not possibly raise a question under the Fourth Amendment—that it could not be a search because it would merely be an efficient alternative to hiring another 10 million police officers to tail
703
every vehicle on the nation’s roads.

Efficiency halted at the doorstep of mass surveillance. The Garcia case did not address the precise contours of where such a
698. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997–98.
699. Id. at 997.
700. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 866 n.13 (5th Cir. 1975), aff’d
en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (“If this be true . . . then there is no need
for the device in the first place. Its value lies in its ability to convey information not otherwise available to the government.”).
701. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977).
702. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997–98.
703. Id. at 998.
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line might be drawn. Nor did Judge Posner consider whether
and what type of restrictions might be constitutionally required.
Applied to RBI, one could convincingly argue that biometric technologies so change the parameters as to make the
704
use of this technology different in kind. As Christopher Milligan observes, most people do not expect that their actions in
public will be randomly observed, with a host of private data
705
simultaneously linked to them. This suggests an expectation
of anonymity and personal privacy, even when standing in a
crowd in the public sphere. Consistent with this view, courts
have recognized the right to various forms of anonymity, suggesting the existence of, at a minimum a “quasi-right” in ano706
nymity—protected in some cases, but not in others. To the
extent that RBI technology takes this away, it is different in
kind than the sort of targeted identification activity contemplated by fingerprint and palm biometrics.
The absence of individualized suspicion in particular
changes the context. Suspicionless searches have been accepted
by the courts in other areas. In National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, for instance, the Court allowed for federal
employees as a whole to be scanned for drug use, even when no
707
individual was directly suspected of using drugs. Similarly,
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz allowed
704. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks
Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1392–98 (2004); John J. Brogan,
Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 81–82 (2002); Max Guirguis, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 9 J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 143, 168–71 (2004); Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial
Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 295, 319–20 (1999); Carla Scherr, Note, You Better Watch Out, You Better
Not Frown, New Video Surveillance Techniques are Already in Town (and
Other Public Spaces), 3 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 499, 500 (2008);
Robert H. Thornburg, Note, Face Recognition Technology: The Potential Orwellian Implications and Constitutionality of Current Uses Under the Fourth
Amendment, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 321, 330–31 (2002).
705. Milligan, supra note 704, at 318–19.
706. Alexander T. Nguyen, Note, Here’s Looking at You, Kid: Has FaceRecognition Technology Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 2, para. 52 (2002) (citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
497 U.S. 502 (1990); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907
(5th Cir. 2001); Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
707. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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suspicionless searches for DUI-related checkpoints. But in
the realm of RBI, suspicionless searches would result in at
least four significant changes that shift the nature of what is
being considered.
First, massive amounts of contextual data would be captured. Carla Scherr explains:
Unlike the beat cop, automated video surveillance sees everything, forgets nothing, and never gets tired or distracted. It captures
digital images that can be viewed at any time, from any place, as
many times as desired, and can be modified and used well beyond the
original intent of either the image collector or the subject. The extreme zoom capabilities of today’s cameras allow them to be so distant
from the subject that the subject is likely to be unaware and unsuspecting that surveillance might be present, and the camera can capture a subject’s image at a level of intimacy that would be totally unacceptable if the image were observed in person. Not even the cover of
darkness provides protection; images can be captured in very low
lighting and can capture information, such as the subject’s tempera709
ture, that is not apparent to the naked eye.

Second, the incident would re-create the conditions of a consensual encounter—without carrying any of the consensuality otherwise involved. Third, the information thus obtained could be
linked with other data, generating new knowledge in the process. Fourth, such data could retroactively implicate individuals in a way significantly different from immediate drug testing
might reveal. There is something at least odd about having the
definition of a search depend upon information not available at
the time the search occurs.
2. Length of Surveillance
Along with a shift in the type and kind of surveillance under consideration, the expansion to RBI introduces the potential for prolonged surveillance. In Maynard, as aforementioned,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court examined the question
left open in Knotts: whether extended surveillance using a GPS
device to track an individual constituted a search within the
710
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court found that
“unlike one’s movements during a single journey, the whole of
708. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
709. Scherr, supra note 704, at 505–06 (citations omitted).
710. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563–64 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d
sub nom., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also United States
v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. PinedaMoreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474
F.3d 994, 996–98 (7th Cir. 2007) (expressly reserving the question of whether
wholesale or mass electronic surveillance requires a warrant).

534

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:407

one’s movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe
711
all of those movements is effectively nil.”
In considering
whether something was exposed to the public, the question for
the court is not what another person could physically or lawfully do, but rather what a reasonable person would expect others
712
to do.
This approach reflected the Court’s jurisprudence in similar contexts. In Florida v. Riley, for instance, Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, whose concurrence was integral to the judgment, noted:
Ciraolo’s expectation of privacy was unreasonable not because the
airplane was operating where it had a “right to be,” but because public air travel at 1,000 feet is a sufficiently routine part of modern life
that it is unreasonable for persons on the ground to expect that their
713
curtilage will not be observed from the air at that altitude.

In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this
714
approach. The Court did not focus on what the passengers
could have done but instead on what a reasonable passenger
715
would expect. Kyllo picked up on this line of reasoning as
well, where the question became whether the technology in
716
question was in general use.
In Maynard, the court explained:
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone
during a single journey as he goes to the market or returns home from
work. It is another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the
scent again the next day and the day after that, week in and week
out, dogging his prey until he has identified all the places, people,
amusements, and chores that make up that person’s hitherto private
717
routine.

Although the government did not argue that constructive exposure derived from the fact that the individual’s movements at
the time were in full public view, the court nevertheless addressed it: “When it comes to privacy . . . precedent suggests
that the whole may be more revealing than the parts. Applying
that precedent to the circumstances of this case, we hold the information the police discovered using the GPS device was not

711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.

Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
Id. at 559.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 453 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
Id. at 338–39.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
615 F.3d at 560.
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718

constructively exposed.” The court recognized that, similar to
the mosaic theory applied in the state’s secrets realm, bits of
information that may initially appear unimportant change in
719
quality when given a broader context.
Prolonged surveillance, for the court, thus revealed a different sort of information than that obtained by short-term
surveillance. Repeatedly going to the gym or attending a synagogue tells a different story than just visiting those places one
time. Such sequences reveal more information. Thus, a single
trip to an OBGYN is simply one data point. But followed a
week later by a visit to Babies“R”Us, a different picture may
720
emerge. The court noted that a reasonable person does not
721
expect that everything she does will be recorded. Instead,
722
there is a basic expectation of anonymity. The court thus concluded that the object of the prolonged surveillance in the case,
Jones, not only had an expectation of privacy, but that it was
723
reasonable.
The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en
724
banc. Chief Judge David Sentelle, joined by Judges Karen
Henderson, Janice Rogers Brown, and Brett Kavanaugh, dis725
sented. Judge Sentelle, offering a different-in-kind analysis,
pointed out that the GPS device merely enhanced human sens726
727
es. The case was therefore undistinguishable from Knotts.
The volume of information obtained, over time, mattered not at
all: “The fact that no particular individual sees . . . all [an individual does over the course of a month] does not make the

718. Id. at 560–61; see also id. at 562 (“The difference is not one of degree
but of kind, for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark
the distinction between a day in the life and a way of life, nor the departure
from a routine that, like the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes story, may reveal even more.”).
719. Id. at 562.
720. Id.
721. Id. at 563.
722. Id.
723. Id. at 566. (“This case does not require us to, and therefore we do not,
decide whether a hypothetical instance of prolonged visual surveillance would
be a search subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”).
724. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
725. Id.
726. Id. at 768.
727. He stated, “There is no material difference between tracking the
movements of the Knotts defendant with a beeper and tracking [respondent]
with a GPS.” Id. at 768.
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728

movements any less public.” He flatly rejected the argument
“that [the] whole reveals more . . . than does the sum of its
729
parts.” As the court concluded in Knotts, “[t]he reasonable
expectation of privacy as to a person’s movements on the highway is . . . zero. The sum of an infinite number of zero-value
730
parts is also zero.”
In United States v. Jones, even as she joined the majority
on grounds of trespass, Justice Sotomayor picked up on this
line of reasoning, suggesting that “[i]n cases involving even
short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular at731
tention.” She continued,
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. See,
[sic] e.g., People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y. 3d 433, 441–42, 909 N.E. 2d 1195,
1199 (2009) (“Disclosed in [GPS] data. . . will be trips the indisputably
private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to
the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the
by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or
church, the gay bar and on and on”). The Government can store such
records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future. And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
732
enforcement practices. . . .

Justice Sotomayor’s words suggested perhaps an even more aggressive posture than that adopted by Justice Alito in his con733
currence.
What animates these judicial decisions is a growing uneasiness about whether the information generated by certain
forms of surveillance is different in kind, or merely degree,
from what could otherwise be gleaned. The prolonged nature of
the surveillance, along with its perfect recall, here plays an important role. Even where these arguments have surfaced, the
technologies in question have been less intrusive than that
which marks the biometric realm. A GPS chip may reveal
728. Id.
729. Id. at 769.
730. Id.
731. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
732. Id. at 955–56 (citation omitted).
733. See id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the problems of longterm GPS surveillance).
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where the car goes, but the verification of personally identifiable information, which is at issue in remote biometric identification, is more invasive in its direct and personal link to a specific individual.
To the extent that the information gleaned is understood
as third party data, the Court’s jurisprudence presents further
difficulties. The Supreme Court has made it clear that information voluntarily provided to third parties does not fall sub734
ject to any reasonable expectation of privacy. The federal
government, however, is designing systems specifically to gather third party biometric data, such as pictures from social networking sites, CCTV footage, and images provided by friends
735
and relatives. This information can then be paired with biographic information—i.e., hard data about what an individual
does or says, where they live, what they buy, and with whom
they associate. In the aggregate, such information could provide a staggering amount of insight into a target’s life. As Justice Sotomayor notes in Jones, the third party data protections
otherwise afforded by the Court are “ill suited to the digital
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mun736
dane tasks.” To the extent that the facial images, video footage, or other biometric data is obtained from third parties, a
function for which the FBI’s Next Generation Identification
system is actually designed, and paired with biographic information, under the Court’s current jurisprudence, such information would not constitute a search or be subject to Fourth
Amendment protections.
3. Resource Limitations and Frequency of Occurrence
In United States v. Garcia, Judge Posner suggested that
certain forms of technological progress may pose a threat to
privacy by enabling surveillance to an extent that in earlier
737
times would have been prohibitively expensive. Assuming,
arguendo, that remote biometric identification is not a full
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment (i.e., that
it is something less than a full search), one question might be
734. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
735. See Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18.
736. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
737. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
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whether it falls within an area similar to that carved out under
738
Terry v. Ohio. Here, Judge Posner’s warning about lifting resource restrictions proves particularly prescient.
In Terry, the Court held that the police could stop and frisk
739
a passerby based on reasonable suspicion. The idea was that,
in justifying the search, the police officer must be able to point
to specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with
740
reasonable inferences from those facts, warrant the intrusion.
Those facts have to be judged against an objective standard:
whether the information available at that time would justify a
741
person in taking such action. Terry dealt with a physical pat
742
down on the outside of the clothes. In 2004, the Court addressed whether merely asking someone their name, in the
743
course of a Terry stop, raised a Fourth Amendment issue. In
a 5-4 decision, the Court held Nevada’s “stop and identify”
744
statute constitutional.
The reasonableness of a search entails balancing the individual’s interest in privacy against the government’s interest in
745
the specific intrusion. The Supreme Court recognized in Terry
that the Fourth Amendment requires that courts assume the
responsibility of guarding against police conduct that is over746
bearing or harassing.
Noted Fourth Amendment scholar
Wayne LaFave reads this as suggesting that “harassment-bysurveillance, at least when there is ‘harassment bordering on
arrest,’ therefore should be viewed as a violation of the Fourth
747
Amendment.”
Do biometric identification devices accomplish by technology what constant stops would do if executed by officers of the
law? It seems to me that the answer to this is yes. Just as frequent stops of pedestrians and the manual recording of that information would create a record of movement in public space,
738. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
739. Id. at 30.
740. Id. at 21.
741. Id.
742. Id. at 7.
743. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 184–85 (2004).
744. Id. at 178 (“The Court is now of the view that Terry principles permit
a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry
stop.”).
745. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976);
United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296, 300–01 (1st Cir. 1975).
746. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
747. LAFAVE, supra note 569, § 2.7 at 778–79 (footnotes omitted).
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so too might the use of biometric identification devices. In fact,
it could create not just frequent records of individuals’ movements, but constant records of the same. This appears to be
something different than what is contemplated by the Court’s
jurisprudence in relation to a Terry stop. It is a difference that
is enabled by the loosening of resource limitations.
It could be argued in response that just because RBI performs a similar function to a Terry stop does not mean that it
does so in a harassing manner. One could convincingly claim
that the level of harassment involved in RBI is actually negligible. In the course of a Terry stop, an individual is forced to
suspend one’s activities. Movement is limited, resulting in a
loss of physical and personal freedom. But simply having this
information recorded as one passes through space does not (on
the surface) appear to entail any physical limitation. Admittedly, this argument assumes that individuals under such surveillance do not alter their movements or behavior because of it.
But in such circumstances, the level of harassment may be so
small as to be non-existent. Further, even denying the underlying assumption and granting that individuals may change their
behavior, surely it would be a convoluted reading of the Court’s
jurisprudence, to connect this to the physical limitation of a
face-to-face encounter.
The problem with this line of argument is that it still assumes a framing based on degree, not kind—i.e., that the level
of harassment in RBI is less than the level of harassment in a
face-to-face encounter, while the level of monitoring is higher
than the level of monitoring in the same. It also rather misses
the point, which is the level of information obtained by a relaxation of the resource constraint.
IV. FURTHER POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES
Privacy concerns are not the only potential constitutional
challenge. Fifth Amendment protections against selfincrimination, First Amendment assurance of the right to
speech and assembly, and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
due process concerns similarly present themselves. Yet the associated jurisprudence in each of these areas proves inadequate
to address the phenomenon of remote biometric identification.
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A. FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Consider the Fifth Amendment, which provides that “[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit748
ness against himself.” This provision is rooted in protections
against being forced by the government to engage in certain
behavior—not (as with the Fourth Amendment), efforts to limit
what the government can do directly to an individual. Thus, at
the broadest level, the way remote biometric identification presents seems not to implicate the Fifth Amendment.
A practical example will suffice. A government-owned camera using remote biometric identification may be directed at
public space in a neighborhood. It seems odd to think of the individual entering that space as being compelled by the government to do so. Similarly, a closed circuit television in a grocery
store such as Safeway—owned by a private company—hardly
amounts to government compulsion to enter the store. In both
instances, the decision to enter the space under surveillance,
whence facial recognition or iris scans could be used to ascertain identity, appears to be voluntary. To the extent that either
of these decisions is not voluntary (e.g., the need to leave one’s
home and travel through the neighborhood to get to work, or
the need to enter the grocery store in order to buy milk for one’s
infant), it is not government action that compels it, but rather
sheer day-to-day living necessity. It is not just the entering of
one or two areas under surveillance, moreover, that an individual encounters in the course of daily life. British studies have
noted, for instance, that the average Londoner is caught on
749
camera, in public space, some 300 times per day.
The result of entering into public space, then, where remote biometric technologies can then identify and track one’s
movements, results in a sort of caveat civis—citizens beware. If
one is travelling in public, there is a sort of de facto notice that
the information could be captured, recorded, and shared. Most
of the time, it is not the government demanding that individuals enter public space. Necessity or personal desire—such as
wanting to see friends, pursue an education, or find new
clothes—may be the driving force. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that no cases have yet to consider FRT, much less FRT

748. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
749. See Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
2321, 2324 (2007).
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paired with video surveillance, in the context of the Fifth
Amendment.
But what about the mere provision of the information itself? Could a case be made that the point at which FRT and
video technologies narrowly, or RBI more broadly, become
communicative or testimonial, such information falls within
Fifth Amendment protections? That is, the government may
not be forcing you to enter public space, but it is forcing you,
once you are in public space, to reveal personal information—
such as who you are dating, whether you are pregnant, or
whether you were routinely go to topless bars. To the extent
that such information becomes testimonial, or communicative,
could it fall within the protections of the Fifth Amendment?
In 1966, the Supreme Court addressed questions raised by
750
biometric identification. Schmerber v. California dealt with
the collection of a blood sample taken involuntarily from a hospitalized patient who had been arrested for driving under the
751
influence. The Warren Court unanimously found that the
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination only
752
applies to evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.
Justice Brennan admitted that requiring the petitioner to submit to the withdrawal and chemical analysis of blood amounted
753
to government compulsion. But while the Fifth Amendment
might reach one’s testimony or communications, it stopped
short of protecting against compelling individuals “to submit to
fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or
speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume
754
a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.” Compelling biometric data that “makes a suspect or accused the source
of ‘real or physical evidence’” thus fell short of Fifth Amend755
ment protections. The Court noted that the distinction be750. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 759 (1966).
751. Id.
752. Id. at 761 (“We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from
being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of
blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.” (footnote omitted)).
753. Id.
754. Id. at 764 (footnote omitted).
755. Id. (emphasis added). This holding was consistent with the Court’s
earlier ruling in Holt v. United States, in which the question turned on whether requiring a defendant to put on a blouse—to prove that it was owned by the
defendant—amounted to compelled testimonial evidence. 218 U.S. 245, 252–53
(1910).
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tween physical information and testimonial or communicative
756
interactions may not always be so clear. The key was whether
the information provided substituted for evidence for use in
criminal proceedings, or whether it could give rise to infor757
mation that could later be used as evidence.
Successive cases adopted a similar approach. The year after Schmerber, in Gilbert v. California, the Court extended its
reasoning to include handwriting samples, holding that “[a]
mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what
is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside [the Fifth Amendment’s] protec758
tion.” That same year, the Court addressed identification procedures in the context of a lineup. Several weeks after he had
been indicted for bank robbery, the respondent in United States
v. Wade had been placed in a lineup and required to repeat
words similar to those allegedly spoken by the robber, at which
759
point two employees made a positive identification.
The
Court held that “[n]either the lineup itself nor anything shown
by this record that Wade was required to do in the lineup vio760
lated his privilege against self-incrimination.” The Court explained,
We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his
person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves
no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have.
It is no different from compelling Schmerber to provide a blood sample or Holt to wear the blouse, and, as in those instances, is not with761
in the cover of the privilege.

The use of his visage or his voice merely as an identifying physical characteristic did not speak to his guilt. In 1973, the Court
took a similar line in considering whether the compelled production of voice exemplars violated the Fifth Amendment privi762
lege against compulsory self-incrimination.
In 1988, the
Court further consolidated its jurisprudence in Doe v. United
States, a case in which the target of a federal grand jury investigation pled the Fifth Amendment to avoid turning over fur756.
757.
758.
759.
760.
761.
762.

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972).
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1973).

2012]

REMOTE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION

543

ther information about the existence or location of bank rec763
ords. In order for evidence to be testimonial, “an accused’s
communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person
764
Certain acts
compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself.”
(such as being compelled to furnish a blood sample, provide a
handwriting or voice exemplar, stand in a lineup, or wear particular clothing) may thus be incriminating, but still fall outside the privilege.
These cases all addressed the question of immediate identification: individuals asked, on a specific occasion, to provide information that served to identify themselves. To this extent,
they replicated the conditions laid out, above, in relation to
immediate biometric identification, or IBI: i.e., situations focused on (1) a single person; (2) in close proximity; (3) in relation to custodial detention; (4) in a manner involving notice;
and (5) as a one-time occurrence. In these circumstances, the
target individuals were being compelled to take steps to provide
the data being sought.
RBI, in contrast, identifies (1) multiple individuals; (2) at a
distance; (3) moving through public space; (4) absent notice and
consent; and (5) in a continuous and on-going manner. Such
targets provide evidentiary data simply by moving through
public space. The problem is that Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, to the extent that it contemplates the provision of evidence from biometric technologies, does so in the context of
IBI—not remote biometric identification.
B. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION
What about the second constitutional consideration—First
765
Amendment protections? It is at least theoretically possible
for RBI to be subject to challenge on First Amendment grounds,
particularly where harm to political or religious speech or association can be demonstrated, or a connection between the target of RBI and the compelling government interest can be severed. Yet, here as well, the doctrine proves inadequate as a
meaningful framework.
763. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 202 (1988).
764. Id. at 210 (footnote omitted).
765. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Under the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, the
government is prevented from regulating speech directly be766
cause of its message. It can, however, regulate actions for
reasons not having to do with any expressive message it might
767
entail. The key question is whether such law (a) is within the
constitutional power of the government, (b) whether it furthers
an important or substantial government interest, (c) whether
this interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression,
and (d) whether the incidental restriction on First Amendment
freedoms is “no greater than is essential to the furtherance” of
768
the targeted interest. The Court considers expressive public
conduct or speech-related public association as falling within
the protections of the First Amendment, thus requiring the
government to justify its actions on a meaningful law enforce769
ment ground.
In the context of the McCarthy era and rapidly expanding
oath and affirmation requirements, the Court found in a number of cases that constitutional violations could arise from the
770
chilling effect of governmental regulations.
The Court explained that in such circumstances, a heavy burden lies on the
government to demonstrate that the inquiry is necessary to
771
protect a legitimate state interest. Early cases in this area focused on instances in which the target had incurred a direct
772
penalty. They left open the problem of the more generalized
harm caused by the individual knowing that they were being
subject to surveillance—or the “concomitant fear that, armed
with the fruits of those activities, the agency might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental to that
773
individual.”
In 1972, the Court addressed this question in a challenge
to the Department of the Army’s surveillance of domestic civil774
ian activity. In a program strikingly close to the capacity rep766. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
767. See id.
768. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
769. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 257–58 (2002).
770. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1971); Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 592 (1967);
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of the U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965).
771. Baird, 401 U.S. at 6–7.
772. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
773. Id.
774. Id. at 2.
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resented by RBI, the Army had initiated a data-gathering sys775
tem in which it began monitoring public space. Information
was derived from the news media, publications, intelligence
agents in attendance at public meetings, and civilian law en776
forcement agencies. In light of growing civil rights agitation,
the military cited in support of the programs its statutory authority to make use of the armed forces to quell insurrection
777
and to respond to domestic violence. The Court ruled in favor
of the government: the burden lay on the target to establish the
778
immediate danger of direct injury. The risk, for the Court,
would be to limit broad scale investigations while arming civilians with judicial weapons to allow them to penetrate into clas779
sified government programs. It was not for the judiciary to
780
second guess the political branches.
Applied to RBI, a strong argument could be marshaled that
under Tatum, any claim as to a generalized chilling of speech
or association would be insufficient to overcome First Amendment obstacles: the government need only demonstrate a sufficient government interest to overcome any objection. Law enforcement, now so tightly interwoven with pressing national
security concerns, would appear to meet this test. Indeed, cases
following Tatum underscored that efforts to claim that the
threat of surveillance undermined political speech would hence781
forward be foreclosed. Whether fear constituted a cognizable
782
harm was irrelevant. Tatum here was “clear and categorical”:
allegations of a subjective chilling effect were simply inade783
quate.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the
chilling effect claimed with regard to speech extends to photo-

775. Id. at 6.
776. Id.
777. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2006) (“Whenever there is an insurrection in any
State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal
service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that
State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress
the insurrection.”).
778. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 15–16.
779. Id. at 14–15.
780. Id. at 15.
781. United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1377–79 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
782. Id.
783. Id. (citing Tatum, 408 U.S. at 13–14).
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graphs or video recording of individuals at demonstrations or
public meetings. Two lower court decisions, however, have.
In 1975, the Third Circuit considered police surveillance of
public meetings, in Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Religious
784
Society of Friends v. Tate. The Philadelphia Police Department, through its Political Disobedience Unit, had compiled
about 18,000 files on individuals and groups, as distinct from
785
the department’s interrogation and investigation records. The
files included information about the targets’ political views, as786
sociations, personal life, and habits. Some targets were una787
ware that such files had been compiled. In June 1970, the police went on television, discussed system, and publicly named
788
some of the targets. Four individuals and two organizations
thus named brought suit alleging (1) that the practices lacked a
nexus to legitimate police purposes and deprived plaintiffs of
their right to anonymity in the conduct of their political activity
and associations; (2) that the intelligence gathering chilled and
deterred plaintiffs in their free exercise of speech and assembly;
and (3) that the practices unconstitutionally interfered with the
plaintiffs’ ability to form lawful political associations focused on
789
unpopular views.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds
of Tatum: the mere fact of an investigation was insufficient to
790
find a chilling effect on speech. The Court of Appeals reversed
791
the lower court in part and affirmed in part. Chief Judge Collins Seitz, writing for the court, determined that the complaints
of police surveillance and the sharing of information between
law enforcement agencies fell short of demonstrating a violation of constitutional rights; however, the allegations regarding
sharing information with non-law enforcement parties and disclosing the parties’ names on national television provided suffi792
cient basis to state a cause of action. “[M]ere police photographing and data gathering at public meetings” was legally
unobjectionable, creating
784. Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d
1335, 1337–38 (3d Cir. 1975).
785. Id. at 1336.
786. Id. at 1336–37.
787. Id. at 1337.
788. Id.
789. Id.
790. Id.
791. Id. at 1339 (footnote omitted).
792. Id.
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at best a so-called subjective chill which the Supreme Court has said
is not a substitute for a claim of specific present harm or a threat of
specific future harm. Nor does the sharing of this information with
other agencies of government having a legitimate law enforcement
793
function give rise to a constitutional violation.

In contrast, dispensing the information to non-law enforcement agencies, as well as to the public, created an entirely
794
different purpose. “It cannot be doubted that disclosure on
nationwide television that certain named persons or organizations are subjects of police intelligence files has a potential for a
substantial adverse impact on such persons and organizations
even though tangible evidence of the impact may be difficult, if
795
not impossible, to obtain.”
It could be argued that the distinction drawn in Philadelphia Yearly, between information collection and information
sharing, rests on tenuous grounds. At a minimum, it seems odd
to have a rule governing the legality of a search in which actions that take place long after the initial search end up determining its legality. Philadelphia Yearly, moreover, could be
said to overread Tatum. Whereas the former case suggested
that the mere presence of cameras, alone, were insufficient to
establish a chilling effect, it could be contended that Tatum left
open the possibility that the target of such surveillance could
demonstrate (a) that the surveillance had occurred and (b) that
the individual, in turn, curbed their activities—thus establishing both an objective and subjective chilling of speech. Either
way, however, the compelling government interest in ensuring
national security would play a role.
The Fourth Circuit has also considered the chilling effect of
taking photographs of individuals at public meetings and
796
demonstrations in the context of the First Amendment. The
police in Richmond, Virginia at the time maintained a uniformed presence at such gatherings, took photos, and made
797
such records available to other law enforcement agencies. In
Donohoe v. Duling, the 2-1 panel found the case controlled by
798
Tatum. Judge Harrison Winter, however, dissented from the
majority, finding that the plaintiffs had both standing to sue
and had demonstrated a cause of action entitling them to re793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.

Id. at 1337–38.
Id. at 1338–39.
Id. at 1339.
Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 197–98 (4th Cir. 1972).
Id.
Id. at 201.

548

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
799

[97:407

lief. For him, Tatum was decided by a majority of the Court
“on the premise that none of the plaintiffs alleged or tendered
any proof to show any harm to himself or any violation of his
800
constitutional rights.”
In contrast, in the immediate case,
three witnesses had been photographed by law enforcement officers, “without their permission and inferably against their
will, while they were engaged in the peaceful exercise of their
first amendment right to assemble and . . . to petition their
801
government for a redress of their grievances.” Other protesters had refused to take part in the meetings once they had been
802
photographed.
Whereas Tatum considered the fear of the
consequences of surveillance, this case contemplated actual
803
harm and an actual violation of rights. The question thus became not whether a chilling effect had occurred, but the degree
804
of such chill in light of the surrounding circumstances. This
805
pushed the court to the O’Brien test.
Applying this case to RBI, it appears that the question of
the harm suffered could change depending upon the location
and targets of the surveillance in question. As a threshold matter, whether there is a First Amendment question at all rests to
some extent on whether an action has an expressive element—
certainly a context-specific inquiry. Much of the activity in
which individuals engage while in public may simply not fall
into this category. In Donohoe, the Fourth Circuit considered
more narrowly the collection of photographs at political and religious gatherings. If the FBI were to focus RBI on public space
outside of mosques or churches, where preachers might otherwise address crowds, perhaps a stronger case of deterrence, as
recognized by Judge Winter, could be made. But, again, to the
extent that the government demonstrates a compelling governmental interest, such objections could be overcome. There
would still need to be a substantial relationship between the
target of the surveillance and the overriding government interest—this suggests a specificity which, depending on the context, may be lacking with regard to RBI. However, the broad
range of threats now considered within the national security
799.
800.
801.
802.
803.
804.
805.

Id. at 202 (Winter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 204–05.
Id. at 205.
Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
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domain, and the innumerable sources of such threats, suggests
806
that such a category may be rather broadly devised.
Another point to draw out in this context is whether there
may be a less intrusive means to conduct such surveillance.
807
Minimization techniques here deserve notice. Surely it is not
necessary for the government to collect all information about
all individuals in public space in an effort to prevent crime.
This stance assumes that the realistic aim of the law is and
ought to be the elimination of all crime, for which complete and
perfect information may be necessary.
In Donohue, Judge Winter drew attention to this prong of
808
the O’Brien test. He noted that gathering information about
an entire crowd went beyond what was necessary for the object
809
at hand. The passage, in its application to RBI, is worth quoting at length:
If it is assumed that there is a legitimate reason for recording the
identity and likeness of those who lead others in the peaceful exercise
of their first amendment rights, there is no reason why police must
engage in wholesale photographing of a demonstration in order to obtain pictures of its leaders. In most instances the leaders are known,
if not by the fact that they have applied for a permit for the demonstration, then by the fact that they are at the front of the crowd or
giving a speech. Moreover, their identity is usually readily ascertainable from the local news media. I conclude that there is no justification for intimidating all the participants in a demonstration in order
810
to obtain pictures of its leaders.

Judge Winter rejected as preposterous the idea that the police would be using photographs to identify unknown people in
a crowd: “I cannot suppose that every time a picture is taken of

806. See Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1573, 1722 (2011).
807. Cf. Donohue, 465 F.2d at 206 (Winter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
the police objectives could have been achieved “with less interference to first
amendment rights”).
808. Id. at 205–06 (“In dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, the district court
justified the practice of the police on the grounds that it (1) allows the police to
identify demonstration leaders; (2) permits the police to identify unknown persons from outside the Richmond area who are participating in the demonstration and who have records of being dangerous; (3) deters violence and vandalism; and (4) serves to protect the demonstrators from counter-demonstrators. I
am not persuaded that these objectives are furthered by the present police
practice or, if they are, that the same results cannot be obtained with less interference to first amendment rights.”).
809. Id. at 206.
810. Id.
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an unknown person it is sent to the FBI in order to determine
811
whether that person is dangerous.”
Forty years later, this is precisely the aim of NGI and the
type of use for which RBI is envisioned by DoD, DHS, and oth812
ers. Judge Winter considered and rejected the possibility that
photography might be used in this way—efforts to do so “would
appear to be a useless tool in controlling the crowd on the day
813
of the demonstration.” Central to his claim was the time it
would take to develop the photographs and to disseminate
them—considerations that appear almost quaint in light of
modern technology. The current return time for photograph,
iris, and fingerprint identification is a matter of seconds, leaving more than enough time for the police to take steps in the
814
course of a meeting or gathering.
Judge Winter raised the question of whether any constitutional limits applied to the gathering of such data on targets
815
who themselves were not suspected of any wrongdoing. In
such cases, he surmised, law enforcement agencies could cer816
tainly take and exchange pictures. As for whether such photographs deterred violence and vandalism, Judge Winter pointed out that the presence of the police would perform an
equivalent function—and one significantly different than monitoring and recording all activities that take place at a demon817
stration.
For Judge Winter, then, “indiscriminate photographing . . . would have little value in deterring crime or
818
apprehending a criminal.” Other, less intrusive means could
be sought in order to avoid “injecting fear into persons who are
819
peacefully exercising their first amendment rights.”
Both Title III and the minimization requirement embedded
in FISA recognize the importance of ensuring the least intru811. Id.
812. See generally BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE., supra note 25 (discussing how
DoD’s data system retrieves information on people in the system).
813. Donohue, 465 F.2d at 206 (Winter, J., dissenting).
814. See generally Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., New Biometric
Technology Improves Security and Facilitates U.S. Entry Process for International Travelers 1 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
usvisit/usvisit_edu_10-fingerprint_consumer_friendly_content_1400_words.pdf
(stating that fingerprint technology allows DHS officials to identify criminals
and immigration violators in the time that it takes them to stand in line).
815. Donohue, 465 F.2d at 206 (Winter, J., dissenting).
816. See id.
817. Id.
818. Id.
819. Id.
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820

sive means possible. What would minimization procedures
look like, however, with regard to RBI? Consider FRT and surveillance cameras. Absent a specific target, the generalized use
of the technology and collection of data does seem to place a rather heavy burden on the public at large, with a broad impact
on numerous individuals who are not at the time to have been
suspected of any wrongdoing. One could argue that the use of
mounted cameras on poles is in fact not intrusive—they sit, silent, and do not physically interrupt or interfere with efforts to
convey a message. But this argument, as well as its counter,
quickly descends into a subjective argument.
C. FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
PROTECTIONS
The third potential constitutional grounding (outside of the
Fourth Amendment) for considering RBI lies in the realm of
821
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns. The
central issue here with regard to RBI is the accuracy of the information obtained and the manner in which it is maintained.
Perhaps the most authoritative public source on the accuracy of
FRT is a report co-authored by Professors Lucas Introna and
Helen Nissenbaum and published by New York University’s
822
Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response. The researchers found that while FRT may prove effective “with relatively small populations in controlled environments, for the verification of identity claims,” the effort to use it in more complex
settings, where individuals “do not voluntarily self-identify”—
i.e., the “face in the crowd” scenario, means that it “[i]s unlikely
823
to become an operational reality for the foreseeable future.”
The researchers’ findings suggest that the technology supporting IBI is more sophisticated—and more accurate—than that
undergirding RBI.
This does not mean that the former is without challenges:
where an individual’s face is pre-submitted to the system, the
quality of the image (as well as the quality of the subsequent
820. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURT 11(b) (on file with author).
821. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
822. LUCAS D. INTRONA AND HELEN NISSENBAUM, N.Y.U. CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: A
SURVEY OF POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES (2010), available at http://
eprints.lancs.ac.uk/49012/1/Document.pdf.
823. Id. at 3.
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image submitted for matching) appear to have a significant im824
pact on overall performance. Various other factors could undermine accuracy, such as the environmental conditions in
which the image was taken, the time that had elapsed between
the images submitted for comparison, the similarity of the
cameras used to capture the images, and the size of the gal825
lery. But it does suggest that accuracy could be a problem for
the way that DOJ/FBI, DHS, and DoD envision their use of re826
mote identification technologies. The authors explain:
In the scenario that we have called “the grand prize,” an FRS [facial recognition system] would pick out targeted individuals in a
crowd. Such are the hopes for FRS serving purposes of law enforcement, national security, and counterterrorism. Potentially connected
to video surveillance systems (CCTV) already monitoring outdoor
public spaces like town centers, the systems would alert authorities to
the presence of known or suspected terrorists or criminals whose images are already enrolled in a system’s gallery, or could also be used
for tracking down lost children or other missing persons. This is
among the most ambitious application scenarios given the current
state of technology. Poor quality probe images due to unpredictable
light and shadows in outdoor scenes, unpredictable facial orientation,
and “noise” from cluttered backgrounds make it difficult for an FRS in
the first place to even pick out faces in the images. Challenges posed
by the lack of control inherent in most scenarios of this kind are exacerbated by the likelihood of uncooperative subjects. Additionally
CCTV cameras are generally mounted high (for protection of the camera itself), looking down into the viewing space, thus imposing a pose
angle from above which has been shown to have a strong negative
impact on recognition and operate at a distance for which obtaining
827
adequate (90 pixel) interoccular resolution is difficult.

Difficult, though, does not mean impossible. The authors point
out, for instance, that the problems associated with scanning
crowds could be overcome by forcing traffic through portals,
828
where more of the “complicating factors” could be controlled.
As a constitutional matter, then, it is possible that the reliability of the technologies involved in RBI could give rise to due
process concerns. Numerous drug-testing cases in the 1980s,
for instance, overturned employee dismissals on the grounds
that the urinalysis on which the dismissals were based only
829
provided ninety-five to ninety-nine percent accuracy.
The
824. Id.
825. Id.
826. The report itself was made possible through a grant from the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at 2.
827. Id. at 20.
828. Id.
829. Kenneth P. Nuger, Biometric Applications: Legal and Societal Consid-
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numbers for many of the technologies involved in RBI are significantly lower, ranging, in some cases, from thirty to sixty
830
percent In the drug testing cases, a cognizable harm directly
followed from the use of (potentially inaccurate) tests. To the
extent that RBI becomes the basis for criminal conviction, a
similar argument could be made. But one need not even go this
far. Where biometric devices, for instance, are used for authentication purposes, the denial of permission for a commercial
driver to cross state lines may itself result in a due process vio831
lation claim.
It is important here to recognize that such claims may only
be relevant for a limited time and, as such, should not be relied
on as a basis for framing the problem. Not only do estimates
vary widely, depending on the technology involved, the system
under consideration, and who is doing the testing, but the
832
technology is rapidly improving.
Professors Alessandro
Acquisti, Ralph Gross, and Fred Stutzman, for instance, of
Carnegie Mellon University, recently conducted a study on the
use of off-the-shelf FRT software for matching Facebook pro833
files to students walking across a U.S. college campus. The
researchers found that based solely on information provided on
the social network site, they could positively identify thirty percent of the students passing through public space. Further experiment led to associating sensitive information (such as the
students’ personal interests, Social Security numbers, and other information) simply by combining face recognition, data min834
ing algorithms, and statistical re-identification techniques.
erations, http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics/publications_consideration.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
830. See generally ANIL K. JAIN & AJAY KUMAR, BIOMETRICS OF NEXT
GENERATION: AN OVERVIEW 12 (2010), available at http://biometrics.cse
.msu.edu/Publications/GeneralBiometrics/JainKumarNextGenBiometrics_
BookChap10.pdf (showing that in some conditions recognition accuracy falls to
forty-seven percent).
831. Id.
832. INTRONA & NISSENBAUM, supra note 822, at 26.
833. See ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI, RALPH GROSS, & FRED STUTZMAN, PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF AUGMENTED REALITY 9 (2012), available at http://www
.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/face-recognition-study-FAQ/acquisti-faces-BLACK
HAT-draft.pdf; see also What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy
and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before the S. Comm on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the Law (2012) (statement of Professor Alessandro Acquisti, Heinz College and CyLab, Carnegie Mellon University),
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-7-18AcquistiTestimony
.pdf.
834. ACQUISTI, GROSS & STUTZMAN, supra note 833, at 1.
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The researchers noted that as of 1997, the best FRT program at
DoD scored an error rate of some 0.54; but by 2006, the false reject rate had plummeted by two orders of magnitude. At the
same time, the amount of information publicly available that
could be used to correlate identification efforts had skyrocket835
ed.
The authors of the New York University study reached a
similar conclusion about the evolutionary rate of technology.
They explained: “There is no doubt that FRT is developing very
rapidly. Face Recognition Vendor Test (FVRT) 2006 indicated
that FRT could, under certain conditions, outperform hu836
mans.” The report went on to contemplate the use of FRT in
837
the “grand prize.” In the interim, a ready solution stood at
hand: systems making use of multi-modal biometric sys838
tems —a solution which, it turns out, is precisely the route being followed by government agencies.
The FBI explained in a press release:
The NGI System will expand on the FBI Criminal Justice Information
Services (CJIS) Division’s current Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS), which is primarily a fingerprint-based
identification system operated and maintained in Clarksburg, West
Virginia. The NGI System will provide improvements to current services and new functionality for the criminal justice, national security,
839
and civil communities . . . .

In sum, even as the technology is rapidly gaining ground, multi-modal biometric systems further enhance the accuracy of
RBI technologies. This significantly undermines the potential
for due process challenges under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
One further consideration with regard to due process and
accuracy stems from the role of state and local government in
obtaining biometric information. To the extent that state and
local governments increasingly occupy the RBI realm and, indeed, act as the handmaidens of federal agencies, Fourteenth
Amendment concerns become increasingly relevant. Statutory
authorization for the collection of personally identifiable infor835. Id.
836. INTRONA & NISSENBAUM, supra note 822, at 42.
837. Id. at 43.
838. Id. at 47.
839. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Announces Contract
Award for Next Generation Identification System (Feb. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-announces-contract-award
-for-next-generation-identification-system.
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mation (discussed in Part II), creates a federal right for government agencies to accumulate significant amounts of data.
With such statutory authorities, however, also comes the concomitant duty to protect against mistakes, tampering, or unwarranted disclosure. The Privacy Act thus requires agencies
to allow for targets to challenge PII held about them. The statute, however, also creates a massive loophole in this requirement, allowing information collected for either law enforcement
or national security purposes (and, assumedly, both), to be exempted from individual challenge.
One is thus driven back upon a potential constitutional duty that requires government agencies to maintain information
in an accurate manner, with access to such information only
provided to the appropriate authorities. A similar question has
come before the courts. In 1977, the Supreme Court considered
a challenge to the constitutionality of New York statutes requiring the state to be given a copy of each drug prescription
and creating security measures for the storage of such information by the state. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a
unanimous court, held the statutes to be a reasonable exercise
840
of New York’s broad police powers. He noted that there were
no grounds to assume that the security provisions incorporated
into the statute would be inadequate or improperly adminis841
tered. Such a provision clearly showed an interest in the protection of individual privacy.
We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might
be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private
data—whether intentional or unintentional—or by a system that did
not contain comparable security provisions. We simply hold that this
record does not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected
842
by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The responsible treatment of the data included in the biometric
repositories, particularly when entered by state and local governments, thus gives rise to a potential Fourteenth Amendment challenge—one which has not been foreclosed by the
Court. Failure to adequately protect such databases against
improper use may thus run afoul of constitutional con843
straints. The problem of pursuing this line of jurisprudence
840. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977).
841. Id. at 601–02.
842. Id. at 605–06.
843. See Steven Goldberg, Enhancing the Senses: How Technological Advances Shape Our View of the Law, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2006) (arguing that “a governmental biometric database with inadequate safeguards
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with regard to RBI stems, again, from the overlapping law enforcement and national security concerns. Citizens’ efforts to
obtain information about database processes runs into the immediate wall of government privilege. Exceptions in FOIA for
national security matters, paired with state secrets doctrine,
844
may make such information nearly impossible to obtain.
V. REMOTE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION COMES OF
AGE
The past decade has witnessed a sudden explosion in remote biometric identification. Congress, however, even as it has
required the Executive to develop and use these technologies,
has not placed meaningful limits on the use of such powers.
Gaps in the 1974 Privacy Act and its progeny, as well as the
1990 Computer Act, in conjunction with explicit exemptions in
the Privacy Act and the 2002 E-Government Act, remove most
biometric systems from the statutes’ remit. As a matter of criminal law, Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act and Title I of the 1986 Electronic Communications
Privacy Act say nothing about RBI. In the national security
statutory realm, it is unclear whether remote biometric technologies are currently included within the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’s definition of electronic surveillance.
The statute’s dependence, moreover, on the distinction between
U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons presents a direct challenge
to the way in which RBI operates. At the same time, principles
enshrined in the statute appear inapplicable to the RBI context. Recourse to constitutional challenge provides little by way
of respite: Fourth Amendment jurisprudence fails to address
the implications of RBI. Fifth Amendment rights against selfincrimination, First Amendment protections on the right to free
speech and free assembly, and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns similarly fall short.
Why is it that the legislature and the courts have been so
slow to recognize the challenges posed by these new technologies—and how ought we to think about the questions raised by
remote biometric identification?
Part of the problem may be an over-reliance on liberal political thought. Indeed, the entire surveillance debate is domicould be challenged by an individual in that database on the theory that the
government had violated his rights”).
844. H.R. 5164, 98th Cong. (1984) (enacted) (exempting the Privacy Act
from FOIA restrictions).
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nated by an emphasis on personally identifiable information.
On one side of the equation, proponents look to grant agencies
the power to collect information on individuals; on the other,
opponents attempt to create protections against abuse of the
same. As Professor Julie Cohen recognizes, regardless of which
position one adopts, the underlying framework rests on liberal
theory: individual rights act as entitlements held by autonomous individuals within society, who themselves have the ca845
pacity for rational thought. The liberal political tradition thus
understands privacy within a broader scheme of legal rights
846
and obligations. Cohen argues that within this rights-based
world privacy has become a kind of second class citizen, which
in turn has generated debate about whether it is a fundamental
847
right, or whether it is merely socially constructed.
Perhaps one solution, then, would be to begin to think
about privacy in a constitutive sense, i.e., as a building block of
848
self and social interaction. The central question thus shifts
from “What pre-existing political rights are held by individuals?” to “What role does privacy play in human development?”
It gives rise to further inquiry, such as “How does privacy influence the social structure of society?” and “How does it affect
the relationship between individuals and the state?” These
types of questions include, but go beyond what Cohen refers to
849
as “human flourishing.” It is a conversation driven by individual experience and social and political construction.

845. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE,
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–17 (2012) (discussing also the principal attributes of the legal subject in liberal political thought).
846. See id. (discussing the abstract rights possessed by autonomous individuals).
847. Id. at 19.
848. Professor Helen Nissenbaum, for instance, who argues (as a descriptive matter) for co-existent, alternative theories of privacy, embraces both liberal, rights-based theory and approaches that emphasize the social context
within which information exchange occurs. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 67–104
(2010). In her view, social norms and values may play a central role in our
conception of privacy, with consequences for the broader construction of society. Id. Professor Daniel Solove, in turn, argues that technology has driven the
concept of privacy beyond recognition. He offers an alternative theory in which
overlapping concepts of privacy accompany culturally-dependent social norms.
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 9 (2008). The value, therefore, of
privacy depends not on individual rights but on the importance of the concept
to society. Id. at 10. See COHEN, supra note 845, at 20.
849. COHEN, supra note 845, at 14–16.
AND THE
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One of Cohen’s most important insights, and one shared by
other constructive theorists, is that privacy plays a more central role in human experience than liberal political theory
acknowledges. Boundary management, which gives breathing
space for subjectivity—and critical subjectivity in particular—
depends upon privacy not as an individual right, but as a social
good. Cohen notes, “A society that wishes to foster critical subjectivity must cabin the informational and spatial logics of sur850
Other norms, such as mobility, access to
veillance.”
knowledge, and discontinuity, may prove equally important in
development of the self and society. There is a broader danger
in reducing the self to binary code.
At a minimum, much more work on this front, specifically
in regard to how we think about privacy as a constitutive principle in regard to information recording, access and management—and particularly as it relates to new identification technologies—needs to occur. This approach rests not on simply
adapting the existing frameworks, but on re-conceiving the
place of privacy for self and society.
What makes this inquiry so pressing is that the federal
government, to date, has been so eager to take advantage of the
new technologies that constitute RBI. At one level, this makes
a great deal of sense. To the extent that technology makes officials more efficient, utilizes resources more effectively, and
helps to accomplish the aims of government agencies, strong
support would naturally follow. This is a rationale adopted by
all three branches of government, as illustrated by, e.g., legislative directives to the executive branch to move swiftly to explore biometric technologies (Part I, above), initiatives taken by
the Executive branch post-9/11 to develop new systems (Part I,
above), and judicial decisions that rest upon the assumption
that the new technologies merely do what a single police officer
could do by tailing and individual—but more efficiently (Part
III, above).
The problem with this approach is that the underlying assumption is wrong. This technology is not simply more efficient.
It is different in kind—not degree—to what has come before.
These are not just incremental changes to the status quo,
which ought to be treated in a manner consistent with traditional framings. Cameras in public space capture significantly
more than the naked eye outside the curtilage of the home
850. Id. at 31.
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might learn. They record, with perfect recall, entire contexts,
which may, in conjunction with other biometric and biographic
data, reveal new insights into citizens’ lives and social networks. The kind of surveillance in question, the length of the
surveillance, and the radical reduction in resource limitations
all differ.
It is time for Congress—and the courts—to recognize this
new form of surveillance. Towards these ends, I have proposed
five guidelines to distinguish RBI technologies from those more
common in immediate biometric identification. Specifically,
RBI allows the government to ascertain the identity (1) of multiple people; (2) at a distance; (3) in public space; (4) absent notice and consent; and (5) in a continuous and on-going man851
ner.
The stakes could not be higher for subjecting
technologies that fall into this category to more rigorous scrutiny. For what we now face are questions about human development, social construction, and the role of government in the
lives of citizens—questions that go well beyond individual
rights.

851. There are a range of tools that could be contemplated, as a practical
matter, to address the challenges of RBI (e.g., notice, the opportunity to correct misinformation, judicial review, public reporting and accountability, feedback about the effectiveness of analysis, training, security clearances for those
with access to information, limitations on data entered into different systems,
the length of time it is kept, and the conditions under which analysis may be
performed, remedies, and intermediary liability). But exactly how to craft such
instruments and what approach to take heavily depends upon the theoretical
underpinnings of how to think about privacy and the manner in which new
technologies are evaluated and implemented.

